Limits of US Influence: the Promotion of Regime Change in Latin America

Scholars often assume that as a global superpower, the United States has had great influence and impact on political regime developments in the world. This article critically examines these claims, focusing on Latin America; by investigating the region most directly dominated by the US, it employs a most-likely-case design. The experiences of countries such as Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela show that US influence has been fairly limited for many years and has diminished over time. The Northern superpower has been less involved and has had less impact on regime developments than often postulated, as the analysis of the coups in Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973 demonstrates. Moreover, nations to which the US has maintained close, comprehensive linkages, such as Venezuela, have slid into “competitive authoritarianism” while a country such as Haiti, over which the US holds great leverage, has failed to establish a functioning democracy. Thus, even in its direct sphere of interest, the most powerful nation in the contemporary world seems to be limited in its capacity to promote or prevent political regime change.Muchos investigadores asumen que, como superpotencia global, los Estados Unidos han tenido una gran influencia y un fuerte impacto sobre los cambios de régimen político en el mundo. El presente artículo hace una evaluación crítica de estos argumentos, concentrándose en el caso latinoamericano. Investigando la región dominada más directamente por los EUA, el artículo utiliza un diseño de "caso más probable". Las experiencias de países como Brasil, Chile, Haití, Nicaragua y Venezuela muestran que, desde hace muchos años, la influencia de EUA ha sido relativamente limitada y que ha disminuido a lo largo del tiempo. La superpotencia del Norte se ha involucrado menos y ha tenido un menor impacto sobre los cambios de régimen que el que muchos observadores postulan, como demuestra el análisis de los golpes militares en Brasil en 1964 y en Chile en 1973. Además, naciones que han mantenido conexiones densas y extensas con los EUA, como por ejemplo Venezuela, han descendido hacia un "autoritarismo competitivo", mientras que un país como Haití, sobre el cual los EUA tienen un enorme poder de presión, ha fallado en el esfuerzo de establecer una democracia que funcione apropiadamente. En conclusión, aun en su esfera de influencia directa, el país más poderoso en el mundo contemporáneo parece enfrentar limitaciones en su capacidad de promover o prevenir cambios del régimen político

Why and how do political actors pursue risky welfare state reforms?

Why and how do political actors pursue risky welfare state reforms, in spite of the institutional mechanisms and political resistance that counteract change? This is one of the key puzzles of contemporary welfare state research, which is brought about by the absence of a complete account that identifies both the cause and causal mechanisms of risky reforms. In this article we offer a remedy for this lacuna. Prospect theory teaches us that political actors will only undertake risky reforms if they consider themselves to be in a losses domain, that is when their current situation is unacceptable. Next, we discuss the strategies that political actors use to avoid the blame associated with risky reforms. These provide the causal mechanisms linking cause and effect. The sudden outburst of risky reforms in formerly 'immovable' Italy provides an empirical illustration of our account. Copyright © 2007 Sage Publications

Cidadania mediada : processos de democratização da política municipal no Brasil

This article discusses the notion that the persistence of &ldquo;traditional&rdquo; political practices weakens Brazil&rsquo;s democracy.Drawing on the cases of three Brazilian municipalities administered by the Workers&rsquo; Party (PT), the author examines the space between &ldquo;traditional&rdquo; and &ldquo;modern&rdquo; and argues that successful democratization does not eradicate practices such as clientelism and patronage, but it tends to incorporate and build on these traditional political elements. Moreover, the article maintains that the democratization of municipal politics is inextricably bound up with the eradication of poverty and the construction of a responsive, state-based social safety net.<br /

International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999

Why do some countries adopt market-oriented reforms such as deregulation, privatization and liberalization of competition in their infrastructure industries while others do not? Why did the pace of adoption accelerate in the 1990s? Building on neo-institutional theory in sociology, we argue that the domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly influenced by international pressures of coercion and emulation. We find robust support for these arguments with an event-history analysis of the determinants of reform in the telecommunications and electricity sectors of as many as 205 countries and territories between 1977 and 1999. Our results also suggest that the coercive effect of multilateral lending from the IMF, the World Bank or Regional Development Banks is increasing over time, a finding that is consistent with anecdotal evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened the scope of the “conditionality” terms specifying market-oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries. We discuss the possibility that, by pressuring countries into policy reform, cross-national coercion and emulation may not produce ideal outcomes.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40099/3/wp713.pd