A Married Woman’s Surname: Is Custom Law?

Although I first examine the history of surnames, the focus of this Article is an inquiry into two questions which the courts must resolve: First, under the common law can women retain their pre-marriage names during marriage; and secondly, if not, is the imposition of the husband’s name on his wife constitutional

Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII

In contrast to most recent commentary and a superficial reading of Supreme Court cases, Professor Lamber rehabilitates the concept of a distinct disparate impact theory under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. She examines one important evidentiary question-the significance of alternative employee section criteria-to expose underlying policy questions often buried in technical questions of form. Others have argued that the Supreme Court\u27s apparent analytical and evidentiary alignment of disparate impact and disparate treatment cases shows that Title VII bars only intentional discrimination and thus the purpose of alternatives evidence is quite limited. Professor Lamber presents a different view, arguing that a proper understanding of the Court\u27s Title VII decisions and of the specific interests employers assert to justify criteria demonstrates that using alternatives to evaluate these justifications need not impose undue burdens on employers. Identifying typical fact patterns in Title VII litigation, she then illustrates three ways in which alternatives evidence can be relevant. Professor Lamber concludes that the utility of alternatives evidence depends on the kind of selection criterion challenged and the employer\u27s reason for using it

Private Causes of Action Under Federal Agency Nondiscrimination Statutes

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. Similarly Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs or activities. Although the effect of Title VI has been felt primarily in education, the statutory prohibition applies to any federally funded activity, public or private, including hospitals, social service and welfare agencies, law enforcement agencies, housing, and recreational programs. Both statutes provide for administrative enforcement against prohibited activities. This article explores the question of whether a private cause of action should be implied against a noncomplying recipient of federal financial assistance under Titles VI and IX