24 research outputs found

    American sanctions and European sovereignty. Egmont European Policy Brief No.54

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    The decision by the United States to withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on Iran broke an international understanding, sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution. However, European and other non-US companies dealing with Iran must abide by US law in order to avoid its extraterritorial effects on their US operations. Efforts are being made to help the EU keep its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when there is disagreement with the US, but until now these have not accomplished much. Therefore a new Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched at the end of January to ensure the continuation of some trade with Iran. But the only convincing way to allow the EU to increase its autonomy is to boost the role of the Euro in international transactions. Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, we need more than ever to address the issue of the extraterritorial application of American sanctions – today it is Iran, what if tomorrow it is China

    Who is leading the European Union? European Policy Brief No. 33, March 2014

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    The European Union will only be reconciled with its citizens when they will be able to identify leaders at the level of the institutions

    Secondary sanctions and multilateralism – the way ahead. Egmont European Policy Brief No. 70 May 2021.

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    The sensitive issue of American ‘secondary sanctions’ imposed on its allies generated serious tensions in the transatlantic relationship when the US left the JCPOA with Iran. Some hoped these would ease with the Biden administration, but the current row about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline demonstrates that the extraterritoriality of sanctions is a well-entrenched US bipartisan policy. The EU has made numerous efforts to react by developing countermeasures, but these have not convinced European companies to challenge the sanctions. The perspective of enhancing the role of the Euro to reduce the dominance of the Dollar in world transactions is also still considered a long shot. New countermeasures have been suggested, notably by the Jacques Delors Institute and the European Commission has announced ‘additional policy options’ to that effect. But the issue should also be addressed in the context of a revival of multilateralism, which the Biden administration seems to favour. The renewed transatlantic dialogue and the G7 framework could be used to address this sensitive issue, in a context in which China’s power aims at challenging the US unipolarity – and the EU aims at developing its ‘strategic autonomy’

    Who is leading the European Union?. European Policy Briefs No. 33, March 2014

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    The European Union will only be reconciled with its citizens when they will be able to identify leaders at the level of the institutions

    Is there an escape from ‘Ever Closer Union’? European Policy Brief No. 49 February 2018

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    The EU Treaty objective of establishing ‘an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe’ means that European integration is a step by step process requiring the use of supranational institutions. It has never been popular with nationalists and was strongly rejected by David Cameron in his quest for a EU reform deal in 2015-16. However, the Brexit negotiations demonstrate that renouncing it will only create harm, whichever ‘leave’ scenario is retained. Ever closer union is also required in the field of Economic and Monetary Union to help the Euro resist new potential threats. In effect, Europe has no choice but to integrate further if it wants to keep its place in an ever more competitive global world

    Un ministre pour une politique étrangÚre européenne

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    European Commission; institutions; international relations; Constitution for Europe; treaty reform

    Chapitre 1. Bilan « institutionnel » des cinq premiÚres années de Lisbonne

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    Les nouveaux leaders introduits en 2009 suite Ă  la ratification du TraitĂ© de Lisbonne Ă©taient attendus depuis longtemps et se sont rĂ©vĂ©lĂ©s immĂ©diatement indispensables, ne fĂ»t-ce que par la continuitĂ© qu’ils assurent dans la conduite du Conseil europĂ©en et dans la gestion de la PESC. De ce fait, personne ne regrette l’effacement de la prĂ©sidence tournante, qui demeure toutefois un acteur essentiel en matiĂšre lĂ©gislative. Le prĂ©sident du Conseil europĂ©en, tout en respectant scrupuleusement les..

    Chapitre 4. Politique étrangÚre et représentation externe

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    La fonction confiĂ©e Ă  Cathy Ashton est d’une nature nouvelle dans le systĂšme de l’Union puisqu’elle donne Ă  un leader « europĂ©en » le droit de prendre des initiatives en matiĂšre de politique Ă©trangĂšre, de prĂ©sider une formation du Conseil, de coordonner l’action extĂ©rieure de la Commission et de gĂ©rer le dialogue avec les tiers. À son arrivĂ©e, Cathy Ashton n’était Ă©videmment pas en mesure d’exercer pleinement des responsabilitĂ©s aussi lourdes. Ses dĂ©buts furent particuliĂšrement difficiles. El..

    Chapitre 3. Pourquoi des leaders « institutionnels » ?

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    L’histoire de la construction europĂ©enne dĂ©montre que le leadership appartient solidement aux États-Membres et n’a Ă©tĂ© dĂ©volu Ă  des reprĂ©sentants des institutions que progressivement et dans la mesure oĂč le besoin se faisait sentir. Le renforcement du leadership du prĂ©sident de la Commission, du prĂ©sident du Conseil europĂ©en et du haut reprĂ©sentant doit donc reposer sur la dĂ©monstration qu’il permet une plus grande efficacité - et non pas qu’il permet de faire un « bond institutionnel ». Si l..
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