Lending with Costly Enforcement of Repayment and Potential Fraud

If contracts are costlessly enforcible then insolvency is the only reason for nonrepayment of loans. While some models have examined the borrower's incentive to repay, it has typically been assumed that the penalty suffered by a debtor in default is imposed automatically and without cost to the lender. If in fact invoking a penalty is costly, Pareto-improving loans may be dynamically inconsistent not because of the absence of a sufficiently harsh penalty for default, but because the lender has no incentive actually to implement the penalty in the event of default. In such situations infinitely-lived institutions can emerge as banking intermediaries between lenders and borrowers. These institutions, repeatedly involved in lending, have an incentive to enforce contracts that individual lenders lack. They can consequently sustain more lending. For their reputations as enforcers of contracts to have value requires that banks earn strictly positive profits. Maintaining the value of bank equity also provides an incentive for bankowners to invest deposits rather than to use these funds fraudulently. Because of the supernormal profits that banks must earn, an equilibrium that is sustained by bank reputation will not replicate an equilibrium in which loan repayment is automatically guaranteed.

Optimal and Time Consistent Exchange Rate Management in an Overlapping Generations Economy

This paper analyzes exchange rate management in a simple overlapping generations model. This framework is used to evaluate alternative policies in terms of their implications for the welfare of individuals in the economy.The analysis identifies two objectives of monetary policy,providing adesirable store of value and collecting seigniorage. When the chief concern is to provide a desirable store of value (as when the monetary authority's major constituency consists of the asset holders of the economy), a policy of fixing the exchange rate does better when shocks are primarily of domestic origin while floating becomes more desirable when foreign shocks predominate. When seigniorage concerns are paramount (as when the authority's constituency is the young generation) flexible rates do better.When seigniorage concernsare paramount and when the monetary authority cannot establish a reputation for conducting monetary policy in a way that makes the currency a desirable store of value, a national currency may not be viable in the absence of exchange controls. Such controls may be justified in this situation.

Foreign-Owned Land

Land and capital serve not only as factors of production but as assets which households use as stores of value. Standard trade models typically recognize only the first role. In its role as an asset land reduces the amount of national savings available for capital investment. Foreign investment affects the national economy through both asset markets and factor markets. When the share of labor in the land-using sectoris large relative to the labor share in the capital-using sector, factor-market effects are likely to dominate. In this case a drop in the price of the agricultural good or a rise in the land-labor ratio attracts foreign investment, while a drop in the world interest rate raises the welfare of a capital-importing country. If the share of labor in the land-using sector is smaller, however, asset-market effects dominate. These results are then likely to be reversed. Even when trade in claims on land equalizes the domestic and world interest rates, a tax on land raises steady-state welfare.

Engines of Growth: Domestic and Foreign Sources of Innovation

We examine productivity growth since World War II in the five leading research economies: West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. Available data on the capital-output ratio suggest that these countries grew as they did because of their ability to adopt more productive technologies, not because of capital deepening per se. We present a multicountry model of technological innovation and diffusion which has the implication that, for a wide range of parameter values, countries converge to a common growth rate, with relative productivities depending on the speed with which countries adopt technologies developed at home and abroad. Using parameter values that fit a cross section of data on productivity, research, and patenting, we simulate the growth of the five countries, given initial productivity levels in 1950 and research efforts in the subsequent four decades. Based on plausible assumptions about 'technology gaps' that existed among these countries in 1950 we can explain their growth experiences quite successfully. Specifically, the simulations capture the magnitude of the slowdown in German, French, and Japanese productivity growth and the relative constancy of U.K. and U.S. growth.

Innovation, Diffusion, and Trade

We explore the determinants of research specialization across countries and its consequences for relative wages. Using a dynamic Ricardian model we examine the effects of faster international technology diffusion and lower trade barriers on the incentive to innovate. In the absence of any diffusion at all, countries devote the same share of resources toward research regardless of trade barriers or research productivity. As long as trade barriers are not too high, faster diffusion shifts research activity toward the country that does it better. This shift in research activity raises the relative wage there. It can even mean that, with more diffusion, the country better at research ends up with a larger share of technologies in its exclusive domain.

International Patenting and Technology Diffusion

We model the invention of new technologies and their diffusion across countries. Our model predicts that, eventually, all countries will grow at the same rate, with each country's productivity ranking determined by how rapidly it adopts inventions. The common growth rate depends on research efforts in all countries, while research effort is determined by how much inventions earn at home and abroad. Patents affect the return to invention. We relate the decision to patent an invention internationally to the cost of patenting in a country and to the expected value of patent protection in that country. We can thus infer the direction and magnitude of the international diffusion of technology from data on international patenting, productivity, and research. We fit the model to data from the five leading research economies. The parameters indicate how much technology flows between these countries and how much each country earns from its inventions domestically and elsewhere. Our results imply that foreign countries are important sources of technology even though countries earn most of their return to innovation at home. For example, about half of U.S. productivity growth derives from foreign technology yet U.S. investors earn 98 per cent of the revenue from their inventions domestically.

Trade in Capital Goods

Innovative activity is highly concentrated in a handful of advanced countries. These same countries are also the major exporters of capital goods to the rest of the world. We develop a model of trade in capital goods to assess its role spreading the benefits of technological advances. Applying the model to data on production and bilateral trade in capital equipment, we estimate the barriers to trade in equipment. These estimates imply substantial differences in equipment prices across countries. We attribute about 25 percent of cross-country productivity differences to variation in the relative price of equipment, about half of which we ascribe to barriers to trade in equipment.

Innovation, Trade, and Growth

We consider the interaction of trade and technology diffusion in a two-region model of innovation and imitation. We find that globalization, either in the form of lower trade barriers or in faster diffusion of technology between innovator and imitator spurs innovation, benefiting both regions.

Sanctions

Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) takes to influence the actions of another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used, for example, by creditors to get a foreign sovereign to repay debt or by one government to influence the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of another government. Sanctions can harm the sender as well as the target. The credibility of such sanctions is thus at issue. We examine, in a game-theoretic framework, whether sanctions that harm both parties enable the sender to extract concessions. We find that they can, and that their thrust alone can suffice when they are contingent on the target's subsequent behavior. Even when sanctions are not used in equilibrium, however, how much compliance they can extract typically depends upon the coats that they would impose on each party.