Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing

We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We assume there are learningby- doing effects for incumbents and show that competition leads to vote-share contracts implementing the socially optimal threshold, which is above one-half. Vote-share contracts improve the average ability level of a reelected politician and increase effort in the first term of an incumbent. On the other hand, vote-share contracts reduce the probability that learning-by-doing takes place. However, the overall effect of vote-share contracts is welfare-enhancing, even under the assumption of learning-by-doing.elections, political contracts, vote-share thresholds, learning-by-doing effects, incumbency advantage

Information Markets, Elections and Contracts

Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare. Finally, we suggest several ways to avoid the manipulation of information markets and we discuss possible pitfalls of the mechanism.democracy, elections, information markets, threshold contracts and triple mechanism

Elections, Contracts and Markets

As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the political information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare.elections, threshold contracts, democracy, information markets, triple mechanism

Multilingual Adaptation of RNN Based ASR Systems

In this work, we focus on multilingual systems based on recurrent neural networks (RNNs), trained using the Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC) loss function. Using a multilingual set of acoustic units poses difficulties. To address this issue, we proposed Language Feature Vectors (LFVs) to train language adaptive multilingual systems. Language adaptation, in contrast to speaker adaptation, needs to be applied not only on the feature level, but also to deeper layers of the network. In this work, we therefore extended our previous approach by introducing a novel technique which we call "modulation". Based on this method, we modulated the hidden layers of RNNs using LFVs. We evaluated this approach in both full and low resource conditions, as well as for grapheme and phone based systems. Lower error rates throughout the different conditions could be achieved by the use of the modulation.Comment: 5 pages, 1 figure, to appear in 2018 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP 2018