90 research outputs found
Disinflationary boom in a price-wage spiral model
This paper analyses the impact of the disinflation policy timing on the sign and the magnitude of the sacrifice ratio in a modified price and wage staggered model of Blanchard (1986). When wages are updated every four quarters and prices every two quarters, we show that a âcold-turkeyâ disinflation is associated to an output boom when the policy is implemented during the last period of life of the wage contract and a recession the other quarters.Disinflation policy, Shock timing, Sacrifice ratio, Price and wage staggered contracts.
Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment inthe Presence of Global EnvironmentalProblems
This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. we call this behaviour precautionary commitment.Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue. we also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinated global co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.global environmental problems; coalition; unilateralcommitment; precautionary commitment.
Bargaining with Non-Monolithic Players
This paper analyses strategic bargaining in negotiations between non-monolithic players, i.e. agents starting negotiations can split up in smaller entities during the bargaining process. We show that the possibility of scission in the informed coalition implies that it loses its information advantages. We also show that when the possibility of a scission exists the uninformed player does not focus on his or her beliefs about the strength of the informed coalition but on the proportion of weak/strong players within this coalition. Finally, our results show that the possibility of a scission reduces the incentives for the leader to propose a high offer to ensure a global agreement. We apply this framework to international negotiations on global public goods and to wage negotiations.Strategic bargaining, Non-monolithic players, Scission, Noncooperative game-theory
North-South Climate Change Negotiations:a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.Bargaining theory; Asymmetric information; Climate change;International cooperation.
North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.Bargaining theory, asymmetric information, climate change, international cooperation
Bycatch ITQ Management in Oligopolistic Fisheries
This paper analyzes the effects of an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system implemented on bycatch on the global harvest level of oligopolistic fisheries. We show that the impact of changes in the total allowable catch (TAC) on the equilibrium harvest level depends on the degree of returns to scale in harvest. In particular, a reduction in the TAC may lead to a rise in activity in fisheries characterized by some amount of increasing returns to scale. Besides, these effects appear to be stronger, the fiercer the competition within fisheries.oligopolistic competition, fisheries, bycatch, ITQs
North-South Climate Change Negotiations:<br />a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information
http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0048-5829International audienceThis article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement
Sustainable coalitions in the commons
It is well known that the non-cooperation among agents harvesting a renewable resource is critical for its sustainable management. The present paper gives insights on the complex balance between coalitions structure, resource state or dynamics and agentsâ heterogeneity to avoid bio-economic collapses. A model bringing together coalition games and a viability approach is proposed to focus on the compatibility between bio-economic constraints and an exploited common stock dynamics. It is examined to what extent cooperation promotes sustainability. Based on the Shapley value, a measure of the marginal contribution of the users to the sustainability of the resource is proposed. It suggests that the stability of the grand coalition occurs for large enough stocks. By contrast, for lower levels of resource, the most efficient user plays the role of a dictator.Renewable resource, dynamic game, coalition, maxmin strategy, shapley value, viability kernel
Une approche évolutionnaire des négociations internationales en présence de problÚmes environnementaux globaux
Le prĂ©sent papier s'articule autour des problĂšmes environnementaux globaux, et se propose de lier les nĂ©gociations internationales au comportement de prĂ©caution. Cela nous conduit Ă montrer que le comportement de prĂ©caution peut aussi bien survenir Ă la suite d'un Ă©chec des nĂ©gociations qu'Ă la conclusion d'un accord. Dans le premier cas, ce comportement a moins d'impact que la coopĂ©ration de tous, mais tend tout de mĂȘme Ă rĂ©duire la portĂ©e de la dĂ©fection. Dans le second cas, si un accord est signĂ© entre un petit nombre de pays, le comportement de prĂ©caution constitue un moyen d'Ă©largir la portĂ©e de la coopĂ©ration sans dĂ©stabiliser la coalition coopĂ©rante. Nous montrons, enfin, que l'adoption de sanctions Ă lâencontre des pays non-coopĂ©rants ne garantit pas pour autant l'Ă©mergence d'un large mouvement de coopĂ©ration.ProblĂšmes environnementaux globaux, Coalition, Engagement unilatĂ©ral, StratĂ©gie Ă©volutionnaire
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The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with Individual Transferable Quotas
This paper deals with the sustainable management of a renewable resource
based on individual and transferable quotas (ITQs) when agents differ in terms of
harvesting costs or catchability. In a dynamic bio-economic model, we determine
the conditions under which the manager of an ITQ system can achieve sustainability
objectives which simultaneously account for stock renewal, economic efficiency
and maintenance of fishing activity for the agents along time. We use the
viability approach and more specifically the viability kernel to handle such a feasibility
problem. We show that the capacity for the manager to set viable management
strategies based on fixing Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits simultaneously
depends on the degree of heterogeneity of users in the fishery, the current value of
the stock and its dynamic features. To quantify this, we also compute the maximal
number of active (viable) agents for a given set of agents and a given stock. It is
shown how this number decreases with heterogeneity of involved agents while it
increases with the stock. A numerical example illustrates the whole results.Keywords: Fisheries Modeling, Fisheries Economics, Modeling and Economic TheoryKeywords: Fisheries Modeling, Fisheries Economics, Modeling and Economic Theor
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