Introduction to measures of inequality and concentration in tourism

There are many statistical measures available in the literature for the analysis of inequality and concentration. The most common measure in this field is the Gini index (Roselló Nadal et al.,2004), which is associated to the Lorenz curve. Both were developed at the beginning of the 20th century: the Lorenz curve in 1905 and the Gini index in 1914 (Giorgi,!1993). A revision of recent applications of these measures in the field of tourism can be found in Cisneros Martín and Fernández Morales (2015)and Duro (2016)

Coordinates and frames from the causal point of view

Lorentzian frames may belong to one of the 199 causal classes. Of these numerous causal classes, people are essentially aware only of two of them. Nevertheless, other causal classes are present in some well-known solutions, or present a strong interest in the physical construction of coordinate systems. Here we show the unusual causal classes to which belong so familiar coordinate systems as those of Lema{\^{\i}}tre, those of Eddington-Finkelstein, or those of Bondi-Sachs. Also the causal classes associated to the Coll light coordinates (four congruences of real geodetic null lines) and to the Coll positioning systems (light signals broadcasted by four clocks) are analyzed. The role that these results play in the comprehension and classification of relativistic coordinate systems is emphasized.Comment: 5 pages, 1 figure, short communication in A Century of Relativity Physics, Proceedings of the XXVIII Spanish Relativity Meeting ERE-2006, 6-10 September - Oviedo - Spain (AIP Conference Proceedings

Absolute Expediency and Imitative Behaviour

This paper analyses a model of learning by imitation, where besides the decision maker, there is a population of individuals facing the same decision problem. We analyze a property called Absolute Expediency, which requires that the decision maker's expected payoff increases from one round to the next for every decision problem and every state of the population. We give a simple characterization of the expediency property and show that its basic feature is proportional imitation: the change in the probability attached to the played action is proportional to the difference between the received and the sampled payoff (the sampled payoff plays the role of an aspiration level).Social Learning, Decision Problems, Imitation, Bounded Rationality.

Gender Differences in Prisoners' Dilemma

Charles Darwin (1874) stated that "women are less selfish but men are more competitive". Very recent papers (Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001 or Andreoni & Vesterlund 2001, among others) have shown the relevance of gender in altruism in both ultimatum and dictator games. In this paper we analyse the role of gender in one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma. We use payments cards to reveal players' values of the game, what gives information about players' beliefs on rival's cooperativeness. Surprisingly 15% of population choose the cooperative action although the gender effect is quite ambiguous in actions. Within those players who choose the cooperative action, females do so believing her rival will defect.Prisoners' Dilemma, cooperation, payment cards, expected utility theory, beliefs, gender differences.

Bolivia's Economic Crisis

By any standard, Bolivia's economic crisis in the 1980's has been extraordinary. Like its neighbors. Bolivia suffered from major external shocks, but the extent of economic collapse in the face of these shocks (including a hyperinflation during 1984-85) suggests that internal factors as well as external shocks have been critical to Bolivia's poor economic performance. One major theme of our work is that the recent economic crisis in Bolivia is a reflection of political and economic conflicts in Bolivian society that have undermined the development process throughout this century. While major reforms have been begun by the present government, many of the deepest problems in Bolivian society that contributed to the crisis remain unresolved.

Moral Framing in Dictator Games by Short Sentences.

Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained significant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is provided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding behavior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game theoretic prediction based on the selfishness assumption. This paper conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room design, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards. Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reciprocity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral” sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modified DG are statistically different from each other, indicating that the additional sentences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selfish behavior vanishes.dictator game, framing e ?ect, social issues, fairness, reciprocity.