Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties’ compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. These conclusions are accentuated when monitoring for compliance to IEAs is inaccurate.International environmental agreements, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government. Key Words:

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.Voluntary agreements, self-enforcing agreements, emissions tax, enforcement

Atlantic Canada: The Constitutional Offshore Regime

While it is a truism that people shape resources, it is equally true that resources shape people. This is so not only in terms of the individual but also of his society. Resources are the foundation of economic development - upon them turn such diverse questions as where a population will settle and the level of education required of that population for the harvesting of the resource. The regions of Canada are not diversified as much by strict cultural populations as with the resources which have shaped the regional populations. To date, the Atlantic provinces have seemingly been by-passed from the mainstream of Canadian economic development. However, in the eastern provinces there presently exists the possibility of a resource bonanza in the form of offshore oil and gas development. The ramifications to the peoples of these provinces are immense. Accordingly, it is crucial if they are to benefit fully in any economic renewal that the regional governments, with necessarily regional interests, have the greatest say in that offshore development

A Study of The United Irish League in The King's County, 1899-1918

This thesis is a study of the growth, development, fortunes, and subsequent decline of the United Irish League (UIL) in the King's county between 1899 and 1918. This organisation carried out many tasks for the Home Rule or Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), such as collecting party funds, registering voters, organising demonstrations, canvassing voters during elections, and solving disputes between Nationalists. Historians have tended to examine the defeat of the IPP in the General Election of 1918 in the light of events that unfolded after 1914 (and more particularly after the Easter Rising), but this thesis shows that the party's structures at local level (ie the UIL organisation) was in a chaotic state as early as 1912; and consequently, the rise of Sinn Fein after 1916 took place in a background of much less opposition than might have been anticipated. The first two chapters in the thesis examine the early growth and development of the movement in the county, which was not entirely a smooth occurrence for a number of reasons. Particularly striking here was the general wave of apathy prevalent in the county after the Parnellite split in 1890, and while the deposed leader had little concrete support in the county, the absence of moderate opinion regarding the crisis meant the bitterness that resulted remained longer than might otherwise have been the case. Existing Nationalist organisations at this time like the Irish National League, Irish National Federation, and the GAA, all suffered from the dispute; while the resultant loss in the confidence of the divided Irish Party at Westminister more than anything else helped to give the IRB a boost in its membership in certain parts of the country at this time. Even after the UIL had established strong roots in Connacht, the new organisation had difficulty making its presence felt in the King's county, and this can be accounted for by the absence of strong clerical support at first for the movement; plus the added fact that the counties two MP's in 1899 failed to join or espouse its principles. This meant paid organisers had the task of establishing branches, but the prudent decision of the RIC not to proclaim any of its meetings or arrest any of its leaders meant the UIL had to work hard to gain publicity for its principles. Even after the formation of the branches in 1899 and 1900, many Nationalists were reluctant to join the movement, and this may be accounted for by the contradiction of aims within the UIL movement, particularly in relation to the grazing or 11- months system of land holding. Chapters three and four deal mainly with agrarian matters, most notably, the effects of the Wyndham Land Act and the Ranch War of 1906-1909. It is argued in the thesis that both had long term implications for the UIL's strength, which may have been unnoticed by Party leaders and MPs at this time. While the Wyndham Land Act was generally welcomed at first in the county, and resulted in many tenants rushing to purchase their holdings, many disputes emerged over the rights of the evicted tenants which had profound implications for some of the UIL branches in the county. Likewise, the Ranch War was also responsible for creating divisions among Nationalists, particularly in relation 1 to the stoppage of the Ormond Hunt, the result being that after 1908 the UIL began to lose support that would culminate in the IPPs defeat in 1918 General Election. The second half of the thesis examines in detail this slip in support for the UIL. The role played by the county's two MPs, Michael Reddy and Haviland Burke, in this are examined, while the National Directory's failure to check this decline deserves special attention. The defeat of the UIL's candidate in the Tullamore by-election of December 1914 may have come as a shock to the IPP, but should not, as the UIL was in very poor shape throughout the county by this time. Attempts to reorganise lapsed branches afterwards in 1915 were hamstrung by the UIL's links to the IPP, for the latter's support for Britain in the War resulted in many decisions which became increasingly unpopular as the conflict dragged on until 1918. The most notable examples here include the recruiting campaign; the malting and liquour restrictions; the many grievances of farmers, such as the commandeering of hay, oats and wool; fixing of cattle prices; the Equalisation of Time Act; and the tillage regulations of 1917. Allied to all this was the change in public opinion in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising, which had an important prelude in the county in the "Tullamore Affair" that March; while the IPP lost more support due to its involvement in the failed Irish Convention of 1917-1918. Meanwhile, during 1916 and 1917, the UIL continued to decline at local level and this is reflected in the amount of funds collected by the organisation which also declined from 1908 onwards, while the reported number of League meetings held in the county from 1915 shows a similar pattern. Sinn Fein activists meanwhile, worked hard to establish branches in the county from 1917 onwards and cleverly exploited local issues like the tillage crisis to gain the movement support. In turn, the fact that the majority of the clergy threw their support behind the party, helped to give it a respectability it might otherwise have lacked. When all these factors are taken in conjunction, it was not surprising that the IPP was more than willing to withdraw its candidate from the north King's county by-election of April 1918; a decision taken in disgust at the Government's decision to pass the Military Conscription Act earlier that month, but made easier by the total break down of the UIL in the constituency. Much more local study of the UIL in other counties is needed to see if a similar development took place in other parts of Ireland, for this thesis shows the League was simply not fit for electoral challenges in the King's county after 1912. In many respects the King's county proved to be the political graveyard of the IPP, for the defeat of the party's candidate in the Tullamore constituency in December 1914 after the apparent securing of Home Rule was a major blow to the party at that time; while the party's decision not to contest for the same seat again in April 1918 marked the point of no return in its electoral fortunes

Characterization of Limitation Statutes in Canadian Private International Law: the Rocky Road of Change

Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada\u27s decision in Tolofson v. Jensen limitations statutes were characterized, prima facie, as procedural for purposes of Canadian private international law. The principal authority for this characterization was the 1835 case of Huber v. Steiner in which an action was brought on a promissory note made in France in 1813 and payable in 1817. The defendant argued that the French Code de commerce applied and that the right of action was extinguished by the provision that all actions ... prescribe themselves by five years reckoning from the day of protest ..... Tindal C.J. recognized the general rule that so much of the law as affects the rights and merits of the contract, all that relates ad litis decisionem, is adopted from the foreign country; so much of the law as affects the remedy only, all that relates ad litis ordinationem, is taken from the lex fori of that country where the action is brought. Applying this right/remedy distinction, Tindal C.J. was not satisfied that the French prescriptive law extinguished the contractual right and held that it merely limited availability of a remedy before the French courts