Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.environmental regulation, audits and compliance, environmental standards, other instruments.

Incentius de les universitats per transferir les seves innovacions

La producció de coneixement a la universitat i la recerca troben la seva aplicació pràctica en l'empresa i en la indústria. Així, la recerca bàsica desenvolupada a la universitat es converteix en un element clau per al creixement d'un país. Aquest treball estudia com es pot incentivar la transferència de coneixement de la universitat a la societat sense que això provoqui en els centres d'investigació una disminució de la seva capacitat de formació i d'inversió en recursos humans.La producción de conocimiento en la universidad y la investigación encuentran su aplicación práctica en la empresa y en la industria. Así, la investigación básica desarrollada en la universidad se convierte en un elemento clave para el crecimiento de un país. Este trabajo estudia cómo se puede incentivar la transferencia de conocimiento de la universidad a la sociedad sin que por ello los centros de investigación pierdan capacidad de formación e inversión en recursos humanos

On the joint production of research and training

Universities and research institutions have the responsibility to produce science and to provide training to new generations of researchers. In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the determinants of a senior scientist's decisions about allocating time between these tasks. The results of this decision depend upon the characteristics of the research project, the senior scientist's concern for training and the expected innate ability of the junior scientist involved. We analyze the role that a regulator can play in defining both the value of scientific projects and the future population of independent scientists.Allocation of time between tasks; research and training; senior and junior scientists

A Theoretical Approach to Dual Practice Regulations in the Health Sector

Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We focus on three interventions: banning dual practice, offering rewarding contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice (including both limits to private earnings of dual providers and limits to involvement in private activities). An ancillary objective of the paper is to investigate whether regulations that are optimal for developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. Our results offer theoretical support for the desirability of different regulations in different economic environments.Dual practice, optimal contracts, physicians' incentives, regulations.

Incentives in University Technology Transfers

There are two main ways in which the knowledge created in universities has been transferred to firms: licensing agreements and the creation of spin-offs. In this paper, we describe the main steps in the transfer of university innovations, the main incentive issues that appear in this process, and the contractual solutions proposed to address them.

Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the easiest-to-monitor firms and to those firms that value pollution the less. Moreover, unless the budget for monitoring is very large, there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental objective and others that do comply; but all of them evade the environmental taxes.Environmental taxes, optimal audit policy.

Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development

This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher?s time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce  researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the ?skewing problem? would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.Faculty behaviour, basic vs. applied research

Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard

Published as an article in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, vol. 44, issue 1, pages 183-194.endogenous coalition formation, moral hazard, partnerships

A theoretical approach to dual practice regulations in the health sector

Financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (ECO2008-04321 and ECO2009- 07616), Generalitat de Catalunya (2009SGR-169) and Junta de Andalucía (SEJ-02936 and SEJ-04992) is gratefully acknowledged.Altres ajuts, Proyecto de la Junta de Andalucía P07-SEJ-02936 i SEJ-04992Internationally, there is wide cross-country heterogeneity in government responses to dual practice in the health sector. This paper provides a uniform theoretical framework to analyze and compare some of the most common regulations. We focus on three interventions: banning dual practice, offering rewarding contracts to public physicians, and limiting dual practice (including both limits to private earnings of dual providers and limits to involvement in private activities). An ancillary objective of the paper is to investigate whether regulations that are optimal for developed countries are adequate for developing countries as well. Our results offer theoretical support for the desirability of different regulations in different economic environments