Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy

We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that individual objective functions are optimized by an effort and insurance combination that is unique and satisfies first- and second-order conditions. Modeling insurance incompleteness in terms of costly production of private insurance services, we characterize the constrained inefficiency arising in general equilibrium from competitive pricing of nonexclusive financial contracts

Consumption smoothing and liquidity income redistribution

We show theoretically that income redistribution benefits borrowingconstrained individuals more than is implied by standard relative-income and uninsurable-risk considerations. Empirically, we find in international opinion-survey data that younger and lower-income individuals express stronger support for government redistribution in countries where consumer credit is less easily available. This evidence supports our theoretical perspective if such individuals are more strongly affected by tighter credit supply, in that expectations of higher incomes in the future increase their propensity to borrow. JEL Classification: E2

Consumption Smoothing and Liquidity Income Redistribution

We show theoretically that income redistribution benefits borrowingconstrained individuals more than is implied by standard relative-income and uninsurable-risk considerations. Empirically, we find in international opinion-survey data that younger and lower-income individuals express stronger support for government redistribution in countries where consumer credit is less easily available. This evidence supports our theoretical perspective if such individuals are more strongly affected by tighter credit supply, in that expectations of higher incomes in the future increase their propensity to borrow.Consumption, Smoothing

Debt Portfolios

We provide a model with endogenous portfolios of secured and unsecured household debt. Secured debt is collateralized by owner-occupied housing whereas unsecured debt can be discharged according to bankruptcy regulations. We show that the calibrated model matches important quantitative characteristics of observed wealth and debt portfolios for prime-age consumers in the U.S. We then establish the quantitative result that home equity does not serve as informal collateral for unsecured debt since, as in the data, unsecured debtors hold small amounts of home equity in equilibrium. Thus, observed variations in homestead exemptions, which are an important part of U.S. bankruptcy regulation, have a small effect on the quantity and price of unsecured debt.household debt portfolios, housing, collateral, bankruptcy, commitment, income risk

Public and Private Insurance with Costly Transactions

We characterize how public insurance schemes are constrained by hidden financial transactions. When non-exclusive private insurance entails increasing unit transaction costs, public transfers are only partly offset by hidden private transactions, and can influence consumption allocation. We show that efficient transfer schemes should take into account the impact of insurance on unobservable effort and saving choices as well as the relative cost of public and private insurance technologies. We provide suggestive evidence for the empirical relevance of these results by inspecting the cross-country relationship between available indicators of insurance transaction costs and variation in public and private insurance.public transfers, private insurance, moral hazard, transaction costs

Debt Portfolios

We provide a model with endogenous portfolios of secured and unsecured household debt. Secured debt is collateralized by durables whereas unsecured debt can be discharged in bankruptcy procedures. We show that the model matches the main quantitative characteristics of observed wealth and debt portfolios in the US and some of the observed changes over time. Furthermore, we establish two quantitative results. Firstly, modest levels of risk aversion are necessary to match observed debt portfolios. Secondly, durables do not improve consumers' access to unsecured credit, and plausible variations of durable exemptions in bankruptcy procedures have very small effects on the equilibrium.Household debt portfolios, Durables, Collateral, Income risk, Bankruptcy

Dealer Pricing of Consumer Credit

Interest rates on consumer lending are lower when funds are tied to purchase of a durable good than when they are made available on an unconditional basis. Further, dealers often choose to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. This paper interprets this phenomenon in terms of monopolistic price discrimination. We characterize consumers' intertemporal consumption decisions and the dealer's pricing incentives when the consumers' unconditional lending and borrowing rate as well as the internal rate of return of the durable purchase differ. Our empirical analysis offers considerable support for the assumptions and implications of our theoretical perspective.