2,152 research outputs found
Diego Gambetta: Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate
communication, signalling, reputation, uncertainty, convention, deception, trust
The Evolution of Trust and Reputation: Results from Simulation Experiments
In online interactions in general, but especially in interactions between buyers and sellers on internet-auction platforms, the interacting parties must deal with trust and cooperation problems. Whether a rating system is able to foster trust and cooperation through reputation and without an external enforcer is an open question. We therefore explore through ecological analysis different buyer and seller strategies in terms of their success and their contribution to supporting or impeding trust and cooperation. In our agent-based model, the interaction between a buyer and a seller is defined by a one-shot trust game with a reputation mechanism. In every interaction, a buyer has complete information about a seller's past behavior. We find that cooperation evolves under two conditions even in the absence of an external sanctioning authority. On the one hand, some minimal fraction of buyers must make use of the sellersâ reputation in their buying strategies and, on the other hand, trustworthy sellers must be given opportunities to gain a good reputation through their cooperative behavior. Despite the apparent usefulness of the reputation mechanism, a small number of deceitful sellers are able to hold their ground.trust game, reputation, agent-based simulation
Lifting the veil of ignorance: An experiment on the contagiousness of norm violations
Norm violations can be contagious. Previous research analyzed two mechanisms of why knowledge about othersâ norm violations triggers its spread: (1) Actors lower their subjective beliefs about the probability or severity of punishment, or (2) they condition their compliance on othersâ compliance. While earlier field studies could hardly disentangle both effects, we use a laboratory experiment which eliminated any punishment threat. Subjects (n = 466) could commit a violation of the honesty norm. They threw a die and were paid according to their reported number. Our design ruled out any possibility of personal identification so that subjects could lie about their thrown number and claim inflated payoffs without risking detection. The aggregate distribution of reported payoffs allowed determining the extent of liars in the population. Two treatments in which subjects were informed about lying behavior of others were compared to a control condition without information feedback. Distributions from a subsequent dice throw revealed that knowledge about liars triggered the spread of lying compared to the control condition. Our results demonstrate the contagiousness of norm violations, where actors imitate norm violations of others under the exclusion of strategic motives.Social norms, social influence, cheating, lying, experimental sociology, conditional cooperation, Heinrich Popitz
âBig dataâ from online interactions offer a rich object of study for academics and policy-makers interested in human nature and economic behaviour
Data on the interactions between individuals on the Internet are often viewed as a potential threat to privacy or freedom of expression, particularly in the aftermath of Edward Snowdenâs disclosures on the surveillance activities conducted by the United Statesâ National Security Agency (NSA). As Wojtek Przepiorka writes, however, the âbig dataâ produced by online transactions on websites such as eBay can also be an invaluable resource for academics and policy-makers. He argues that subjecting this data to formal study has the potential to uncover key insights on human nature and economic behaviour
Temporal Embeddedness and Signals of Trustworthiness: Experimental Tests of a Game Theoretic Model in the United Kingdom, Russia, and Switzerland
Based on signalling theory, Posner (1998, 2000) suggests that seemingly irrational behaviour or social norms emerge because they help to distinguish agents who prefer to engage in repeated cooperative interactions (long-term types) from agents with immediate non-cooperative incentives (short-term types). In this article, we formalize Posner's theory in a signalling trust game, derive hypotheses from our model, and test them empirically in a series of laboratory experiments in the United Kingdom, Russia, and Switzerland. Our results are surprisingly robust across the three countries and in line with most of our hypotheses. However, contrary to our main hypothesis, the introduction of a signalling opportunity does not increase the overall level of trust in our experiments and even reduces it under certain conditions. We argue that this is due to a high proportion of short-term types honouring trust because of non-selfish motives. Our results show that if a priori levels of trust and trustworthiness are high, introducing a signalling opportunity that is meant to distinguish long-term and short-term types may have a counterproductive effec
Does Living in a Protected Area Reduce Resource Use and Promote Life Satisfaction? Survey Results from and Around Three Regional Nature Parks in Switzerland
Regional nature parks in Switzerland are, for the most part, protected areas that aim to promote sustainable development and residentsâ well-being. In recent years, research on regional nature parks and comparable protected areas has focused on questions regarding local populationsâ acceptance of such areas, their governance, and their economic effects. However, we know surprisingly little about the impact of protected areas on environmental resource use and life satisfaction, two essential ingredients of sustainable regional development. In this study, we survey people living in and around three regional nature parks in Switzerland on their resource use and life satisfaction (gross sample nâ=â3358). We propose a novel measurement of resource use based on vignettes describing different lifestyles, which we validate against the carbon footprint obtained for a subsample of our respondents. With these indicators, using multiple regression analyses, we test several hypotheses derived from the literature on the relationship between resource use and life satisfaction in and around protected areas. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find differences in resource use or life satisfaction, or the relationship between resource use and life satisfaction, across park and non-park regions. We discuss potential explanations for our findings and their implications for nature park authorities and future study designs
Identifying individuals\u27 preferences using games: A field experiment in promoting sustainable energy consumption
We present a novel approach to identify individualsâ preferences in the context of sustainable energy consumption by letting them play a public good game (PGG). The study will be conducted using an energy-efficiency website developed by us and operated by an Austrian utility company that currently facilitates 9,929 users out of which 1,000 will be randomly selected as participants. Laboratory experiments on PGGs identified two types of cooperative behavior: free riders and conditional cooperators. While free riders tend to act unaffected by the behavior of others, conditional cooperators are stronger influenced by the perception of their peers. In our study, participants receive normative feedback on their consumption, and we investigate the moderating effects of the PGGâs results on changes in energy consumption. The findings will contribute to the design of information systems to promote environmental sustainability because their effectiveness is increased if the consumption feedback provided reflects the recipientâs preference
Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation
Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practices or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup âfriendsâ and outgroup âfoesâ, facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes â albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations
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