Formally insuring the informally insured

Rainfall is critical for the livelihoods of millions of Indians – yet many have no formal insurance if the rains fail. This column looks at what happens when a new formal insurance policy based on the weather is offered at random to farmers and farm workers across several states in India

Migrating Away from a Seasonal Famine: A Randomized Intervention in Bangladesh

The rural northwestern districts of Bangladesh, home to 10 million people, experience a preharvest seasonal famine, locally known as Monga, with disturbing regularity. Surprisingly, outmigration from the Monga-prone districts is not all that common. This research tests whether migration could play any role in Monga mitigation. We implemented a randomized intervention that provided monetary incentives to individuals in Monga-prone regions to seasonally outmigrate during the pre-harvest season. We experimentally varied the conditionalities attached to the incentives, such as a requirement to form a group and migrate jointly (as opposed to migrating individually), sometimes assigning migration partners and the destination, and varying group size. This paper reports just the first stage results of this randomized intervention project, where we focus on household responsiveness to our incentive offers in terms of their decision to migrate. Our cash and credit incentives had a very large effect on migration propensity: over 40% of those receiving an incentive choose to migrate, whereas only 13% of control households do. This large effect is consistent with the presence of savings or borrowing constraints for these households, since providing information on wages and employment conditions at destinations only has a negligible 2 percentage point impact on the propensity to migrate relative to the control group.Monga, famine, Bangladesh, migration

The Economics of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Poor Countries

The COVID-19 pandemic has upended health and living standards around the world. This article provides an interim overview of these effects, with a particular focus on low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Economists have explained how the pandemic is likely to have differential consequences for LMICs, and demand distinct policy responses, compared to rich countries. We survey the rapidly expanding body of empirical research that documents its many adverse economic and non-economic effects in terms of living standards, education, health, and gender equality, which appear to be unprecedented in depth and scale. We also review research on successful and failed policy responses, including the failure to ensure widespread vaccine coverage in LMICs, which is needed to end the pandemic. We close with a discussion of implications for public policy in LMICs, and for the institutions of international governance, given the likelihood of future pandemics and other major shocks (e.g., climate)

The political economy of health services provision and access in Brazil

The authors examine the impact of local politics and government structure on the allocation of publicly subsidized (SUS) health services across municipios (counties) in Brazil, and on the probability that uninsured individuals who require medical attention actually receive access to those health services. Using data from the 1998 PNAD survey they demonstrate that higher per capita levels of SUS doctors, nurses, and clinic rooms increase the probability that an uninsured individual gains access to health services when he, or she seeks it. The authors find that an increase in income inequality, an increase in the percentage of the population that votes, and an increase in the percentage of votes going to left-leaning candidates are each associated with higher levels of public health services. The per capita provision of doctors, nurses, and clinics is also greater in counties with a popular local leader, and in counties where the county mayor and state governor are politically aligned. Administrative decentralization of health services to the county decreases provision levels, and reduces access to services by the uninsured, unless it is accompanied by good local governance.Health Systems Development&Reform,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Public Health Promotion,Regional Rural Development,Gender and Health,Health Economics&Finance,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Systems Development&Reform,Regional Rural Development,Gender and Health

Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt

Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign

Can Network Theory-based Targeting Increase Technology Adoption?

In order to induce farmers to adopt a productive new agricultural technology, we apply simple and complex contagion diffusion models on rich social network data from 200 villages in Malawi to identify seed farmers to target and train on the new technology. A randomized controlled trial compares these theory-driven network targeting approaches to simpler strategies that either rely on a government extension worker or an easily measurable proxy for the social network (geographic distance between households) to identify seed farmers. Our results indicate that technology diffusion is characterized by a complex contagion learning environment in which most farmers need to learn from multiple people before they adopt themselves. Network theory based targeting can out-perform traditional approaches to extension, and we identify methods to realize these gains at low cost to policymakers. Keywords: Social Learning, Agricultural Technology Adoption, Complex Contagion, Malawi JEL Classification Codes: O16, O13Comment: 61 page

Enforcing Regulation under Illicit Adaptation

Attempts to curb illegal activity by enforcing regulations gets complicated when agents react to the new regulatory regime in unanticipated ways to circumvent enforcement. We present a research strategy that uncovers such reactions, and permits program evaluation net of such adaptive behaviors. Our interventions were designed to reduce over-fishing of the critically endangered Pacific hake by either (a) monitoring and penalizing vendors that sell illegal fish or (b) discouraging consumers from purchasing using an information campaign. Vendors attempt to circumvent the ban through hidden sales and other means, which we track using mystery shoppers. Instituting random monitoring visits are much more effective in reducing true hake availability by limiting such cheating, compared to visits that occur on a predictable schedule. Monitoring at higher frequency (designed to limit temporal displacement of illegal sales) backfires, because targeted agents learn faster, and cheat more effectively. Sophisticated policy design is therefore crucial for determining the sustained, longer-term effects of enforcement. Data collected from fishermen, vendors, and consumers allow us to document the upstream, downstream, spillover, and equilibrium effects of enforcement on the entire supply chain. The consumer information campaign generates two-thirds of the gains compared to random monitoring, but is simpler for the government to implement and almost as cost-effective