Anonymity in Nonatomic Games

In nonatomic games, anonymity must be assumed in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. This can be formalized by making payoffs dependent either on the players' distribution on the action set or on the strategy mean. An extension of Rath's (1992) proof to the case of limited anonymity is proposed: the behavior of the population as a whole, is shown sufficient to get equilibrium existence in pure strategies.

The effects of vocational education on adult skills, employment and wages: What can we learn from PIAAC?

We have shown that vocational education does not perform as well as academic education both in labour market outcomes and in the level of basic skills, including literacy and numeracy. This is especially true for higher education. Only at the upper secondary or post-secondary level does vocational education perform slightly better than academic education in the probability of being currently employed as well as in the time spent in paid employment, although the differences we find are small

The Effect of Immigration on the School Performance of Natives: Cross Country Evidence Using PISA Test Scores

We study whether a higher share of immigrant pupils affects the school performance of natives using aggregate multi-country data from PISA. We find evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship. The size of the estimated effect is small: doubling the share of immigrant pupils in secondary schools from its current sample average of 4.8 percent to close to 10 percent would reduce the test score of natives by 1.32 to 1.96 percent, depending on the selected group of natives. There is also evidence that – conditional on the average share of immigrant pupils – reducing the dispersion of this share between schools has small positive effects on the test scores of natives.immigrants, school performance, natives

Educational standards in private and public schools

When school quality increases with the educational standard set by schools, education before college needs not be a hierarchy with private schools offering better quality than public schools. An alternative configuration, with public schools offering a higher educational standard than private schools, is also possible, in spite of the fact that tuition levied by private schools is strictly positive. In our model, private schools can offer a lower educational standard at a positive price because they attract students with a relatively high cost of effort, who would find the high standards of public schools excessively demanding. With the key parameters calibrated for the US and Italy, our model predicts that majority voting in the US supports a system with high quality private schools and low quality public schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano, 1998. An equilibrium with low quality private schools is supported instead in Italy.private schools, public schools, majority voting

The Implications of Cultural Background on Labour Market Choices: The Case of Religion and Entrepreneurship

We suggest a methodology for identifying the implications of alternative cultural and social norms embodied by religious denomination on labour market outcomes, by estimating the differential impact of Protestantism versus Catholicism on the propensity to be an entrepreneur, on the basis of the diverse minority status of both confessions across European regions. Our quasi-experimental research design exploits the stronger degree of attachment to religious ethic of religious minorities and the exogenous historical determination of the geographical distribution of religious minorities in Europe. Our analysis of European Social Survey data collected in four waves between 2002 and 2008 in 22 European countries, indicates that cultural background has a significant effect on the individual propensity to become an entrepreneur, with Protestantism increasing the chances to be an entrepreneur by around 3% with respect to Catholicism. Our findings, stable across a number of robustness checks, provide further evidence on the need to take cultural elements into consideration when analysing economic behaviour.entrepreneurship, self-employment, religion, culture, Protestantism, Catholicism

Educational Standards in Private and Public Schools

We show that, when school quality is measured by the educational standard and attaining the standard requires costly effort, secondary education needs not be a hierarchy with private schools offering better quality than public schools, as in Epple and Romano, 1998. An alternative configuration, with public schools offering a higher educational standard than private schools, is also possible, in spite of the fact that tuition levied by private schools is strictly positive. In our model, private schools can offer a lower educational standard at a positive price because they attract students with a relatively high cost of effort, who would find the high standards of the public school excessively demanding. With the key parameters calibrated on the available micro-econometric evidence from the US, our model predicts that majority voting in the US supports a system with high quality private schools and low quality public schools, as assumed by Epple and Romano, 1998. This system, however, is not the one that would be selected by the social planner, who prefers high quality public schools combined with low quality private schools.private schools, public schools, majority voting

On The Economic Value of Repeated Interactions Under Adverse Selection

The paper studies, in a repeated interaction setting, how the presence of cooperative agents in a heterogeneous community organized in groups affects efficiency and group stability. The paper expands on existing literature by assuming that each type can profitably mimic other types. It is shown that such enlargement of profitable options prevents group stabilization in the single group case. Stabilization can be obtained with many groups, but its driver is not the efficiency gain due to the presence of cooperative individuals. Rather, stabilization is the result of free riding opportunities.Adverse Selection, Group Stability, Altruism

Lost in Transition? The returns to education acquired under communism 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall

Using data for 23 economies in Eastern and Western Europe, we find evidence that having studied under communism is relatively penalized in the economies of the late 2000s. This evidence, however, is limited to males and to primary and secondary education, and holds for eight CEE economies but not for the East Germans who have studied in the former German Democratic Republic. We also find that post-secondary education acquired under communism yields higher, not lower, payoffs than similar education in Western Europe.

Lost in Transition? The Returns to Education Acquired under Communism 15 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall

Using data for 22 economies in Eastern and Western Europe, we find evidence that having studied under communism is relatively penalized in the economies of the late 2000s. This evidence, however, is limited to males and to primary and secondary education, and holds for eight CEE economies but not for the East Germans who have studied in the former German Democratic Republic. We also find that post-secondary education acquired under communism yields higher, not lower, payoffs than similar education in Western Europe.returns to education, Eastern Europe

Pricing of an Endogenous Peak-Load

This paper aims to explore the peak-load price results arising in a congestion game setting. A continuum of players decide when consuming a service (say, during the day or the night): for instance, they choose when connecting to internet or when driving a car in the road network. The utility they get is a function of the individual preferences and of the aggregate behavior of the other players. Therefore day and night demands are endogenous. We consider what prices a social planner imposes to drive the players' choice towards the equilibrium distribution of first best. Moreover, we consider what prices (and what distribution) a monopolist, maximizing his profit, chooses, when he has to satisfy an universal service requirement and when he may restrict his supply. Finally, we determine which capacity level is optimal to install for either a social planner or a monopolist in this setting.