Rationing in IPOs

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winner’s curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors’ information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We determine the optimal degree of rationing in a class of credible mechanisms. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations.IPOs

Competition for Listings

We develop a model in which two profit maximizing exchanges compete for IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by firms wishing to go public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All firms prefer lower costs, however firms differ in how they value a decrease in trading costs. Hence, in equilibrium, the exchanges obtain positive expected profits by charging different trading fees and different listing fees. As a result, firms that list on different exchanges have different characteristics. The model has testable implications for the cross-sectional characteristics of IPOs' on different quality exchanges and the relationship between the level of trading costs and listing fees. We also find that competition does not guarantee that exchanges choose welfare maximizing trading rules. In some cases, welfare is larger with a monopolist exchange than with oligopolist exchanges.market microstructure; listings; competition; exchanges; regulation

Rationing in IPOs

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. We consider two allocation rules. Under share dispersion, before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winner's curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors' information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We determine the optimal degree of rationing in a class of credible mechanisms. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations

Rationing in IPOs

We provide a model of bookbuilding in IPOs, in which the issuer can choose to ration shares. Before informed investors submit their bids, they know that, in the aggregate, winning bidders will receive only a fraction of their demand. We demonstrate that this mitigates the winner’s curse, that is, the incentive of bidders to shade their bids. It leads to more aggressive bidding, to the extent that rationing can be revenue-enhancing. In a parametric example, we characterize bid and revenue functions, and the optimal degree of rationing. We show that, when investors’ information is diffuse, maximal rationing is optimal. Conversely, when their information is concentrated, the seller should not ration shares. We provide testable predictions on bid dispersion and the degree of rationing. Our model reconciles the documented anomaly that higher bidders in IPOs do not necessarily receive higher allocations.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/42727/1/10679_2005_Article_2987.pd

Information acquisition in a limit order market

Abstract We model an infinite horizon trading game of a limit order market with informed traders. Agents with a private and common value motive for trade randomly arrive in a market and may either post prices (submit limit orders) or accept posted prices (submit market orders). If their orders have not executed, traders may reenter the market and thus solve a dynamic problem. We consider agents' incentive to acquire information. We characterize how information acquisition changes agents' strategies and demonstrate the effect of this on the efficiency of market prices. We demonstrate that for some costs of acquiring information, there are multiple equilibria in the information acquisition game. Finally, we demonstrate that information acquisition can make all agents worse off

Hedging Labor Income Risk

We use a detailed panel data set of Swedish households to investigate the relation between their labor income risk and financial investment decisions. In particular, we relate changes in wage volatility to changes in the portfolio holdings for households that switched industries between 1999 and 2002. We find that households do adjust their portfolio holdings when switching jobs, which is consistent with the idea that households hedge their human capital risk in the stock market. The results are statistically and economically significant. A household going from an industry with low wage volatility to one with high volatility will ceteris paribus decrease its portfolio share of risky assets by up to 35%, or USD 15,575

Empirical Analysis of National Income and So2 Emissions in Selected European Countries

Data on GDP per capita and sulfur emissions for twelve European countries were analyzed to determine the relationship between emissions and income in these countries. As a whole, the relationship between sulfur emissions and per capita income is a fourth order polynomial and not a quadratic one as found in most studies. When countries were examined individually, seven out of the twelve countries depicted the same relationship. Looking closely at the regulations restricting sulfur emissions in the UK, the impact of all regulations supported the inverted U-shaped Kuznets curve. Individually, however, it is found that only two regulations have statistically significant impacts: Smoke Abatement Act in 1926 (reduced the amount of sulfur associated with a given level of GDP); and Clean Air Act in 1956 (increased the amount of sulfur emissions associated with a given level of GDP)