1,271 research outputs found
Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles
Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These
discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one
another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large
unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of
potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that
members of organized groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of playing roles in an organizational
structure and having a common goal. The minimal form of cooperation I argue for is not grounded in
collective intentions involving symmetric mental states, special collective intentional modes, or joint
commitments. More generally, I show how considering minimal cooperation in the context of organized
groups provides an opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which the social world and social phenomena
depend on internalist mental factors (e.g., intentions, beliefs) and externalist non-mental factors (e.g.,
documents, laws, job descriptions). The view of minimal cooperation among members of organized groups I
offer provides support for an externalist rather than internalist theory of at least one social phenomenon
Does Identity Politics Reinforce Oppression?
Identity politics has been critiqued in various ways. One central problemâthe
Reinforcement Problemâclaims that identity politics reinforces groups rooted in
oppression thereby undermining its own liberatory aims. Here I consider two versions of the
problemâone psychological and one metaphysical. I defang the first by drawing on work in
social psychology. I then argue that careful consideration of the metaphysics of social
groups and of the practice of identity politics provides resources to dissolve the second
version. Identity politics involves the creation or transformation of groups in ways that do
not succumb to the metaphysical Reinforcement Problem
Social Ontology
Traditionally, social entities (i.e., social properties, facts, kinds, groups, institutions,
and structures) have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. In this chapter, we
consider whether the exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically
warranted or if it instead rests on historical accident or bias. We examine three ways one might
attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the domain of metaphysical inquiry and
argue that each fails. Thus, we conclude that social entities are not justifiably excluded from
metaphysical inquiry. Finally, we ask how focusing on social entities could change the character
of metaphysical inquiry. We suggest that starting from examples of social entities might lead
metaphysicians to rethink the assumption that describing reality in terms of intrinsic,
independent, and individualistic features is preferable to describing it in terms of relational,
dependent, and non-individualistic features
Social Identity, Indexicality, and the Appropriation of Slurs
Slurs are expressions that can be used to demean and dehumanize targets based on their membership in racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or sexual orientation groups. Almost all treatments of slurs posit that they
have derogatory content of some sort. Such viewsâwhich I call contentbasedâmust explain why in cases of appropriation slurs fail to express their standard derogatory contents. A popular strategy is to take appropriated slurs to be ambiguous; they have both a derogatory content and a positive appropriated content. However, if appropriated slurs are ambiguous, why can only members in the target group use them to express a non-offensive/positive meaning? Here, I develop and motivate an answer that could be adopted by any content-based theorist. I argue that appropriated contents of slurs include a plural fi rst-person pronoun. I show how the semantics of pronouns like âweâ can be put to use to explain why only some can use a slur to express its appropriated content. Moreover, I argue that the picture I develop is motivated by the process of appropriation and helps to explain how it achieves its aims of promoting group solidarity and positive group identity
Essentializing Language and the Prospects for Ameliorative Projects
Some language encourages essentialist thinking. While philosophers have largely
focused on generics and essentialism, I argue that nouns as a category are poised to refer to
kinds and to promote representational essentializing. Our psychological propensity to
essentialize when nouns are used reveals a limitation for anti-essentialist ameliorative
projects. Even ameliorated nouns can continue to underpin essentialist thinking. I conclude
by arguing that representational essentialism does not doom anti-essentialist ameliorative
projects. Rather it reveals that would-be ameliorators ought to attend to the propensities for
our representational devices to essentialize and to the complex relationship between
essentialism and prejudice
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