A VLSI compatible conducting polymer composite based "electronic nose" chip

The focus of this work would be to exploit the vapor detection technology developed recently at Caltech that forms the basis for a low power, simple "electronic nose". In this work we have integrated the sensors, signal preprocessing, signal processing, and data analysis functions into a single, low power, low cost, "nose chip". Such a device could be implantable covertly or overtly onto suspect sites, deployable through remote delivery methods, worn by soldiers for CW alerts and in principle for IFF or military/nonmilitary identification purposes, and for other areas of national security where low power, lightweight, small, chemical sensing is of importance

Do we need dynamic semantics?

I suspect the answer to the question in the title of this paper is no. But the scope of my paper will be considerably more limited: I will be concerned with whether certain types of considerations that are commonly cited in favor of dynamic semantics do in fact push us towards a dynamic semantics. Ultimately, I will argue that the evidence points to a dynamics of discourse that is best treated pragmatically, rather than as part of the semantics

Powering the Planet [2007 MRS Spring Meeting Plenary Address]

I am humbled and honored to be here to tell you about a topic that is dear to everyone’s heart — and vital to the future of our planet. My colleague, Richard Smalley, gave a presentation1 on this topic several years ago, at a similar MRS plenary session. Over the last few years of Dr. Smalley’s life, he and I worked together, traveling across our country to deliver a message about a subject that we — like many others, both scientists and lay people — have come to believe is unequivocally the most important technological problem in the world: our global energy future. That is an incredibly powerful statement, one that during the next hour I hope to ably defend

Dynamic Semantics

This article focuses on foundational issues in dynamic and static semantics, specifically on what is conceptually at stake between the dynamic framework and the truth-conditional framework, and consequently what kinds of evidence support each framework. The article examines two questions. First, it explores the consequences of taking the proposition as central semantic notion as characteristic of static semantics, and argues that this is not as limiting in accounting for discourse dynamics as many think. Specifically, it explores what it means for a static semantics to incorporate the notion of context change potential in a dynamic pragmatics and denies that this conception of static semantics requires that all updates to the context be eliminative and distributive. Second, it argues that the central difference between the two frameworks is whether semantics or pragmatics accounts for dynamics, and explores what this means for the oft-heard claim that dynamic semantics blurs the semantics/pragmatics distinction

Confronting a Monument: The Great Chief Justice in an Age of Historical Reckoning

The year 2018 brought us two new studies of Chief Justice John Marshall. Together, they provide a platform for discussing Marshall and his role in shaping American law. They also provide a platform for discussing the uses of American history in American law and the value of an historian’s truthful, careful, complete, and accurate accounting of American history, particularly in an area as sensitive as American slavery. One of the books reviewed, Without Precedent, by Professor Joel Richard Paul, provides an account of Chief Justice Marshall that is consistent with the standard narrative. That standard narrative has consistently made a series of unsupported and ahistorical claims about Marshall over the course of two centuries. The substantial errors contained in this standard narrative are exposed by another book, Supreme Injustice, by Professor Paul Finkelman, which reveals, in groundbreaking fashion, Chief Justice Marshall’s deep personal and professional commitment to, and investment in, the institution of American slavery. Chief Justice Marshall’s commitment to an institution that has been rejected by our law and by pervasive social norms should give his modern successors, attorneys, judges or students of the law, as well as citizens, substantial pause when relying upon Marshall as a posthumous authority and reference point in debates regarding contemporary legal subjects. Any other conclusion would countenance an unjustified double-standard when assessing American historical figures whose conduct we would condemn if perpetrated by historical figures from foreign nations