Elaboration and validation processes: implications for media attitude change

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Media Psychology on 09/06/2015, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15213269.2015.1008103This review describes two core processes involved in understanding how attitudes are structured and changed. Elaboration refers to the extent to which people think carefully or in a more cursory manner about messages and validation refers to the extent to which people see their thoughts and attitudes resulting from messages as correct or not. Elaboration is important for understanding both initial attitude changes that occur as a result of media exposure as well as whether those changes are consequential (e.g., resist change and relate to behavior). Validation processes are important for understanding whether thoughts are relied upon in forming attitudes and whether attitudes are relied upon in determining behavior. Elaboration and validation are related in a number of ways such as when more extensive elaboration of an issue leads to an attitude that is perceived to be vali

Flexible correction processes in social judgment: implications for persuasion

Journal ArticleTwo experiments were conducted to examine correction for perceived bias in persuasion situations. Study 1 showed that, although a manipulation of source likability had an impact on attitudes when no instruction to remove bias was present, when people were asked to remove any bias from their judgments, the effect of the source likability manipulation disappeared. The fact that the correction instruction did not increase the impact of an argument quality manipulation on attitudes suggested that effort aimed at correction is conceptually distinct from effort aimed at processing a message in general. Study 2 showed that a correction for source likability took place under low elaboration conditions--where a manipulation of source likability had an impact when no correction instructions were provided, and under high elaboration conditions--where a manipulation of source likability had no impact when no correction instructions were provided. In the high elaboration conditions, correcting for an impact that was not actually present led a dislikable source to be more influential than a likable source

Metacognitive confidence can increase but also decrease performance in academic settings

The present research examined the role of metacognitive confidence in understanding to what extent people’s valenced thoughts guide their performance in academic settings. First, students were asked to engage in positive or negative thinking about exams in their major area of study (Study 1) or about themselves (Studies 2 and 3). The valence of these primary cognitions was manipulated to be positive or negative. Furthermore, a metacognitive variable, the perceived validity of the primary cognitions, was measured or varied to be relatively high or low. Finally, performance was assessed using a knowledge test (Study 1), a geometric shapes task (Study 2) or a selection of questions from the Graduate Record Examination (Study 3). In accordance with self-validation theory, we predicted and found that metacognitive confidence (relative to doubt) increased the impact of primary cognitions on performance. When thoughts were positive, increased confidence in the primary cognitions improved performance. However, when thoughts were negative, the same confidence validated the negative primary cognitions and reduced performance. Thus, metacognitive confidence can lead to opposite findings on performance depending on whether it validates performance-relevant positive thoughts or negative thoughts. Variations in the perceived validity of thoughts mediated the obtained effects. Therefore, we conclude that understanding the process of thought validation can help in specifying why and when metacognitive confidence is likely to work or to backfire in producing the desired performance effectsResearch was supported by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación y Universidades, Gobierno de España (ES) [PSI2017-83303-C2-1-P] Grant to Pablo Briño

El poder aumenta el uso de las primeras impresiones

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in [JOURNAL TITLE] on [date of publication], available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/[Article DOI].The present research examines the effect of power in impression formation. In line with prior research on persuasion, we hypothesized that having power increases reliance on thoughts relative to being powerless. Participants in this experiment were first led to generate either positive or negative thoughts about a job candidate by providing them with a strong or weak vita. Following this manipulation, participants were instructed to remember episodes of their lives in which they either had power over others or others had power over them. Relative to powerless participants, those induced to feel powerful showed more reliance on the thoughts listed. As a consequence, the effect of the direction of the thoughts on subsequent judgments of the job candidate (including judgments of competence and warmth) was greater for participants with high, as opposed to low power. These results reveal for the first time that power can validate what people think about other people.La presente investigación examina el efecto del poder sobre la formación de impresiones. En línea con la investigación previa en el contexto de la persuasión, se esperaba que las personas con alto poder utilizaran sus pensamientos en mayor medida que las personas con bajo poder. Para poner a prueba esta hipótesis, se llevó a cabo un experimento en el que los participantes primero generaron pensamientos favorables o desfavorables hacia un candidato a un puesto de trabajo en función de los méritos de su curriculum vitae. A continuación, se pidió a los participantes que pensaran en episodios previos en los que tuvieron poder sobre otra persona o en episodios en los que tuvieron poder sobre ellos. Los participantes asignados a la condición de alto poder utilizaron más sus pensamientos iniciales al juzgar al candidato (tanto en términos de competencia como de atractivo) que aquellos en la condición de bajo poder. Estos resultados sugieren por primera vez que el poder puede validar lo que piensan las personas sobre los demás

Attitude change as a function of the number of words in which thoughts are expressed

This research examines whether varying the number of words in which thoughts are expressed can influence subsequent evaluations. Across six studies, keeping the number of thoughts constant, we tested to what extent the length of the thoughts, the personal importance of the topic, and the extent of practice in short versus long thought expression influenced attitude change. In the first two studies, expressing thoughts in one word (vs. many words) led to less thought use when the topic was high in importance (Experiment 1) but to more thought use when topic was low in importance (Experiment 2). In a third study, the number of words used was manipulated along with the perceived importance of the experimental task. As predicted, expressing thoughts was perceived to be easier with one vs. many words when the task was low in importance but the opposite held when it was high in importance. In Experiment 4, attitudes were more influenced by thoughts when one word was used in a task that was framed to low importance task but many words were used on the task framed with high importance. Experiment 5 included a direct manipulation of ease and extended these results from a motivational framework to an ability setting by using a paradigm in which familiarity (based on prior training) interacted with thought length to affect attitudes. A final study replicated the key effect with more real-world materials, and extended the contribution from an experimental approach to testing process to a measurement approach to mediationThis work was supported in part by the Spanish Government [grant number PSI2014-58476-P] to the second author and to NSF [grant 0847834] to the third autho

Treating thoughts as material objects can increase or decrease their impact on evaluation

When posting or re-using the article, you should provide a link/URL from the article posted to the SAGE Journals Online site where the article is published: http://online.sagepub.com and please make the following acknowledgment: "The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in , Vol/Issue, Month/Year by SAGE Publications Ltd, All rights reserved. © [The Author(s)]"In Western dualistic culture, it is assumed that thoughts cannot be treated as material objects; however, language is replete with metaphorical analogies suggesting otherwise. In the research reported here, we examined whether objectifying thoughts can influence whether the thoughts are used in subsequent evaluations. In Experiment 1, participants wrote about what they either liked or disliked about their bodies. Then, the paper on which they wrote their thoughts was either ripped up and tossed in the trash or kept and checked for errors. When participants physically discarded a representation of their thoughts, they mentally discarded them as well, using them less in forming judgments than did participants who retained a representation of their thoughts. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and also showed that people relied on their thoughts more when they physically kept them in a safe place—putting their thoughts in their pockets—than when they discarded them. A final study revealed that these effects were stronger when the action was performed physically rather than merely imagined.This research was supported in part by Spanish Grant No. PSI2011-26212 from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación to the first author and by National Science Foundation Grant No. 0847834 to the third author

Wanting other attitudes: actual–desired attitude discrepancies predict feelings of ambivalence and ambivalence consequences

The experience of attitudinal ambivalence (subjective ambivalence) is important because it predicts key consequences of attitudes (e.g., attitude–behavior correspondence, attitude stability). However, the field's understanding of the antecedents of subjective ambivalence is still developing. We explore an unexamined antecedent of subjective ambivalence. Specifically, we examined discrepancies between participants' actual attitudes and their desired attitudes as antecedents of subjective ambivalence and ambivalence consequences. Six studies using a variety of attitude objects were conducted to test these ideas. The first four studies demonstrated that actual–desired attitude discrepancies predicted subjective ambivalence over its previously documented antecedents. Critically, two additional studies showed that actual–desired attitude discrepancies predicted important consequences of ambivalence. As actual–desired attitude discrepancies increased, participants' attitude–behavior correspondence decreased (Study 5), and desire to reduce attitudinal conflict increased (Study 6). Process data in these latter studies revealed indirect effects through subjective ambivalence that held after controlling for the objective presence of evaluative conflict