Does Phenomenal Consciousness Overflow Attention? An Argument from Feature-Integration

In the past two decades a number of arguments have been given in favor of the possibility of phenomenal consciousness without attentional access, otherwise known as phenomenal overflow. This paper will show that the empirical data commonly cited in support of this thesis is, at best, ambiguous between two equally plausible interpretations, one of which does not posit phenomenology beyond attention. Next, after citing evidence for the feature-integration theory of attention, this paper will give an account of the relationship between consciousness and attention that accounts for both the empirical data and our phenomenological intuitions without positing phenomenal consciousness beyond attention. Having undercut the motivations for accepting phenomenal overflow along with having given reasons to think that phenomenal overflow does not occur, I end with the tentative conclusion that attention is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness

New findings for contemporary marketing to Black men: A Content analysis of alcoholic beverage ad appeals from Ebony and GQ magazines

The present study uses content analysis to investigate differences in alcoholic beverage advertisement appeals, from Ebony and Gentlemen\u27s Quarterly magazines, aimed at Black men in contrast to the mainstream male demographic. The present study reports that there are no significant statistical differences between ad appeals aimed at Black men and the mainstream male demographic. Consequently, it is suggested that cultural unawareness has displaced racial and ethnic stereotyping in contemporary marketing to Black men. Future research should concern appeals Black media make to their own markets to expose the biases of Black consumer groups who misrepresent the issue of race in contemporary marketing

MPs with both an educational and occupational background in STEM are the most likely to demonstrate engagement with STEM issues in Parliament

Joshua Myers and Hilde Coffé investigate the effect of having a STEM background on both the likelihood of MPs proposing a STEM Private Members’ Bill and the proportion of proposals an MP dedicates to such bills. They find that having a STEM background does not affect the likelihood of proposing a STEM bill. However, MPs with both an educational and occupational STEM background are more likely to spend a higher proportion of their bill proposals dedicated to STEM issues. They also find that having a STEM educational background matters more strongly for women than for men

Growth of Thin Oxidation-Resistive Crystalline Si Nanostructures on Graphene

We report the growth of Si nanostructures, either as thin films or nanoparticles, on graphene substrates. The Si nanostructures are shown to be single crystalline, air stable and oxidation resistive, as indicated by the observation of a single crystalline Si Raman mode at around 520 cm-1, a STM image of an ordered surface structure under ambient condition, and a Schottky junction with graphite. Ultra-thin silicon regions exhibit silicene-like behavior, including a Raman mode at around 550 cm-1, a triangular lattice structure in STM that has distinctly different lattice spacing from that of either graphene or thicker Si, and metallic conductivity of up to 500 times higher than that of graphite. This work suggests a bottom-up approach to forming a Si nanostructure array on a large scale patterned graphene substrate for fabricating nanoscale Si electronic devices

Reasoning with Imagination

This chapter argues that epistemic uses of the imagination are a sui generis form of reasoning. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, there are imaginings which instantiate the epistemic structure of reasoning. Second, reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with doxastic states. Thus, the epistemic role of the imagination is that it is a distinctive way of reasoning out what follows from our prior evidence. This view has a number of important implications for the epistemology of the imagination. For one thing, it clarifies the epistemic role of widely invoked “constraints” on the imagination. For another, it highlights important and underappreciated disanalogies between how perceptual experiences and imaginings justify beliefs. Ultimately, the view that we can reason with imagination offers an illuminating and theoretically fruitful framework through which to understand the epistemic structure of the imagination

The Epistemic Status of the Imagination

Imagination plays a rich epistemic role in our cognitive lives. For example, if I want to learn whether my luggage will fit into the overhead compartment on a plane, I might imagine trying to fit it into the overhead compartment and form a justified belief on the basis of this imagining. But what explains the fact that imagination has the power to justify beliefs, and what is the structure of imaginative justification? In this paper, I answer these questions by arguing that imaginings manifest an epistemic status: they are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified. This epistemic status grounds their ability to justify beliefs, and they accrue this status in virtue of being based on evidence. Thus, imaginings are best understood as justified justifiers. I argue for this view by way of showing how it offers a satisfying explanation of certain key features of imaginative justification that would otherwise be puzzling. I also argue that imaginings exhibit a number of markers of the basing relation, which further motivates the view that imaginings can be based on evidence. The arguments in this paper have theoretically fruitful implications not only for the epistemology of imagination, but for accounts of reasoning and epistemic normativity more generally

Imagination as a source of empirical justification

Traditionally, philosophers have been skeptical that the imagination can justify beliefs about the actual world. After all, how could merely imagining something give you any reason to believe that it is true? However, within the past decade or so, a lively debate has emerged over whether the imagination can justify empirical belief and, if so, how. This paper provides a critical overview of the recent literature on the epistemology of imagination and points to avenues for future research