The Okun Misery Index in the European Union Countries from 2000 to 2009

The study is composed of four main parts and a summary. The first part, introduction, discusses various measures of the economic system's efficiency that are used in practice. Part two emphasises that the GDP per capita according to purchasing power parity still remains the most popular among those measures. Further, it presents the ranking of the European Union countries taking that measure into account, the research period being 1999-2009. Part three points out that it is also the level of poverty (misery) that determines the economic system's efficiency. That level can be measured by means of various indicators, among others, the so called HPI-2 index calculated by the UN. It will be the Okun misery index, however, computed as the sum of inflation and unemployment rates that will be presented as an alternative being of interest from the macroeconomic point of view. The ranking of the European Union member states according to that measure in the 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 periods will be provided in part four. The article will end in a summary containing synthetic conclusions drawn from earlier observations.Opracowanie składa się z czterech części zasadniczych i podsumowania. W punkcie pierwszym omówiono różnorodne mierniki sprawności systemu gospodarczego wykorzystywane w praktyce. W części drugiej podkreślono, iż nadal najpopularniejszym z nich jest PKB per capita według parytetu siły nabywczej. Zgodnie z tym miernikiem przedstawiono ranking państw Unii Europejskiej w latach 1999-2009. W punkcie trzecim podkreślono, że o sprawności systemu gospodarczego decyduje także poziom ubóstwa. Może być on mierzony różnymi wskaźnikami, m.in. tzw. indeksem HPI-2 obliczanym przez ONZ. Jako ciekawą z makroekonomicznego punktu widzenia alternatywę ukazano jednak miarę wskaźnika ubóstwa Okuna obliczanego poprzez zsumowanie stopy inflacji i stopy bezrobocia. Ranking państw Unii Europejskiej według tej miary w okresach 2000-2004 oraz 2005-2009 zaprezentowano w części czwartej. Całość zamknięto podsumowaniem, w którym zawarto syntetyczne wnioski z przeprowadzonych obserwacji

Competitive market for multiple firms and economic crisis

The origin of economic crises is a key problem for economics. We present a model of long-run competitive markets to show that the multiplicity of behaviors in an economic system, over a long time scale, emerge as statistical regularities (perfectly competitive markets obey Bose-Einstein statistics and purely monopolistic-competitive markets obey Boltzmann statistics) and that how interaction among firms influences the evolutionary of competitive markets. It has been widely accepted that perfect competition is most efficient. Our study shows that the perfectly competitive system, as an extreme case of competitive markets, is most efficient but not stable, and gives rise to economic crises as society reaches full employment. In the economic crisis revealed by our model, many firms condense (collapse) into the lowest supply level (zero supply, namely bankruptcy status), in analogy to Bose-Einstein condensation. This curious phenomenon arises because perfect competition (homogeneous competitions) equals symmetric (indistinguishable) investment direction, a fact abhorred by nature. Therefore, we urge the promotion of monopolistic competition (heterogeneous competitions) rather than perfect competition. To provide early warning of economic crises, we introduce a resolving index of investment, which approaches zero in the run-up to an economic crisis. On the other hand, our model discloses, as a profound conclusion, that the technological level for a long-run social or economic system is proportional to the freedom (disorder) of this system; in other words, technology equals the entropy of system. As an application of this new concept, we give a possible answer to the Needham question: "Why was it that despite the immense achievements of traditional China it had been in Europe and not in China that the scientific and industrial revolutions occurred?"Comment: 17 pages; 3 figure

Why are Prices Sticky? Evidence from Business Survey Data

This paper offers new insights on the price setting behaviour of German retail firms using a novel dataset that consists of a large panel of monthly business surveys from 1991-2006. The firm-level data allows matching changes in firms' prices to several other firm-characteristics. Moreover, information on price expectations allow analyzing the determinants of price updating. Using univariate and bivariate ordered probit specifications, empirical menu cost models are estimated relating the probability of price adjustment and price updating, respectively, to both time- and state- dependent variables. First, results suggest an important role for state-dependence; changes in the macroeconomic and institutional environment as well as firm-specific factors are significantly related to the timing of price adjustment. These findings imply that price setting models should endogenize the timing of price adjustment in order to generate realistic predictions concerning the transmission of monetary policy. Second, an analysis of price expectations yields similar results providing evidence in favour of state-dependent sticky plan models. Third, intermediate input cost changes are among the most important determinants of price adjustment suggesting that pricing models should explicitly incorporate price setting at different production stages. However, the results show that adjustment to input cost changes takes time indicating "additional stickiness" at the last stage of processing

Why Don’t People Pay Attention? Endogenous Sticky Information in a DSGE Model

Building on the models of sticky information, we endogenize the probability of obtaining new information by introducing a switching mechanism allowing agents to choose between costly rational expectations and costless expectations under sticky information. Thereby, the share of agents with rational expectations becomes endogenous and timevarying. While central results of sticky information models are retained, we find that the share of rational expectations is positively correlated with the variance of the variable forecasted, providing a link to models of near-rationality. Output expectations in our model are generally more rational than inflation expectations, but the share of rational inflation expectations increases with a rising variance of the interest rate. With regard to optimal monetary policy, we find that the Taylor principle provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the determinacy of the model. However, output and inflation stability are optimized if the central bank does not react too strongly to inflation, but rather also targets the output gap with a relatively large coefficient in the Taylor rule

Universal features in the growth dynamics of complex organizations

We analyze the fluctuations in the gross domestic product (GDP) of 152 countries for the period 1950--1992. We find that (i) the distribution of annual growth rates for countries of a given GDP decays with ``fatter'' tails than for a Gaussian, and (ii) the width of the distribution scales as a power law of GDP with a scaling exponent $\beta \approx 0.15$. Both findings are in surprising agreement with results on firm growth. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the evolution of organizations with complex structure is governed by similar growth mechanisms.Comment: 4 pages, 7 ps figures, using Latex2e with epsf rotate and multicol style files. Submitted to PR

A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing