Durchrechung in der Pensionsversicherung: Langfristige Implikationen

Im Gegensatz zur öffentlichen Pensionsdiskussion der "Finanzierbarkeit" bzw. der "Nachhaltigkeit" stehen im Beitrag mögliche Folgewirkungen der Ausweitung der Bemessungszeit für die Bildung der Pensionsbemessungsgrundlage von 15 auf 40 Jahre im Mittelpunkt. Die Stärkung des Äquivalenzprinzips wird demnach bei zunehmender Destandardisierung der Beschäftigungs- wie auch der Einkommensverläufe künftig mit einem Bedeutungsgewinn der Ausgleichsmechanismen wie Teilversicherungszeiten und Mindestsicherungselementen verbunden sein – eine Entwicklung, die mit dem Kostendämpfungsziel der lebenslangen Durchrechnung nicht in Übereinstimmung steht

Österreich 2025: Arbeitszeitverteilung in Österreich - Analyse und Optionen aus Sicht der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer

Die empirische Evidenz zur Verteilung der Arbeitszeit unselbstständig Beschäftigter in Österreich zeigt eine hohe Heterogenität, insbesondere zwischen Frauen und Männern (Gender-Time-Gap). Während Frauen durchschnittlich mehr Zeit pro Woche für unbezahlte Tätigkeiten aufwenden als Männer, sind Männer im Durchschnitt einen Vollzeit-Tag pro Woche (8,2 Stunden) länger in bezahlter Beschäftigung als Frauen. Der beträchtliche Unterschied in der durchschnittlichen Wochenerwerbsarbeitszeit (Männer 39,8 und Frauen 31,6 Stunden) geht primär darauf zurück, dass fast die Hälfte der Frauen (49,4%) teilzeitbeschäftigt ist und viele Männer Überstunden leisten. Grund dafür sind traditionelle Rollenbilder sowie die ungleiche Verteilung der Hausarbeit und der Betreuung von Kindern und Pflegebedürftigen. So dominiert in Paarhaushalten mit Kindern unter 15 Jahren das Zuverdienst-Modell: Der Mann ist in Vollzeit erwerbstätig, die Frau in Teilzeit. Gleichzeitig entspricht bei rund einem Viertel der unselbstständig Beschäftigten die tatsächlich geleistete Wochenerwerbsarbeitszeit nicht dem gewünschten Ausmaß: Frauen würden durchschnittlich gerne mehr Stunden pro Woche berufstätig sein, Männer weniger. Mit zunehmendem Alter wird der Abstand zwischen gewünschter und realisierter Arbeitszeit größer. Die Studie zeigt arbeitszeitbezogene Ansatzpunkte zur Förderung einer ausgeglichenen Verteilung der Erwerbsarbeitszeit von Frauen und Männern über ihr Erwerbsleben ebenso wie Maßnahmen für spezifische Lebensphasen, die eine Anpassung der individuellen Erwerbsarbeitszeit zur Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und außerberuflichen Verpflichtungen bzw. Interessen ermöglichen.The empirical evidence for the distribution of the working hours of dependent workers in Austria shows a high heterogeneity, especially between women and men (gender time gap). While women spend an average more time per week on unpaid activities than men, men are on average a full-time day per week (8.2 hours) longer in paid employment than women. The significant difference in average weekly working hours (men 39.8 and women 31.6 hours) is primarily due to the fact that almost half of women (49.4%) work part-time and many men work overtime. The reason for this is traditional gender roles, as well as the uneven distribution of domestic work and the care of children and dependent persons. For example, in couples with children under the age of 15, the modified breadwinner model dominates: the man is full-time working, the woman part-time. At the same time, about a quarter of the employed is unsatisfied with their actual weekly working hours: on average women prefer working more hours a week, men less. With increasing age, the distance between preferred and realized weekly working hours increases. The study shows working-time approaches to promote a balanced distribution of the working time of women and men over their working lives, as well as measures for specific life stages, which allow an adaptation of the individual working time to reconcile work and non-work commitments or interests

Pension Levels and Income Replacement Ratios after the Adoption of the General Retirement Income Act

The effects of pension harmonisation on individual pension levels can be shown by applying the provisions of the General Retirement Income Act (APG) to the insurance patterns of persons retiring and receiving their first old-age pensions in 2002-03. For men, the General Retirement Income Act results in a reduction of gross pension benefits and a lower income replacement ratio, i.e., the ratio between the first retirement income and the last earned income. The extent of the reduction depends on the retirement age and, in particular, the deductions due to early retirement (corridor pension). In case of a long contributory period (traditional employment pattern), the income replacement ratio drops by 6 percentage points, while for persons with unstable insurance patterns the income replacement ratio according to APG will be about 14 percentage points lower than according to ASVG (General Social Insurance Act). These losses can be mitigated through continued employment up to the statutory retirement age and offset for persons with a traditional insurance history.Pensionsreform Allgemeines Pensionsgesetz Pensionshöhe Einkommensersatzrate

Expenditure on Social Protection in 2001

In 2001, the economic situation was less favourable than in previous years: modest economic growth (+0.8 percent) was accompanied by high unemployment (6.1 percent). Nonetheless, the social expenditure ratio in Austria rose just slightly to 28.4 percent. Having reached its peak of 29.9 percent in 1994, it had been declining ever since. Throughout the second half of the 1990s it ranged between 28.3 percent (2000) and 28.9 percent (1999), so that the figure for 2001 corresponded to the trend of overall stagnation.Sozialausgaben; Sozialquote; Sozialschutzausgaben

Severance Payment and New Severance Payment Scheme: New Momentum or Obstacle for the Austrian Labour Market?

WIFO studied the effects which two schemes to reform the severance payment currently proposed to Parliament would have on the Austrian labour market. Only a few terminated employment relationships currently meet the requirements to qualify for severance payment. An employee giving notice him-/herself is not eligible for severance payment. Eligibility rises in graduated steps with the length of stay in a company: no severance payment is due for employment of less than three years, but it amounts to one year's salary after 25 years of employment. In Austria, about one third of all employment relationships are terminated annually, with most of these employees not eligible for severance payment, since the currently applicable stepped rate acts to the detriment of employees who are employed by the same company for less than three years. Severance payment thus operates rather as a premium for employee loyalty. Two proposals have been submitted to Parliament which aim to bring the severance payment system more in line with high mobility rates and which simultaneously attempt to change severance payments into an old-age pension provision scheme (second pillar). The proposals furnished, respectively, by the SPÖ (Social Democratic Party) and ÖVP (Austrian People's Party) are contribution-based systems. In both models, the employee's entitlement to severance payment grows uniformly with the length of gainful employment. Even when an employee quits, the entitlement remains active in the severance payment fund, although the ÖVP's model precludes the employee from disposing of the money. Under the ÖVP's model, the employer pays contributions only for employees who have worked for the employer for more than a year. While this is an improvement over the current stepped model, it is still detrimental to the desired higher mobility of employees who would thus suffer a loss of entitlement. For mobile and seasonal workers in particular this model grants neither a bridging support nor any additional old age pension provision. After 300 contributory months (25 years), no more contributions need to be paid for the employee. The envisaged slow transition to the new system would reduce wage costs for older employees only in the 26th year, at a time when demographic projections forecast a severe shortage of workers. Seen from today, the capping will have a long-term effect in the loan and insurance industry, chemicals manufacturing industry, and energy and water utilities. With the maximum severance payment set at one year's salary, just as today, employees of these industries would not be worse off than today. The SPÖ proposal includes all employees in the system, regardless of the period of gainful employment and the type of termination. Employers need to make contributions to the severance payment funds for all employees, from the time they are first employed until the time they leave/retire. The model places greater emphasis on bridging and on additional old-age provision, since entitlements rise with the duration of gainful employment. Almost 71 percent of terminated employment relationships and 23 percent of continuing employment relationships have a duration of less than one year. Short term employment is particularly widespread in the construction industry, tourism, retail trade, data processing, loan and insurance businesses, and producer and other services. A reform of severance payments as envisaged by the SPÖ model would mean additional expenditure for employers, but would offer better security against unemployment and old-age provision to employees of these sectors, whereas this security would be lower if the ÖVP model were implemented.Umstellung des Abfertigungsrechtes: Impuls oder Hemmnis auf dem österreichischen Arbeitsmarkt?; Severance Payment and New Severance Payment Scheme: New Momentum or Obstacle for the Austrian Labour Market?

Social Expenditure Ratio for 2000 0.2 Percentage Points Lower than in 1999

Seen against the background of the relatively favourable economic conditions prevailing in 2000 (3.5 percent in real economic growth), expenditure for social security totalled € 59.6 billion, an increase over 1999 by 1.7 percent in real terms and thus markedly lower than the rise in GDP. As a result, the social expenditure ratio declined by 0.2 percentage points down to 28.8 percent. In the EU in general, the ratio reached an average of 27.4 percent in 2000. It is highest in Sweden and Denmark, followed by France and Germany, with Austria at fifth place.Sozialquote; Sozialleistungen; Österreich; Die Ausgaben für soziale Sicherheit im Jahr 2000; Social Expenditure Ratio for 2000 0.2 Percentage Points Lower than in 1999

Short-time Employment Dominates Labour Market in Austria

The analysis brought to light unexpectedly short employment periods in the Austrian labour market: on average, an employment terminated in 1997 had been effective for just 1.8 years. Unsurprisingly, average employment was very short in the sectors with traditional seasonal employment. What came as a surprise, however, was the fact that employment periods in the expanding services industries (company-related services, data processing, etc.) were also markedly below the overall average. The retail business is similarly characterised by short employment spells. The "longest" – albeit still very short – employment periods can be found in those sectors whose institutional framework provides for some degree of job security: here the list is topped by the insurance industry, where employment periods were 4.9 years on average, closely followed by energy and water utility industries and the credit sector. Short employment periods are, however, not limited to construction and tourism, the traditional sectors with seasonal employment. Rather, strong signs were found of labour market segmentation across all economic sectors. Taking the duration of employment as a yardstick, at least two segments, and thus at least two groups of employees, can be distinguished in the Austrian labour market: on the one hand, the stable primary labour market segment, with average employment periods of 12.4 years; on the other hand an uncertain secondary labour market with average employment periods of 2.6 years. Within the latter, a special group is made up by seasonal workers whose average employment spell is just 4 months. The segmentation of the Austrian labour market applies equally for women and men: both work short periods in seasonal jobs. In the secondary segment, women are employed slightly longer than men, at 2.7 and 2.5 years, respectively. In the secure segment, men enjoy a slight advantage over women, at 12.6 and 12.1 years, respectively. In view of these very short employment periods, an even greater increase in labour mobility through economic and social policy measures would run counter to efforts of efficiency. Mobility in terms of time spend on the same job is governed by the production process. Efficient production requires a certain pool of company-specific human resources, i.e., job-linked qualifications. Greater mobility would reduce the productivity of a company and it would mean constant training of new workers. For companies, greater mobility would thus mean greater costs from fluctuation and hencea decline in productivity.Kurze Beschäftigungsdauer dominiert den österreichischen Arbeitsmarkt; Short-time Employment Dominates Labour Market in Austria

Redistribution and Contribution Equivalence Austrian Old Age Security

The public pension system in Austria redistributes 15 percent of the gross domestic product within a pay-as-you-go-system to retirees. The extent of money transfers is not only determined by the systems gradual maturity but also by exogenous factors like demographic change, more volatile job relations and adjusting participation rates of the labour force. In a pay-as-you-go-system this generates financial pressure and finally shifts the redistribution pattern between generations. Austria's pension system is income based and designed to protect the retiree's living standard. Early pension reforms until the mid 1980's concentrated on increasing contribution rates. Negative labour market effects from high wedges between net and gross wages forced more recent reforms to stress actuarial measures, thereby redesigning the systems towards a more contribution based system. The main group at which financial cuts were targeted are future retirees. This is in line with international experience on pension reforms. The pension reform of 1997 harmonised the increments used to calculate new pensions at 2 percent for each insurance year. The maximum retirement pension (80 percent of the basis of assessment) can thus be obtained after 40 insurance years. At the same time, a system of actuarial discounts was introduced as a first attempt to raise the retirement age: each year of retirement before the regular retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men) makes for a reduction of 2 percent from the base of assessment. The reduction was capped in order to avoid hardships. Both reforms entered into force at the start of 2000, thereby strengthening the insurance principle of the retirement pension. As a further incentive to retire later, the period for calculating the basis of assessment for early retirement will be gradually extended to 18 years, starting in 2003. The transition phase will not be completed until 2020. The delayed effectiveness of the 1997 reform means that it does not yet have any visible financial effect on the federal contribution to the pension insurance schemes. Actually, the actuarial discounts currently produce a counter-incentive, speeding up early retirement. The retirement age for direct pensions nevertheless did not vary much over the past years. Average figures thus do not show a rush towards early retirement. The pension reform 2000 is characterised by budgetary consolidation efforts of the federal government. The financially most important part reduces the attractiveness of early retirement schemes by raising the discount to 3 percent per year and the minimum age for early retirement to 56½ and 61½ years, respectively. By relying on more rigorous admission criteria the government makes shure to achieve financial targets at the cost of formulating actuarial correct discounts and by restricting the possibility of individual choice with respect to the retirement age.Umverteilung und Beitragsäquivalenz in der Alterssicherung; Redistribution and Contribution Equivalence Austrian Old Age Security

Kosten der Anrechnung von Kindererziehungszeiten in der Pensionsversicherung: Endbericht (überarbeitet) ; Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Jugend und Familie

aus dem Inhaltsverzeichnis: Einleitung; Problemstellung; Rechtliche Regelungen; Verwendete Daten und Modelle; Die "alten" Kindererziehungszeitregelungen; Die bisherigen Kosten der Anrechnung von Kindererziehungszeiten ; Prognose der Kindererziehungszeiten bis 2010; Zusammenfassung und Schlußfolgerungen; Anhang: Tabellen und Graphiken