But in the End, Why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? At the Root of the Hegel–Deleuze Affair

Deleuze said that he detested Hegelianism and dialectics: this paper claims that Deleuze is contra Hegel because he has and proposes a different philosophical system. Thus, I suggest that if we want to understand the reason of such a “disgust,” we need to focus the philosophical question that moves the entire Deleuzian system (§ 1). Then, I explain that if the ground-question of Hegel’s philosophy is “how is it possible that things are surpassed, that they go on?”, the Deleuzian one is “how is it that there is always something new, that things come out?” (§ 2). Finally, I discuss how desire can be considered as a key-example for seeing how the perspectives of the two thinkers diverge (§ 3)

Oltre la tecno-fobia/mania: prospettive di “tecno-realismo” a partire dall’antropologia filosofica

The paper proposes a rethinking of the “Techniksfrage” and the “post-humanism” focused on the discussion of the human nature and the man’s place in the world. 0) “Philosophy of technology” went in search of an Universal Essence of The Technology, ending with the construction of the opposition “techno-phobics/techno-maniacs”: it forgot the plurality of the technologies, and represented the technology as an unsurpassable destiny (Evil or Good). 1) Indeed, a “philosophical anthropology of the technology” makes it possible to think the relationship man/technology in a “soberly realistic” way: if man is naturally un-natural, the technological animal because of his relational openness to the world, then technai express the modes through which he relates to the world and “declines” his generic nature. 2) Therefore, we cannot oppose a “subject” (human/natural) to an “object” (artificial/unnatural): we have to understand the faktum of the relation which constitutes both them as always opened (subjectile and objectile). 3) According to this, the post-human could be thought as a overcoming-uplifting (post) of the evolutionary and existential logic that characterizes the human nature (human): a over-humanistic horizon could not be realistically conceived without the body, ec-centric center of human action – of the possible domination of the domination of nature

Throw the bathwater out but save the baby: new perspectives in Critical Theory

In this paper, I discuss the status of critical theory and thinking, claiming that we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater: if a certain way of conceiving and practicing it has nowadays become partial and unfit, then it’s not true that it is qua tale useless, old-fashioned, or dead. I start stressing that, in general, Critical Theory highlights that there is a problematic relation between individuals and social structure, which has to be pointed out, to indicate actual and possible transformations. Then, I propose a heuristic distinction between two main paradigms of Critical Theory and thinking (the modern Critical Theory and the postmodern Critical Theory), discussing three main aspects, separated but intertwined. The first is more strictly philosophical, involving the problem of the transcendent or immanent position of the critique: on the one hand, we have the external condemnation of the society, in the name of some kind of superior truth; on the other hand, we have the inner problematization of a given social field, according to criteria that have been posited by itself or that are implicit in it (§ 1). The second is more strictly anthropological, dealing with the problem of human nature and alienation: on the one hand, we have the hope for the restoration of a lost state of originary plenitude; on the other hand, we have the effort of learning the better way to deal with human openness and relationality (§ 2). The third is more strictly sociological, posing the question of ways and forms of life: on the one hand, we have an ironical attitude, aiming to elaborate a true counter-society that should take the place of the false present one; on the other hand, we have a humoristic attitude, that attempts to make the problem that a society both poses and tries to answer a problem that reemerges, so that it can be again for the first time seen as a problem (§ 3)

Tendenze a essere. Il disposizionalismo tra antropologia, ontologia e abeologia

The article discusses some fundamental traits of contemporary dispositionalism, on an anthropological and ontological level. I start claiming that the current relevance of dispositionalism also depends on the fact that we are immersed in a sort of ‘dispositionalist atmosphere’, in a double sense: we are experiencing a power oriented towards ‘capacitation’ and not coercion; we are living the diffusion of the implicit ideal of hidden potential, connected to a vision of the human being as potential (§ 0). Then, I define such a potential nature as generic, and describe its three main characteristics, in order to point out their wider conceptual consequences. starting with the recognition that any power is both particular and plastic at the same time: openness; habituability; historicity (§ 1). This allows me to highlight the basic task that every dispositionalist perspective has to fulfil today: to move in a perspective which is at once neo-Aristotelian and post-Darwinian (§ 2). Afterward, I dwell on analytical dispositionalist ontologies, presenting three key aspects of the dispositions, and discussing their implications: a) potentiality; b) independence; c) directionality (§ 3). Finally, I examine the continental context, focusing on the position of G. Deleuze, in order to contribute to a ‘mutual enlightenment’ between dispositionalism and deleuzism, and to the construction of a genuine non-fixist and non-substantialist worldview: I not only explain that Deleuze would be a pandispositionalist tending towards structuralism in the contemporary spectrum, describing his position with respect to points a), b) and c), but I also show that his perspective allows to pinpoint at least two other relevant issues, such as d) duration and e) echology (§ 4)