Zimmermann’s Polemics with Vernić and Lach

Stjepan Zimmermann bio je uključen u dvije polemike oko svoje knjige Duševni život koja je tiskana 1932. godine, a sadržava opći pregled empirijske i filozofske psihologije. Jedna je polemika bila između Zimmermanna i Zdenka Vernića. Vernić misli da je knjiga obična promidžba neotomističke crkvene filozofije, a Zimmermannu prigovara i manjak originalnosti u istraživanju problematike. Josip Lach je pak u svojoj recenziji knjige iznio nekoliko prigovora, tvrdeći da su neke teze nejasne; općeniti Lachov prigovor upućen je manjku skolastičke filozofije u knjizi. Zimmermann odgovara Verniću tvrdnjom da su sve teze u knjizi argumentirane na strogo znanstven način te da se zbog toga ne radi o vjerskoj promidžbi, unatoč slaganju teza iz knjige s vjerskim istinama katolicizma, dok Lachu odgovara tezom da u knjizi tog obima i te namjene naprosto nema mjesta za detaljniji prikaz tematike iz neoskolastičke perspektive.Stjepan Zimmermann was involved in two public polemics about his book Duševni život (Mental Life) published in 1932, which contains a general summary of empirical and philosophical psychology. One of the debates involved Zimmermann and Zdenko Vernić, who believes the book to be a simple propaganda of Neo-Thomist philosophy, and he also objects to the lack of Zimmermann’s originality in his research. Josip Lach has also brought up several objections in his review of the book, claiming that some of the theses are not clear enough. Lach’s general criticism concerns the lack of scholastic philosophy in the book. Zimmermann responds to Vernić by claiming that all the theses in the book are argued for in a strict scientific manner and therefore they are not an example of religious propaganda, despite the fact that some of them agree with the religious truths of Catholicism, while he responds to Lach with an argument that a book of that size and purpose simply does not allow a detailed analysis of the subject matter from a Neo-Scholastic perspective

Bubanović and Zimmermann on soul and body

Od 1915. do kraja 1917. vodila se polemika između Frana Bubanovića i Stjepana Zimmermanna oko odnosa tijela i duše. Bubanović je zastupao materijalizam, dok je Zimmermann tvrdio da su tijelo i duša različiti, te da je duša neprotežna. Debata se doticala i odnosa filozofije prema prirodnim znanostima, gdje je Bubanović tvrdio da filozofija mora uzeti u obzir rezultate prirodnih znanosti, a Zimmermann je smatrao da je filozofija jednim svojim dijelom neovisna o prirodnim znanostima.Since 1915 till the end of 1917 a public disscussion between Fran Bubanović and Stjepan Zimmermann took place regarding the relation between body and soul. Bubanović advocated materialism, while Zimmermann claimed that the soul is distinct from the body, and that it is not extended. The debate also touched on the relationship of philosophy and the natural sciences; Bubanović thought that philosophy has to take into consideration the results of natural science and Zimmermann criticized the legitimacy of inferring significant philosophical theses from scientific results due to his belief that human knowledge transcends experience

Zimmermann about Intentionality

Zimmermann intencionalnost shvaća kao esencijalnu relacionalnost, tj. odnos mentalnoga stanja prema predmetu. Makar ne zastupa tezu o intencionalnosti kao oznaci mentalnoga, tvrdi da je intencionalnost prikladan kriterij za klasifikaciju mentalnih stanja u međusobno isključive kategorije. Suprotno tim izjavama, ne čini se da je pojam intencionalnosti u njegovim djelima posve jasan, niti da ima eksplanatornu ulogu koju mu je Zimmermann namijenio. Zimmermann se pri klasifikaciji mentalnih stanja češće poziva na razliku između osjetnih i duhovnih, za koju često iznosi i detaljne argumente. U ovom radu iznosim probleme s Zimmermannovim shvaćanjem intencionalnosti, te pojašnjavam alternativnu podjelu mentalnih stanja koju se u njegovim djelima može pronaći. Ključni dio argumenata u prilog toj alternativnoj podjeli Zimmermannovo je inzistiranje na postojanju fiziološki neuvjetovanih momenata u ljudskoj spoznaji, a glavni su primjeri skolastički shvaćena apstrakcija i relativno opažanje. Analizom tih primjera pokazuje se da su višestruko problematični, te da ne pružaju adekvatnu potporu značajnim tezama koje Zimmermann na njima temelji.Zimmermann understands intentionality as essential relationality, ie the relation of a mental state with its object. Although he doesn’t subscribe to the thesis of intentionality as the mark of the mental, he does claim that intentionality is a suitable criterion for classification of mental states into mutually exclusive categories. Contrary to those statements, there does not seem to be a clear conception of intentionality present in his works, nor it seems that intentionality plays the intended explanatory role. Zimmermann more often uses another distinction while classifying mental states, that between sensory and spiritual ones, which he often adduces detailed arguments for. In this paper I bring forth the problems with Zimmermann’s notion of intentionality and explain the alternative division of mental states found in his works. Crucial part of the arguments presented in favor of the alternative division is Zimmermann’s insistence on the existence of physiologically unconditioned moments in human cognition, prime examples of which are abstraction (construed in a scholastic manner) and relative perception. Analysis of those examples shows that they contain multiple problems, and do not provide adequate support to the claims Zimmermann bases on them

ZIMMERMANN ON SUBJECT MATTER AND METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY

Stjepan Zimmermann na više mjesta u svom opusu raspravlja o predmetu, ciljevima, zadaćama i metodama psihologije. Autonomiju psihologije kao znanosti usko veže uz posebnost njezina predmeta, tj. smatra da je psihologija kao znanost moguća samo ako se može pokazati da ona svoj predmet ne dijeli s drugim znanostima. Glavnim metodama psihologije Zimmermann smatra samopromatranje i eksperiment. Prema metodi, psihologiju je moguće podijeliti na empirijsku i filozofsku, a njihova je razlika u odnosu prema iskustvenoj verifikaciji zaključaka do kojih dolaze. Središnji pak dio filozofske psihologije pitanje je o jastvu, tj. ontološkom statusu svjesnog subjekta. Zimmermann pohvalno komentira rad würzburške škole psihologije, u čijim rezultatima vidi empirijsku potvrdu filozofskih teza koje zastupa. U ovom članku detaljnije pojašnjavam te Zimmermannove teze te navodim prigovore koje im je moguće uputiti.Stjepan Zimmermann dealt with the subject matter, goals, tasks and methods of psychology on multiple occasions in his work. He viewed the scientific autonomy of psychology as being closely related to the special character of its subject matter, and he believed that scientific psychology is possible only if it can be shown that its subject matter is not shared with other sciences. Zimmermann considered self-observation and experiment to be the main methods of psychology. Using the criterion of method, psychology can be divided into empirical and philosophical, and their difference is in the relation to experiential verification of their conclusions. The central part of philosophical psychology is the question of the self, or the ontological status of the conscious subject. Zimmermann commended the work of the Würzburg School of Psychology, the results of which he saw as an empirical confirmation of the philosophical claims he accepted. In this article, a more thorough explanation of Zimmermann’s claims has been provided and possible objections brought forth