The overhang hangover

The authors revisit the debt overhang question. They first use nonparametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer Curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent) growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, the authors depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, they ask whether, as the overhang level of debt is reached: (1) investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default; (2) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor; and (3) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to preempt default and exact punitive interest rates. The authors find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing or the burden of debt.

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). This paper starts by illustrating these opposing effects by, first, analyzing the dynamics of output growth and financial intermediation around systemic banking crises and, second, showing that the growth enhancing effects of financial depth are weaker in countries that experienced such crises. After these illustrative exercises, the paper attempts an empirical explanation of the apparently opposing effects of financial intermediation. This explanation is based on a distinction between transitory and trend effects of domestic credit aggregates on economic growth. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of long- and short-run effects, following Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)’s Pooled Mean Group Estimator. The main result of the paper is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship.

Banks, Liquidity Crises and Economic Growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. Middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. The model also replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies. Finally, using GMM dynamic panel data techniques for a sample of 83 countries we show that growth implications of the model are consistent with the empirical facts.OLG growth models, liquidity, financial intermediation, financial fragility, banking crises

Financial development, financial fragility, and growth

The authors study the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (for example, Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (for example, Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The authors account for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, they estimate an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). Their conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth coexists with a mostly negative short-run relationship. The authors further develop an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies,Econometrics,Achieving Shared Growth,Financial Economics,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Macroeconomic Management

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper attempts to reconcile the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). This paper starts by illustrating these opposing effects by, first, analyzing the dynamics of output growth and financial intermediation around systemic banking crises and, second, showing that the growth enhancing effects of financial depth are weaker in countries that experienced such crises. After these illustrative exercises, the paper attempts an empirical explanation of the apparently opposing effects of financial intermediation. This explanation is based on a distinction between transitory and trend effects of domestic credit aggregates on economic growth. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of long- and short-run effects, following Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999)’s Pooled Mean Group Estimator. The main result of the paper is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship.

Wealth, Financial Intermediation and Growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development to economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with the level of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income.Growth models, Liquidity, Financial intermediation, Financial fragility, Banking crises

Banks, Liquidity Crises and Economic Growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb-Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth-ancing role in reducing ineffcient liquidation of long-term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle-income economies may find it optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system.Growth models, Liquidity, Financial intermediation, Financial fragility, Banking crises

Crises and Growth: A Re-Evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generate borrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, where the nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

Systemic Crises and Growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitate risk-taking increase leverage and investment. This leads to higher growth, but also to a greater incidence of crises. Conditions are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher growth.financial constraints, growth and institutions, bailout guarantees, volatility, emerging markets

Systemic Crises and Growth

In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and growth we present a model where contract enforce-ability problems generate borrowing constraints and impede growth. In the set of financially liberalized countries with a moderate degree of contract enforceability, systemic risk-taking relaxes borrowing constraints and increases investment. This leads to higher mean growth, but also to greater incidence of crises. We find that the negative link between skewness and growth is indeed strongest in this set of countries, validating the restrictions imposed by the model's equilibrium.