Secure detection in quantum key distribution by real-time calibration of receiver

The single photon detection efficiency of the detector unit is crucial for the security of common quantum key distribution protocols like Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84). A low value for the efficiency indicates a possible eavesdropping attack that exploits the photon receiver's imperfections. We present a method for estimating the detection efficiency, and calculate the corresponding secure key generation rate. The estimation is done by testing gated detectors using a randomly activated photon source inside the receiver unit. This estimate gives a secure rate for any detector with non-unity single photon detection efficiency, both inherit or due to blinding. By adding extra optical components to the receiver, we make sure that the key is extracted from photon states for which our estimate is valid. The result is a quantum key distribution scheme that is secure against any attack that exploits detector imperfections.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figure

Perturbation of spectra and spectral subspaces

We consider the problem of variation of spectral subspaces for linear self-adjoint operators under off-diagonal perturbations. We prove a number of new optimal results on the shift of the spectrum and obtain (sharp) estimates on the norm of the difference of two spectral projections

Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography

Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.Comment: 13 pages, 8 figure

On a Subspace Perturbation Problem

We discuss the problem of perturbation of spectral subspaces for linear self-adjoint operators on a separable Hilbert space. Let $A$ and $V$ be bounded self-adjoint operators. Assume that the spectrum of $A$ consists of two disjoint parts $\sigma$ and $\Sigma$ such that $d=\text{dist}(\sigma, \Sigma)>0$. We show that the norm of the difference of the spectral projections \EE_A(\sigma) and \EE_{A+V}\big (\{\lambda | \dist(\lambda, \sigma) $<d/2\}\big)$ for $A$ and $A+V$ is less then one whenever either (i) $\|V\|<\frac{2}{2+\pi}d$ or (ii) $\|V\|<{1/2}d$ and certain assumptions on the mutual disposition of the sets $\sigma$ and $\Sigma$ are satisfied

Controlling single-photon detector ID210 with bright light

We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be exploited by an eavesdropper to perform a faked-state attack giving her full knowledge of the key without being noticed. We consider the attack on standard BB84 protocol and a subcarrier-wave scheme, and outline a possible countermeasure.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Invisible Trojan-horse attack

We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a detailed numerical comparison of the attack performance against Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol at 1924nm versus that at 1536nm. The attack strategy was proposed earlier but found to be unsuccessful at the latter wavelength, as reported in N.~Jain et al., New J. Phys. 16, 123030 (2014). However at 1924nm, we show experimentally that the noise response of the detectors to bright pulses is greatly reduced, and show by modeling that the same attack will succeed. The invisible nature of the attack poses a threat to the security of practical QKD if proper countermeasures are not adopted.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figures, due to problem in the compilation of bibliography, we are uploading a corrected versio