Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization

We provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization. In their influential analysis of 19th century continental European industrialization, Gerschenkron and Schumpeter accorded banks a central role, arguing that they promoted the creation of new industries. We formalize this role of banks by introducing financial intermediaries into a 'big push' model. We show that banks may act as `catalysts' for industrialization provided that they are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms, and that they possess sufficient market power to make profits from coordination. The theory provides simple conditions that help to explain why banks seem to play a creative role in some but not in other emerging markets. The model also shows that universal banking helps to reduce the cost of coordination. Finally, we show that one disadvantage of catalytic banks is that they may favor concentration in the industrial sector.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39827/3/wp443.pd

Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization

We provide a new theory of the role of banks as catalysts for industrialization. In their influential analysis of 19th century continental European industrialization, Gerschenkron and Schumpeter accorded banks a central role, arguing that they promoted the creation of new industries. We formalize this role of banks by introducing financial intermediaries into a 'big push' model. We show that banks may act as `catalysts' for industrialization provided that they are sufficiently large to mobilize a critical mass of firms, and that they possess sufficient market power to make profits from coordination. The theory provides simple conditions that help to explain why banks seem to play a creative role in some but not in other emerging markets. The model also shows that universal banking helps to reduce the cost of coordination. Finally, we show that one disadvantage of catalytic banks is that they may favor concentration in the industrial sector.Coordination Failures, Financial Institutions, Financial History, Banks, Banking and Finance

Financing Entrepreneurial Firms in Europe: Facts, Issues, and Research Agenda

During the latter part of the 1990s the introduction of the euro, the dramatic increase in the supply of venture capital in most EU countries, and the creation of several ‘new’ equity markets targeted at innovative firms have dramatically transformed the financing prospects of European entrepreneurial firms. In this study we contribute to a deeper understanding of their actual relevance by (i) gathering new evidence on European venture capital and on Europe’s ‘new’ stock markets, (ii) providing a rigorous econometric analysis of their impact on corporate growth, and (iii) elaborating on our findings to devise a research agenda.venture capital, initial public offerings (IPOs), entrepreneurship, going public, accounting standards

Public policy and the creation of active venture capital markets

We study how public policy can contribute to increase the share of early stage and high-tech venture capital investments, thus helping the development of active venture capital markets. A simple extension of the seminal model by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) provides a theoretical base for our analysis. We then explore a unique panel of data for 14 European countries between 1988 and 2001. We have several novel findings. First, the opening of stock markets targeted at entrepreneurial companies positively affects the shares of early stage and high-tech venture capital investments; reductions in capital gains tax rates have a similar, albeit weaker, effect. Second, a reduction in labor regulation creases the share of high-tech investments. Finally, we find no evidence of a shortage of supply of venture capital funds, and no evidence of an effect of increased public R&D spending on the share of high-tech or early stage venture capital investments. JEL Classification: G10, G24, H20, O30Barriers to Entrepreneurship, Capital Gains Tax, Public Policy, Public R&D Expenditure, Stock Markets, Venture Capital

Investor Size and Division of Labor: Evidence from a Survey of Private Equity Limited Partners

Using a comprehensive survey, we show that investors with a larger capital allocation to private equity are more specialized and have a wider scope of due diligence and investment activities. Smaller investors tend to free ride on decisions made by larger investors. Other investor characteristics (experience, type, location, compensation structure, number of funds under management) play no role. These results are consistent with increasing returns to scale for due diligence, and with the savings generated by increased scale going into increasing scope rather than into cost reduction. Our findings provide an explanation for the observed outperformance of larger investors when it comes to investing in private equity

What is the Role of Legal Systems in Financial Intermediation? Theory and Evidence

We develop a theory and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between a venture investor and an entrepreneur. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection, and they develop more value-adding skills. These predictions are stongly supported by the empirical analysis. We also find that the investor’s legal system is more important that of the company in determining these effects, and that legal system effects persist within civil law countries

TheImportanceofTrustforInvestment: Evidence from Venture Capital

This paper examines the effect of trust in a micro-economic environment, where trust is clearly exogenous. Using a hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity of venture capital firms ’ partners is shown to matter for the effect of trust. We also considers the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights. We find trust and sophisticated contracts to be complements, no

What is the Role of Legal Systems in Financial Intermediation? Theory and Evidence

We develop a theory and empirical test of how the legal system affects the relationship between a venture investor and an entrepreneur. The theory uses a double moral hazard framework to show how optimal contracts and investor actions depend on the quality of the legal system. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of European venture capital deals. The main results are that with better legal protection, investors give more non-contractible support and demand more downside protection, and they develop more value-adding skills. These predictions are stongly supported by the empirical analysis. We also find that the investor’s legal system is more important that of the company in determining these effects, and that legal system effects persist within civil law countries

The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital

We examine the effect of trust on financial investment decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. We then consider the relationship between trust and performance, evaluating two competing hypotheses: one based on the notion that higher trust benefits investment performance, the other based on the notion that lack of trust constitutes a hurdle to investments. We find evidence of a negative relationship between trust and exit performance, especially for IPOs. We further show that more sophisticated investors are more likely to make low trust investments, and that by doing so they achieve superior performance. Based on this and some additional evidence we conclude that lack of trust is a hurdle to making venture capital investments, but that investors who overcome this hurdle tend to do well