ALM practices, multiple uncertainty and monopolistic behavior: A microeconomic study of banking decisions

We study the decisions that a monopolistic bank takes to achieve risk management and profit objectives. The bank faces liquidity and solvency risks because loans may not be repaid and because unexpected deposit withdrawals may occur. The Asset-Liability-Management (ALM) banking model shows that compromise solutions are necessary to deal with the tradeoffs between liquidity management and profitability. It also shows that asset management practices increase profits. Moreover it shows that liability management practices and market power support profitability. Finally, the model confirms that banks should undertake long-term risky investments when depositors trust the viability of the asset transformation process.Banking; ALM; multiple uncertainty; monopolistic behavior

Financial structure, financial development and banking fragility: International evidence

We study the effects of financial structure and financial development on banking fragility. We develop our study by using fixed-effects panel-data regressions and by controlling the effects of certain banking indicators. We use individual and principal-components indicators of the activity, size and efficiency of intermediaries and markets. The indicators include data for 211 countries between 1990 and 2003. Our main findings suggest that banking stability is enhanced in market-based financial systems. Financial development reduces it. However this fragility-enhancing effect can be unveiled only when we account for financial structure. Thus, financial structure and development jointly matter to assess banking fragility.Banks; fragility; financial structure; financial development

Corporate governance, market competition and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms

We study how competition and corporate governance may explain investment decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms. We develop the study with indexes of market concentration and agency costs and OLS regressions. The analysis uses longitudinal census data. Our results suggest that investment is better explained by the Dominance Index, a Mexican measure of concentration, than by the Herfindahl-Hirschman one. They also suggest that agency costs (proxy for the degree of separation of ownership and control), and market competition may encourage investment decisions. Furthermore they suggest an inverse relationship between market competition and agency costs. We believe that our findings support the hypothesis that competition may be an alternative mechanism to encourage corporate practices in emerging economies.Corporate governance; competition; investment; Mexico; manufacturing, economic development