Quantifying Detection Probabilities for Proliferation Activities in Undeclared Facilities

International Safeguards is currently in an evolutionary process to increase effiec-tiveness and efficiency of the verification system. This is an obvious consequence ofthe inability to detect the Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme in the early90's. By the adoption of the Programme 93+2, this has led to the development ofIntegrated Safeguards and the State-level concept. Moreover, the IAEA's focus wasextended onto proliferation activities outside the State's declared facilities. The effec-tiveness of safeguards activities within declared facilities can and have been quantifiedwith respect to costs and detection probabilities. In contrast, when verifying the ab-sence of undeclared facilities this quantification has been avoided in the past becauseit has been considered to be impossible. However, when balancing the allocation ofbudget between the declared and the undeclared field, explicit reasoning is neededwhy safeguards effort is distributed in a given way. Such reasoning can be given by aholistic, information and risk-driven approach to Acquisition Path Analysis comprisingdeclared and undeclared facilities [1]. Regarding the input, this approach relies on thequantification of several factors, i.e. costs of attractiveness values for specific prolif-eration activities, potential safeguards measures and detection probabilities for thesemeasures also for the undeclared field. In order to overcome the lack of quantificationfor detection probabilities in undeclared facilities, the authors of this paper propose ageneral verification error model. Based on this model, four different approaches are ex-plained and assessed with respect to their advantages and disadvantages: the analogyapproach, the Bayes approach, the frequentist approach and the process approach.The paper concludes with a summary and an outlook on potential future researchactivities

EXPERIENCES IN SAFEGUARDING NUCLEAR REACTORS UNDER DECOMMISSIONING IN GERMANY

Regarding the complexity of safeguarding nuclear facilities under decommissioning, it is important to distinguish between item and bulk handling facilities. Item facilities such as power reactors do normally not have a hidden hold up of nuclear material that is recovered during the decommissioning of the facility. Consequently, the decommissioning steps for reactor facilities are straight forward. Once all spent fuel elements are removed, i.e., a permanently ‘shut down’ facility reaches the status of ‘closed down’, it remains without nuclear material that must be safeguarded. During the follow-up decommissioning process, the safeguards activities focus on the removal or rendering inoperable of essential equipment. The main objective at this stage is to reach the status of ‘decommissioned for safeguards purposes’. The paper describes and discusses experiences and technical challenges in safeguarding German nuclear reactors in their end-of-life stages from ‘shut down’ and ‘closed down’ to finally ‘decommissioned for safeguards purposes’

High Resolution Radar Satellite Imagery Analysis for Safeguards Applications

For monitoring nuclear sites, the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery shows essential promises. Unlike optical remote sensing instruments, radar sensors operate under almost all weather conditions and independently of the sunlight, i.e. time of the day. Such technical specifications are required both for continuous and for ad-hoc, timed surveillance tasks. With Cosmo-Skymed, TerraSARX and Radarsat-2, high-resolution SAR imagery with a spatial resolution up to 1m has recently become available. Our work therefore aims to investigate the potential of high-resolution TerraSAR data for nuclear monitoring. This paper focuses on exploiting amplitude of a single acquisition, assessing amplitude changes and phase differences between two acquisitions, and PS-InSAR processing of an image stack

The Evolution of International Safeguards - A View from Germany

On March 25 in the year 1957, the treaty creating the European Atomic Energy Community, the so-called 'Euratom Treaty' was signed by West Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This treaty constituted the legal framework to establish a multinational safeguards system in these countries to guarantee that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes otherthan those intended.In 1973, the European Community signed an agreement with the IAEA to accept safeguards pursuant to the NPT on all nuclear material in all their peaceful activities. This 'Verification Agreement' provided the basic for a co-operation of Euratom and IAEA in conducting their respective safeguards activities. Over the years, this co-operation evolved into a real partnership now governed by the rule of 'one job one person'.In the sixties and the following two decades, Germany embarked into numerous nuclear activities covering nearly the whole spectrum of different nuclear facilities. Germany thus could collect experiences with safeguards approaches and safeguards practices for many installations in the nuclear fuel cycle which we will delineate exemplarily in our presentation.The paper will also deal with the new Safeguards approach based on the State Level Concept and Integrated Safeguards. The implication on Safeguards Implementation and evaluation for Germany will be analyzed

Acquisition Path Analysis: JCPOA Case Study

A systems-based approach to acquisition path analysis was developed under a request by the International Atomic Energy Agency Member State Support Program. The model evaluates a given state’s Physical Model to determine the optimal inspection strategy by first applying graph theory for the determination of the technically feasible acquisition paths by the state and then applying game theory for the evaluation of inspection and proliferation strategies. To satisfy the requirements of the request, the Physical Model was constructed as a directed graph such that edges represent processes leading to the nodes, which are material forms. In previous papers presented at the INMM annual meetings and elsewhere, the model was demonstrated by using two hypothetical states as examples. In 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by Iran, the E3+3 and the European Union. Earlier this year, following the agreement’s schedule, Iran applied the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1 to its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This paper uses details within the JCPOA and its annexes along with open source information about the agreement to evaluate the utility of this systems-based approach to determine inspection strategies. By using the JCPOA as a data input, the model is demonstrated to be useful for acquisition path analysis. The results are critically evaluated and potential improvements to the acquisition path analysis model are detailed

State Provided GIS Data Sources for Treaty Verification

The IAEA’s Division of Information Management regularly uses geographic information forassessment of correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, which is essential tosoundly draw safeguards conclusions. The data model guidelines (1) for providing informationset forth in the Model Additional Protocol (AP) may also provide for other verification regimeswith a proven, real-world example when designing criteria for geographic information providedby States parties. Within the IAEA, a joint Member State Support Programme task on DigitalDeclaration Site Maps has already demonstrated the viability of submitting declaration sitemaps digitally in a spatial format. IAEA’s new input system for AP declarations, ProtocolReporter 3, supports the integration of digital maps. A next step in this pilot project is to evaluatethe technical changes required to implement a new submission process using a secure,web-based Geographic Information System (GIS) for a few selected sites in Germany. ModernGIS portals hold the potential to assist in sharing information and enhancing collaboration withininternational verification organizations or between organizations and State parties. 1. TheIAEA’s 2004 Guidelines and Format for Preparation and Submission of Declarations Pursuant toArticles 2 and 3 of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements, Service Series 1