6 research outputs found
PoRt : Non-Interactive Continuous Availability Proof of Replicated Storage
Secure cryptographic storage is one of the most important issues that both businesses and end-users take into account before moving their data to either centralized clouds or blockchain-based decentralized storage marketplace. Recent work [4] formalizes the notion of Proof of Storage-Time (PoSt) which enables storage servers to demonstrate non-interactive continuous availability of outsourced data in a publicly verifiable way. The work also proposes a stateful compact PoSt construction, while leaving the stateless and transparent PoSt with support for proof of replication as an open problem. In this paper, we consider this problem by constructing a proof system that enables servers to simultaneously demonstrate continuous availability and dedication of unique storage resources for encoded replicas of a data file in a stateless and publicly verifiable way. We first formalize Proof of Replication-Time (PoRt) by extending PoSt formal definition and security model to provide support for replications. Then, we provide a concrete instantiation of PoRt by designing a lightweight replica encoding algorithm where replicas' failures are efficiently located through an efficient comparison-based verification process, after the data deposit period ends. PoRt's proofs are aggregatable: the prover can take several sequentially generated proofs and efficiently aggregate them into a single, succinct proof. The protocol is also stateless in the sense that the client can efficiently extend the deposit period by incrementally updating the tags and without requiring to download the outsourced file replicas. We also demonstrate feasible extensions of PoRt to support dynamic data updates, and be transparent to enable its direct use in decentralized storage networks, a property not supported in previous proposals. Finally, PoRt's verification cost is independent of both outsourced file size and deposit length.Peer reviewe
PoRt: Non-Interactive Continuous Availability Proof of Replicated Storage
Secure cryptographic storage is one of the most important issues
that both businesses and end-users take into account before moving
their data to either centralized clouds or blockchain-based decen-
tralized storage marketplace. Recent work [4 ] formalizes the notion
of Proof of Storage-Time (PoSt) which enables storage servers to
demonstrate non-interactive continuous availability of outsourced
data in a publicly verifiable way. The work also proposes a stateful
compact PoSt construction, while leaving the stateless and transpar-
ent PoSt with support for proof of replication as an open problem.
In this paper, we consider this problem by constructing a proof
system that enables a server to simultaneously demonstrate con-
tinuous availability and dedication of unique storage resources for
encoded replicas of a data file in a stateless and publicly verifi-
able way. We first formalize Proof of Replication-Time (PoRt) by
extending PoSt formal definition and security model to provide
support for replications. Then, we provide a concrete instantia-
tion of PoRt by designing a lightweight replica encoding algorithm
where replicas’ failures are efficiently located through an efficient
comparison-based verification process, after the data deposit period
ends. PoRt’s proofs are aggregatable: the prover can take several
sequentially generated proofs and efficiently aggregate them into
a single, succinct proof. The protocol is also stateless in the sense
that the client can efficiently extend the deposit period by incre-
mentally updating the tags and without requiring to download the
outsourced file replicas. We also demonstrate feasible extensions
of PoRt to support dynamic data updates, and be transparent to
enable its direct use in decentralized storage networks, a property
not supported in previous proposals. Finally, PoRt’s verification
cost is independent of both outsourced file size and deposit length
A Secure Bandwidth-Efficient Treatment for Dropout-Resistant Time-Series Data Aggregation
Aggregate statistics derived from time-series data collected by individual users are extremely beneficial in diverse fields, such as e-health applications, IoT-based smart metering networks, and federated learning systems. Since user data are privacy-sensitive in many cases, the untrusted aggregator may only infer the aggregation without breaching individual privacy. To this aim, secure aggregation techniques have been extensively researched over the past years. However, most existing schemes suffer either from high communication overhead when users join and leave, or cannot tolerate node dropouts. In this paper, we propose a dropout-resistant bandwidth-efficient time-series data
aggregation. The proposed scheme does not incur any interaction among users, involving a solo round of user→aggregator communication exclusively. Additionally, it does not trigger a re-generation of private keys when users join and leave. Moreover, the aggregator is able to output the aggregate value by employing the re-encrypt capability acquired during a one-time setup phase, notwithstanding the number of nodes in the ecosystem that partake in the data collection of a certain epoch. Dropout-resistancy, trust-less key management, low-bandwidth and non-interactive nature of our construction make it ideal for many rapid-changing distributed real-world networks. Other than bandwidth efficiency, our scheme has also demonstrated efficiency in terms of computation overhea
An Attribute-Based Anonymous Broadcast Encryption Scheme with Adaptive Security in the Standard Model
In broadcast encryption schemes, a distribution center broadcasts an encrypted message to a subset chosen from a universe of receivers and only the intended users are able to decrypt the message. Most broadcast encryption schemes do not provide anonymity and the identities of target receivers are sent in plaintext. However, in several applications, the authorized users\u27 identities has the same sensitivity as the message itself. YRL, is an anonymous attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme with linear computation, communication and storage overheads in the number of attributes. In this paper, we first propose an attack on the YRL scheme and show that unfortunately the unauthorized receivers can also decrypt the broadcasted message. Next, we propose the Improved-YRL scheme and prove that it achieves anonymity and semantic security under adaptive corruptions in the chosen ciphertext setting. The proof is provided using the dual system encryption technique and is based on three complexity assumptions in composite order bilinear maps. The Improved-YRL scheme is a step forward in solving the long-standing problem of secure and low overhead anonymous broadcast encryption
stoRNA: Stateless Transparent Proofs of Storage-time
Proof of Storage-time (PoSt) is a cryptographic primitive
that enables a server to demonstrate non-interactive continuous avail-
ability of outsourced data in a publicly verifiable way. This notion was
first introduced by Filecoin to secure their Blockchain-based decentral-
ized storage marketplace, using expensive SNARKs to compact proofs.
Recent work [2] employs the notion of trapdoor delay function to address
the problem of compact PoSt without SNARKs. This approach however
entails statefulness and non-transparency, while it requires an expensive
pre-processing phase by the client. All of the above renders their solution
impractical for decentralized storage marketplaces, leaving the stateless
trapdoor-free PoSt with reduced setup costs as an open problem. In
this work, we present stateless and transparent PoSt constructions using
probabilistic sampling and a new Merkle variant commitment. In the
process of enabling adjustable prover difficulty, we then propose a multi-
prover construction to diminish the CPU work each prover is required to
do. Both schemes feature a fast setup phase and logarithmic verification
time and bandwidth with the end-to-end setup, prove, and verification
costs lower than the existing solution
An Attribute-Based Anonymous Broadcast Encryption Scheme with Adaptive Security in the Standard Model
In broadcast encryption schemes, a distribution center broadcasts an encrypted message to a subset chosen from a universe of receivers and only the intended users are able to decrypt the message. Most broadcast encryption schemes do not provide anonymity and the identities of target receivers are sent in plaintext. However, in several applications, the authorized users\u27 identities has the same sensitivity as the message itself. YRL, is an anonymous attribute-based broadcast encryption scheme with linear computation, communication and storage overheads in the number of attributes. In this paper, we first propose an attack on the YRL scheme and show that unfortunately the unauthorized receivers can also decrypt the broadcasted message. Next, we propose the Improved-YRL scheme and prove that it achieves anonymity and semantic security under adaptive corruptions in the chosen ciphertext setting. The proof is provided using the dual system encryption technique and is based on three complexity assumptions in composite order bilinear maps. The Improved-YRL scheme is a step forward in solving the long-standing problem of secure and low overhead anonymous broadcast encryption