The Effect of Audit Standards on Fraud Consultation and Auditor Judgment

We investigate how the strictness of a requirement to consult on potential client fraud affects auditor assessments of fraud risk and the propensity to consult with firm experts. We test two specific forms of guidance about fraud consultations: (1) relatively strict (i.e., mandatory and binding) and (2) relatively lenient (i.e., advisory and non-binding). We predict that a strict consultation requirement will lead to greater propensity to consult and higher fraud risk assessments. We further investigate potentially amplifying effects of a client attribute (underlying fraud risk) and an engagement attribute (deadline pressure). Results from two experiments with 208 Dutch audit managers and partners demonstrate that fraud risk and the consultation propensity are both assessed higher under a strict consultation requirement. For near-partners and partners, this effect is compounded when a client exhibits significant red flags; for managers, it is compounded when deadline pressure is tight. This study demonstrates that the formulation of a standard, such as the consultation requirement, may create adverse incentives that bias risk assessment, which should be considered by regulators and audit firms when developing, formulating and implementing such procedures

Audit research in the wake of SOX

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to summarize the effect that the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) by the US Congress had on audit research. More specifically, the paper compares the nature of research about auditing conducted before the Act’s passage to the nature of research about audit regulation that dominates the literature since its passage. Design/methodology/approach - The paper builds on an extensive review of the research literature before and after the passage of SOX to suggest and examine potential future research paths that might develop in auditing. The streams of research are linked and organized around four themes: auditing as a competitive process, auditing as a service process, auditing as a production process and auditing as a quality control process. Findings - In general, auditing research prior to SOX tended to focus on issues encountered in the practice of auditing with tangential implications for audit regulation. The passage of SOX had the effect of focusing audit research on the nature, costs and benefits of regulation, particularly the components of the law that had the most effect on auditing such as the prohibition against many non-audit services, the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as a standard setter that also inspects audit firms, and the introduction of the requirement that a client’s internal control over financial reporting be examined and opined upon as part of an integrated audit. Although this research has increased our understanding of auditing and regulation, the heavy focus on SOX has pushed research about auditing itself to a lesser role. The profession’s, academy’s and regulatory understanding of auditing may benefit from a more balanced approach to auditing as something separate from the regulation of auditing. Originality/value - The intent of this paper is to challenge the way researchers think about research questions in auditing. Hopefully, this approach will encourage auditing researchers to look at the audit and audit regulation through a new lens, testing propositions and aspects of auditing that have been overlooked by the dominate focus on audit regulation over the past decade

Short-term accruals and the pricing and production of audit services

This study investigates how risk associated with increased levels of accruals that might be indicative of earnings management affects the pricing and production of audit services. Francis and Krishnan (1999) suggest that auditors can deal with the risk of earnings management in five ways: (1) screen out high-risk clients; (2) charge a premium to riskier clients; (3) increase audit effort; (4) negotiate adjustments to the financial statements; and/or (5) report more conservatively (e.g., by issuing a modified report). Using a unique data set, the current study investigates two of these options: charging a fee premium and increasing audit effort. Based on previous research on audit pricing and production, we construct models for audit fees, total audit effort, labor mix (extent of experienced auditor effort), and engagement profit margin including an accruals measure that could indicate earnings management. We test these models on a sample of 119 audit engagements from one Big 6 audit firm in The Netherlands. We find that signed short-term accruals are associated with a significant increase in audit fees as well as total effort, but not with experience mix or profit margin. However, we find secondary evidence that auditors utilize more supervisors, assistants and support personnel and earn smaller profits (returns) when a client has higher levels of short-term accruals. Taken together, these results suggest that auditors are responsive to high levels of short-term accruals that may be indicative of earnings management, and will increase their work effort even if they are unable to recoup all of the related costs

Economic incentives for voluntary reporting on internal risk management and control systems

This paper investigates managers' economic incentives for voluntary reporting on risk management and internal control using a sample of publicly traded firms in The Netherlands in the late 1990s. In this particular setting, internal control reporting was voluntary and covered a wide business-based approach as defined in key internal control frameworks. We create an index to measure the extent of disclosure by identifying six reportable items related to internal control. Regarding managers' incentives to report, we hypothesize that voluntary disclosure increases with the extent of information and agency problems, as proxied by management and block holder ownership and financial leverage. Supporting our hypotheses, we find a negative relationship between the extent of internal control disclosure and management and block holder ownership, and positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and financial leverage. We interpret these findings as evidence for a conscious trade-off by managers, which is linked to the costs and benefits of making internal control disclosures. Additionally, we find some evidence that the extent of disclosure varies with firms' inherent risk exposure, as proxied by a number of firm operating characteristics. One implication of our findings is that regulators may wish to allow firms flexibility in their internal control reporting choice, as firms take a broad approach to internal control that goes beyond SOX-based regulations, and tailor their internal control reports to suit their specific environments

The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees

Leading academic and professional accountants have suggested that the crisis in auditing over the past few years may have had its origin in deregulation which allowed firms to advertise their services and solicit new clients, encouraging accounting firms to become more commercial. In this paper, we look at this issue in New Zealand which has the unique distinction of having separated two key forms of deregulation, namely advertising and solicitation, by 6 years. This allows us to separately examine the effect of each form of market competition on audit fees. We find that advertising is associated with increases in fees, not decreases, which suggests that quality-based advertising took place, and not price-based advertising. In contrast, solicitation corresponded with a general decrease in average fees for clients of the Big 8. We interpret this result as indicating an increase in competition among accounting firms. Our results suggest that there may be a much more complex relationship among market competition, advertising and solicitation, and fees than the arguments used to originally justify deregulation.status: publishe