Reply to Comment on 'Unintentional unfairness when applying new greenhouse gas emissions metrics at country level'

This is a companion article to 2021 Environ. Res. Lett. 16 068001 This is a companion article to 2019 Environ. Res. Lett. 14 114039H2020 Societal Challengeshttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100010676Peer Reviewe

Unintentional unfairness when applying new greenhouse gas emissions metrics at country level

The 2015 Paris Agreement sets out that rapid reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are needed to keep global warming to safe levels. A new approach (known as GWP*) has been suggested to compare contributions of long- and short-lived GHGs, providing a close link between cumulative CO2-equivalent emissions and total warming. However, comparison factors for non-CO2 GHGs under the GWP* metric depend on past emissions, and hence raise questions of equity and fairness when applied at any but the global level. The use of GWP* would put most developing countries at a disadvantage compared to developed countries, because when using GWP* countries with high historical emissions of short-lived GHGs are exempted from accounting for avoidable future warming that is caused by sustaining these emissions. We show that when various established equity or fairness criteria are applied to GWP* (defined here as eGWP*), perceived national non-CO2 emissions vary by more than an order of magnitude, particularly in countries with high methane emissions like New Zealand. We show that national emission estimates that use GWP* are very sensitive to arbitrary choices made by countries and therewith facilitate the creation of loopholes when CO2-equivalent emissions based on the GWP* concept are traded between countries that use different approaches. In light of such equity-dependent accounting differences, GHG metrics like GWP* should only be used at the global level. A common, transparent and equity-neutral accounting metric is vital for the Paris Agreement's effectiveness and its environmental integrity

Unintentional unfairness when applying new greenhouse gas emissions metrics at country level

The 2015 Paris Agreement sets out that rapid reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are needed to keep global warming to safe levels. A new approach (known as GWP*) has been suggested to compare contributions of long- and short-lived GHGs, providing a close link between cumulative CO2-equivalent emissions and total warming. However, comparison factors for non-CO2 GHGs under the GWP* metric depend on past emissions, and hence raise questions of equity and fairness when applied at any but the global level. The use of GWP* would put most developing countries at a disadvantage compared to developed countries, because when using GWP* countries with high historical emissions of short-lived GHGs are exempted from accounting for avoidable future warming that is caused by sustaining these emissions. We show that when various established equity or fairness criteria are applied to GWP* (defined here as eGWP*), perceived national non-CO2 emissions vary by more than an order of magnitude, particularly in countries with high methane emissions like New Zealand. We show that national emission estimates that use GWP* are very sensitive to arbitrary choices made by countries and therewith facilitate the creation of loopholes when CO2-equivalent emissions based on the GWP* concept are traded between countries that use different approaches. In light of such equity-dependent accounting differences, GHG metrics like GWP* should only be used at the global level. A common, transparent and equity-neutral accounting metric is vital for the Paris Agreement's effectiveness and its environmental integrity

Natural Climate Solutions must embrace multiple perspectives to ensure synergy with sustainable development

To limit global warming to well below 2°C, immediate emissions reductions must be coupled with active removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. “Natural Climate Solutions” (NCS) achieve atmospheric CO2 reduction through the conservation, restoration, or altered management of natural ecosystems, with enormous potential to deliver “win-win-win” outcomes for climate, nature and society. Yet the supply of high-quality NCS projects does not meet market demand, and projects already underway often fail to deliver their promised benefits, due to a complex set of interacting ecological, social, and financial constraints. How can these cross-sectoral challenges be surmounted? Here we draw from expert elicitation surveys and workshops with professionals across the ecological, sociological, and economic sciences, evaluating differing perspectives on NCS, and suggesting how these might be integrated to address urgent environmental challenges. We demonstrate that funders” perceptions of operational, political, and regulatory risk strongly shape the kinds of NCS projects that are implemented, and the locations where they occur. Because of this, greenhouse gas removal through NCS may fall far short of technical potential. Moreover, socioecological co-benefits of NCS are unlikely to be realized unless the local communities engaged with these projects are granted ownership over implementation and outcomes

Understanding the carbon dioxide removal range in 1.5 °C compatible and high overshoot pathways

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) features prominently in the 1.5 °C compatible and high overshoot pathways in the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report (AR6, WGIII). However, the amount of CDR varies considerably among scenarios. We analyze the range in CDR volumes in AR6 WGIII pathways by exploring relationships between variables as potential driving forces, focusing on CDR in 2050 and scenario properties linked to reaching net-zero CO2. It is also shown how the relative and absolute contribution of CDR to total mitigation up until reaching net-zero CO2 substantially differs across scenarios. The volumes of CDR in 2050 and 2100 and the cumulative amount throughout the 21st century were most strongly correlated to the degree to which CO2 emissions are reduced as a means of reaching net-zero CO2. CDR in 2050 is also substantially correlated to the timing of net-zero CO2. The robustness of the analyzed relationships was evaluated by comparing different scenario filtering and data-cleaning approaches. Beyond filtering and cleaning, additional factors that influence CDR deployment in scenarios, such as discount rates, carbon price trajectories, and scenario design choices, were discussed.Peer Reviewe

Impact of short-lived non-CO2 mitigation on carbon budgets for stabilizing global warming

Limiting global warming to any level requires limiting the total amount of CO2 emissions, or staying within a CO2 budget. Here we assess how emissions from short-lived non-CO2 species like methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), black-carbon, and sulphates influence these CO2 budgets. Our default case, which assumes mitigation in all sectors and of all gases, results in a CO2 budget between 2011–2100 of 340 PgC for a >66% chance of staying below 2°C, consistent with the assessment of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Extreme variations of air-pollutant emissions from black-carbon and sulphates influence this budget by about ±5%. In the hypothetical case of no methane or HFCs mitigation—which is unlikely when CO2 is stringently reduced—the budgets would be much smaller (40% or up to 60%, respectively). However, assuming very stringent CH4 mitigation as a sensitivity case, CO2 budgets could be 25% higher. A limit on cumulative CO2 emissions remains critical for temperature targets. Even a 25% higher CO2 budget still means peaking global emissions in the next two decades, and achieving net zero CO2 emissions during the third quarter of the 21st century. The leverage we have to affect the CO2 budget by targeting non-CO2 diminishes strongly along with CO2 mitigation, because these are partly linked through economic and technological factors

Inconsistencies when applying novel metrics for emissions accounting to the Paris agreement

Addressing emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs) is an integral part of efficient climate change mitigation and therefore an essential part of climate policy. Metrics are used to aggregate and compare emissions of short- and long-lived GHGs and need to account for the difference in both magnitude and persistence of their climatic effects. Different metrics describe different approaches and perspectives, and hence yield different numerical estimates for aggregated GHG emissions. When interpreting GHG emission reduction targets, being mindful of the underlying metrical choices thus proves to be essential. Here we present the impact a recently proposed GHG metric related to the concept of CO2 forcing-equivalent emissions (called GWP*) would have on the internal consistency and environmental integrity of the Paris Agreement. We show that interpreting the Paris Agreement goals in a metric like GWP* that is significantly different from the standard metric used in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report can lead to profound inconsistencies in the mitigation architecture of the Agreement. It could even undermine the integrity of the Agreement's mitigation target altogether by failing to deliver net-zero CO2 emissions and therewith failing to ensure warming is halted. Our results indicate that great care needs to be taken when applying new concepts that appear scientifically favourable to a pre-existing climate policy context

Path independence of carbon budgets when meeting a stringent global mean temperature target after an overshoot

Emission pathways that are consistent with meeting the Paris Agreement goal of holding global mean temperature rise well below 2 °C often assume a temperature overshoot. In such overshoot scenarios, a given temperature limit is first exceeded and later returned to, under the assumption of large‐scale deliberate carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere. Here we show that although such strategy might result in a reversal of global mean temperature, the carbon cycle exhibits path dependence. After an overshoot, more carbon is stored in the ocean and less on land compared to a scenario with the same cumulative CO2 emissions but no overshoot. The near‐path independence of surface air temperature arises despite the path dependence in the carbon cycle, as it is offset by path dependence in the thermal response of the ocean. Such behavior has important implications for carbon budgets (i.e. the total amount of CO2 emissions consistent with holding warming to a given level), which do not differ much among scenarios that entail different levels of overshoot. Therefore, the concept of a carbon budget remains robust for scenarios with low levels of overshoot (up to 300 Pg C overshoot considered here) but should be used with caution for higher levels of overshoot, particularly for limiting the environmental change in dimensions other than global mean temperature rise

Geosciences after Paris

The adoption of the Paris Agreement is a historic milestone for the global response to the threat of climate change. Scientists are now being challenged to investigate a 1.5 degrees C world - which will require an accelerated effort from the geoscience community

Early retirement of power plants in climate mitigation scenarios

International efforts to avoid dangerous climate change aim for large and rapid reductions of fossil fuel CO2 emissions worldwide, including nearly complete decarbonization of the electric power sector. However, achieving such rapid reductions may depend on early retirement of coal- and natural gas-fired power plants. Here, we analyze future fossil fuel electricity demand in 171 energy-emissions scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), evaluating the implicit retirements and/or reduced operation of generating infrastructure. Although IAMs calculate retirements endogenously, the structure and methods of each model differ; we use a standard approach to infer retirements in outputs from all six major IAMs and—unlike the IAMs themselves—we begin with the age distribution and region-specific operating capacities of the existing power fleet. We find that coal-fired power plants in scenarios consistent with international climate targets (i.e. keeping global warming well-below 2 °C or 1.5 °C) retire one to three decades earlier than historically has been the case. If plants are built to meet projected fossil electricity demand and instead allowed to operate at the level and over the lifetimes they have historically, the roughly 200 Gt CO2 of additional emissions this century would be incompatible with keeping global warming well-below 2 °C. Thus, ambitious climate mitigation scenarios entail drastic, and perhaps un-appreciated, changes in the operating and/or retirement schedules of power infrastructure