Hölder Continuous Implementation

Building upon the classical concept of Holder continuity and the notion of "continuous implementation"introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009), we define Hölder continuous implementation. We show that, under a richness assumption on the payo proles (associated with outcomes), the following full characterization result holds for finite mechanisms: a social choice function is Hölder continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable messages.High order beliefs, Robust implementation

Continuous Implementation

It is well-known that mechanism design literature makes many simplifying infor- mational assumptions in particular in terms of common knowledge of the environment among players. In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specif- ically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues to be (partially) implementable for types "close" to this initial model. We ?rst show that if the model is of complete information a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it satis?es Maskin?s monotonicity. We then extend this result to general incomplete information settings and show that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable only if it is fully implementable in iterative dominance. For ?nite mechanisms, this condition is also su¢ cient. We also discuss implications of this characterization for the virtual implementation approach.High order beliefs, robust implementation

Mutation du marketing BtoB : D'une stratégie marketing BtoB à une stratégie BtoC et ses dérivés/Moyens, enjeux et impacts pour des biens techniques dans l'industrie du bâtiment/Le cas de BWT, leader européen du traitement de l’eau

Marketing et Ecoute des marché

Continuous Implementation with Local Payoff Uncertainty

Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner is not entirely sure of the validity of his model and thus wants the social choice function to be not only (partially) implemented at all types of the initial model, but also at all types “close” to those types. In addition, we assume that the social planner also has some doubts on the payoffs of the outcomes and thus wants his prediction to be robust when these payoffs are close but not exactly equal to those in the initial model. Under this local payoff uncertainty, the present paper establishes the following full characterization result for finite mechanisms: a social choice function is continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies

Hölder Continuous Implementation

Building upon the classical concept of H older continuity and the notion of \continuous implementation"introduced in Oury and Tercieux (2009), we de ne H older continuous implementation. We show that, under a richness assumption on the payo pro les (associated with outcomes), the following full characterization result holds for nite mechanisms: a social choice function is H older continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable messages.no

Noise-Independent Selection in Multidimensional Global Games

This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (Journal of Economic Theory 108 (2003) 1- 44) for onedimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by Carlsson and Van Damme (Econometrica, 61, 989-1018). More precisely, our main result states that if an action pro le of some complete information game is noise-independently selected in some one-dimensional global game, then it is also noise-independently selected in all multidimensional global games.no

Continuous Implementation

In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a social choice function is continuously implementable. More specifically, we say that a social choice function is continuously (partially) implementable if it is (partially) implementable for types in the model under study and it continues to be (partially) implementable for types "close" to this initial model. Our results show that this notion is tightly connected to full implementation in rationalizable strategies

Genetic and environmental effects on puroindoline-a and puroindoline-b content and their relationship to technological properties in French bread wheats

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