Constructing convex directions for stable polynomials

Cataloged from PDF version of article.New constructions of convex directions for Hurwitz-stable polynomials are obtained. The technique is based on interpretations of the phase-derivative conditions in terms of the sensitivity of the root-locus associated with the even and odd parts of a polynomial

Watermarking via zero assigned filter banks

Cataloged from PDF version of article.In order to identify the owner and distributor of digital data, a watermarking scheme in frequency domain for multimedia files is proposed. The scheme satisfies the imperceptibility and persistence requirements and it is robust against additive noise. It consists of a few stages of wavelet decomposition of several subblocks of the original signal using special zero assigned filter banks. By assigning zeros to filters on the high frequency portion of the spectrum, filter banks with frequency selective response are obtained. The information is then inserted in the wavelet-decomposed and compressed signal. Several robustness tests are performed on male voice, female voice, and music files, color and gray level images. The algorithm is tested under white Gaussian noise and against JPEG compression and it is observed to be robust even when exposed to high levels of corruption. & 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserve

Foraging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic games

Cataloged from PDF version of article.The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium under two different foraging location specifications, and both equilibria display many features of a foraging swarm behavior observed in biological swarms. Explicit expressions are derived for pairwise distances between individuals of the swarm, swarm size, and swarm center location during foraging. © 2013 IEEE

PID stabilization of MIMO plants

Cataloged from PDF version of article.Closed-loop stabilization using proportional–integral–derivative (PID) controllers is investigated for linear multiple-input–multiple-output (MIMO) plants. General necessary conditions for existence of PID-controllers are derived. Several plant classes that admit PID-controllers are explicitly described. Plants with only one or two unstable zeros at or “close” to the origin (alternatively, at or close to infinity) as well as plants with only one or two unstable poles which are at or close to origin are among these classes. Systematic PID-controller synthesis procedures are developed for these classes of plants

Two-channel decentralized integral action controller design

Cataloged from PDF version of article.We propose a systematic controller design method that provides integral-action in linear time-invariant two-channel decentralized control systems. Each channel of the plant is single-input–single-output, with any number of poles at the origin but no other poles in the instability region. An explicit parametrization of all decentralized stabilizing controllers incorporating the integral-action requirement is provided for this special case of plants. The main result is a design methodology that constructs simple low-order controllers in the cascaded form of proportional-integral and first-order blocks

Decentralized control and periodic feedback

Cataloged from PDF version of article.The decentralized stabilization problem for linear, discretetime, periodically timevarying plants using periodic controllers is considered. The main tool used isl the technique of Uning a periodic system to a timeinvariant one via extensions of the input and output spaces. It is shown that a periodically time-varying system of fundamental period N can be stabilized by a decentralized periodic controller if and only if: 1) the system is stabilizable and detectable, and 2) the N-lifting of each complementary subsystem of identieally zero inpnt-ontput map is free of unstable input-output decoupling zeros. In the special case of N = 1, this yields and clarifies all the mr exisling results on decentralized stabilization of time-invariant plants by periodically time varying controllers

Decentralized Blocking Zeros and Decentralized Strong Stabilization Problem

Cataloged from PDF version of article.This paper is concerned with a new system theoretic concept, decentralized blocking zeros, and its applications in the design of decentralized controllers for linear time-invariant finitedimensional systems. The concept of decentralized blocking zeros is a generalization of its centralized counterpart to multichannel systems under decentralized control. Decentralized blocking zeros are defined as the common blocking zeros of the main diagonal transfer matrices and various complementary transfer matrices of a given plant. As an application of this concept, we consider the decentralized strong stabilization problem (DSSP) where the objective is to stabilize a plant using a stable decentralized controller. It is shown that a parity interlacing property should be satisfied among the real unstable poles and real unstable decentralized blocking zeros of the plant for the DSSP to be solvable. That parity interlacing property is also suf6icient for the solution of the DSSP for a large class of plants satisfying a certain connectivity condition. The DSSP is exploited in the solution of a special decentralized simultaneous stabilization problem, called the decentralized concurrent stabilization problem (DCSP). Various applications of the DCSP in the design of controllers for large-scale systems are also discussed

Partially informed agents can form a swarm in a nash equilibrium

Foraging swarms in one-dimensional motion with incomplete position information are studied in the context of a noncooperative differential game. In this game, the swarming individuals act with partial information as it is assumed that each agent knows the positions of only the adjacent ones. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium solution that exhibits many features of a foraging swarm such as movement coordination, self-organization, stability, and formation control exists. © 1963-2012 IEEE

Automated discrimination of psychotropic drugs in mice via computer vision-based analysis

Cataloged from PDF version of article.We developed an inexpensive computer vision-based method utilizing an algorithm which differentiates drug-induced behavioral alterations. The mice were observed in an open-field arena and their activity was recorded for 100 min. For each animal the first 50 min of observation were regarded as the drug-free period. Each animal was exposed to only one drug and they were injected (i.p.) with either amphetamine or cocaine as the stimulant drugs or morphine or diazepam as the inhibitory agents. The software divided the arena into virtual grids and calculated the number of visits (sojourn counts) to the grids and instantaneous speeds within these grids by analyzing video data. These spatial distributions of sojourn counts and instantaneous speeds were used to construct feature vectors which were fed to the classifier algorithms for the final step of matching the animals and the drugs. The software decided which of the animals were drug-treated at a rate of 96%. The algorithm achieved 92% accuracy in sorting the data according to the increased or decreased activity and then determined which drug was delivered. The method differentiated the type of psychostimulant or inhibitory drugs with a success ratio of 70% and 80%, respectively. This method provides a new way to automatically evaluate and classify drug-induced behaviors in mice. Crown Copyright © 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

Consensus as a Nash Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game

Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input. This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions. © 2016 IEEE