Parties, promiscuity and politicisation: business-political networks in Poland

Research on post-communist political economy has begun to focus on the interface between business and politics. It is widely agreed that informal networks rather than business associations dominate this interface, but there has been very little systematic research in this area. The literature tends to assume that a politicised economy entails business-political networks that are structured by parties. Theoretically, this article distinguishes politicisation from party politicisation and argues that the two are unlikely to be found together in a post-communist context. Empirically, elite survey data and qualitative interviews are used to explore networks of businesspeople and politicians in Poland. Substantial evidence is found against the popular idea that Polish politicians have business clienteles clearly separated from each other according to party loyalties. Instead, it is argued that these politicians and businesspeople are promiscuous. Since there seems to be little that is unusual about the Polish case, this conclusion has theoretical, methodological, substantive and policy implications for other post-communist countries

Transcription regulation of the Escherichia coli pcnB gene coding for poly(A) polymerase I: roles of ppGpp, DksA and sigma factors

Poly(A) polymerase I (PAP I), encoded by the pcnB gene, is a major enzyme responsible for RNA polyadenylation in Escherichia coli, a process involved in the global control of gene expression in this bacterium through influencing the rate of transcript degradation. Recent studies have suggested a complicated regulation of pcnB expression, including a complex promoter region, a control at the level of translation initiation and dependence on bacterial growth rate. In this report, studies on transcription regulation of the pcnB gene are described. Results of in vivo and in vitro experiments indicated that (a) there are three σ70-dependent (p1, pB, and p2) and two σS-dependent (pS1 and pS2) promoters of the pcnB gene, (b) guanosine tetraphosphate (ppGpp) and DksA directly inhibit transcription from pB, pS1 and pS2, and (c) pB activity is drastically impaired at the stationary phase of growth. These results indicate that regulation of the pcnB gene transcription is a complex process, which involves several factors acting to ensure precise control of PAP I production. Moreover, inhibition of activities of pS1 and pS2 by ppGpp and DksA suggests that regulation of transcription from promoters requiring alternative σ factors by these effectors of the stringent response might occur according to both passive and active models

Together forever? Explaining exclusivity in party-firm relations

Parties and firms are the key actors of representative democracy and capitalism respectively and the dynamic of attachment between them is a central feature of any political economy. This is the first article to systematically analyse the exclusivity of party-firm relations. We consider exclusivity at a point in time and exclusivity over time. Does a firm have a relationship with only one party at a given point in time, or is it close to more than one party? Does a firm maintain a relationship with only one party over time, or does it switch between parties? Most important, how do patterns of exclusivity impact on a firm’s ability to lobby successfully? We propose a general theory, which explains patterns of party-firm relations by reference to the division of institutions and the type of party competition in a political system. A preliminary test of our theory with Polish survey data confirms our predictions, establishing a promising hypothesis for future research

Governing drug reimbursement policy in Poland: The role of the state, civil society, and the private sector

This article investigates the distribution of power in Poland’s drug reimbursement policy in the early 2000s. We examine competing theoretical expectations suggested by neopluralism, historical institutionalism, corporate domination, and clique theory of the post-communist state, using data from a purposive sample of 109 semi-structured interviews and documentary sources. We have four concrete findings. First, we uncovered rapid growth in budgetary spending on expensive drugs for narrow groups of patients. Second, to achieve these favorable policy outcomes drug companies employed two prevalent methods of lobbying: informal persuasion of key members of local cliques and endorsements expressed by patient organizations acting as seemingly independent “third parties.” Third, medical experts were co-opted by multinational drug companies because they relied on these firms for scientific and financial resources that were crucial for their professional success. Finally, there was one-way social mobility from the state to the pharmaceutical sector, not the “revolving door” pattern familiar from advanced capitalist countries, with deleterious consequences for state capacity. Overall, the data best supported a combination of corporate domination and clique theory: drug reimbursement in Poland was dominated by Western multinationals in collaboration with domestically based cliques.Piotr Ozieranski is indebted to the Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge and St Edmund’s College for research grants

UPS and Downs of Maritocratic Principles of Public Policy

The author analyses the factors that weaken the influence of the principles of meritocracy on the institutions and public policy. He indicates that a meritocratic approach to governance in the programming of public actions has become a resource for obtaining legitimacy of power in Poland to a limited extent. The advantages of meritocracy (the “efficiency” and “justice”) have not been exploited on a significant scale. As a result, there is a significant illegitimacy of the democratic system, as well as the weakening of the society identification with the state. This phenomenon is  characterized by low prestige of politicians and a poor voter turnout. The author draws attention to the fact that meritocratic management mechanisms of public institutions in Poland are significantly reduced due to numerous factors – the appropriation of the state by political parties, institutional nomadism of the elite, the rules of political capitalism, a soft state and the institutionalization of non-responsibility or activities of various interest groups and backstage actors of politics