Investor Behavior in the Option Market

This paper investigates the behavior of investors in the equity option market using a unique and detailed dataset of open interest and volume for all contracts listed on the Chicago Board Options Exchange over the 1990 through 2001 period. We document major stylized facts about the option market activity of three types of non-market maker investors over this time period and also investigate how their trading changed during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000. Our key findings are: (1) non-market maker investors have about four times more long call than long put open interest, (2) these investors have more short than long open interest in both calls and puts, (3) each type of investor purchases more calls to open brand new positions when the return on underlying stocks are higher over horizons ranging from one week to two years into the past, (4) the least sophisticated group of investors substantially increased their purchases of calls on growth but not value stocks during the stock market bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000, and (5) none of the investor groups significantly increased their purchases of puts during the bubble period in order to overcome short sales constraints in the stock market.

Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols

Using a comprehensive sample of equity-linked private securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000, we examine whether such offerings can be used as a mechanism for wealth transfer between issuers and acquirers. For deals involving issuers and acquirers in the same business group (chaebol), the announcement returns for chaebol-affiliated issuers with good past performance are lower than those for other types of issuers if the price discount is larger. In contrast, this deal leads to more value creation for chaebol-affiliated acquirers than other types of acquirers. Furthermore, well-performing chaebol-affiliated acquirers experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy securities from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol. We also find that chaebol firms with good past performance tend to sell private securities at a low price to their member firms. This evidence is consistent with tunneling within business groups.

Are Insiders' Trades Informative?

We document insider trading activities of all companies listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq exchanges during the 1975-1995 period. Insider trading is common, and in more than half the sample firms, there is at least some insider activity in a given year. In general, very little market movement is observed when insiders trade and when they report their trades to the SEC. Insiders in aggregate are contrarian investors. However, they predict market movements better than simple contrarian strategies. Insiders also seem to be able to predict cross-sectional stock returns. The result, however, is driven by insider's ability to predict returns in smaller firms. In addition, insider purchases are more informative than insider sales.

Synthesis of Natural Homoisoflavonoids Having Either 5,7-Dihydroxy-6-methoxy or 7-Hydroxy-5,6-dimethoxy Groups

Naturally occurring homoisoflavonoids containing either 5,7-dihydroxy-6-methoxy or 7-hydroxy-5,6-dimethoxy groups such as the antiangiogenic homoisoflavanone, cremastranone, were synthesized via three or four linear steps from the known 4-chromenone. This facile synthesis includes chemoselective 1,4-reduction of 4-chromenone and selective deprotection of 3-benzylidene-4-chromanone a containing C7-benzyloxy group

Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued Equity?

This article examines the relationship between top executives' trading and the long-run stock returns of seasoned equity issuing firms. Primary issuers, who sell mostly newly issued primary shares, significantly underperform their benchmarks, regardless of the top executives' prior trading pattern. However, top executives' trading is reliably associated with the stock returns of secondary issuers, who sell mostly secondary shares previously held by existing shareholders. On average, secondary issuers do not underperform their benchmarks. The results suggest that increased free cash flow problems after issue play an important role in explaining the underperformance of issuing firms. Copyright 1997 by American Finance Association.

Two essays in finance

In the first essay, "Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued Equity?", I develop a simple equilibrium model which shows that insider trading around seasoned equity offerings (SEO) depends on both the quality of issuing firms and insiders' exogenous consumption shocks, neither of which are known by outside investors in the model. The empirical evidence indicates that insider trading is not reliably related to the future long-term stock returns of issuing firms even though it is reliably related to their announcement period abnormal returns. Issuing firms underperform their benchmarks regardless of the prior insider trading pattern. This suggests that insiders who have purchased shares before issuing do not realize that the market has overcapitalized prior good news, and are not knowingly selling overvalued equity.The second essay, "Deposit Insurance with Changing Volatility: An Application of Exotic Options", develops a model to incorporate the bank managers' incentives to change the bank's volatility into the pricing of deposit insurance. It is assumed that the volatility of the bank's assets changes or can be changed when the assets first hit a certain level. The results show that the shareholders' equity and the deposit insurance premium can be represented as combinations of generalized versions of particular barrier options known as down-and-out and down-and-in options. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the properties of the model.U of I OnlyETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissio