Cap and Trade: How the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Market Works, and How it Could Work Better

This Article provides an overview of the sulfur dioxide allowances market, and identifies ways in which could be improved. This information can be used to improve the performance of the sulfur dioxide allowances market, and incorporated into new emissions allowance markets to improve their operation. Part I of this Article provides background information on the creation and operation of the sulfur dioxide allowances market. Part II reports and analyzes data regarding the actual behavior of the market from 1995 to 2003. Part III engages in an economic analysis of the interaction between the allowances market and the power industry. Part IV then identifies and describes some barriers to efficient trading. Finally, Part V will explore potential solutions to the problems caused by the capital gains tax. Improving the efficiency of the sulfur dioxide allowances market will allow firms to spend less money to maintain current emissions levels. To the extent that environmental regulations are constrained by industry costs, this improved efficiency will allow for more stringent environmental regulation

The Difficulties of Encouraging Cooperation in a Zero-Sum Game

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally provide only the “rules of the road” on which litigation is conducted. However, in some areas the Rules step outside of this role and attempt to overtly encourage cooperation. One such rule is Rule 68, which allows a defendant to make an offer of judgment to the plaintiff, and provides that if the plaintiff refuses and subsequently wins less money than the defendant offered, the plaintiff must cover the defendant’s costs. Rule 68 was launched into prominence when the Supreme Court ruled, in Marek v. Chesney that a Rule 68 offer could negate the operation of attorney’s fee-shifting statutes. A storm of proposals, counter-proposals, analyses and critiques of the Rule soon followed. This article compares Rule 68 to Rule 4(d), which has been operating quietly for some time to encourage parties to cooperate to avoid the costs of service of process. The comparison serves to highlight some of the unappreciated features of Rule 68 as it currently stands, and some of the potential pitfalls to the commonly proposed expansion of the rule. The article concludes by offering a reform proposal designed to enhance the likelihood of reasonable settlements while avoiding the normative and practical problems inherent in expanding Rule 68

Heterogeneously Catalyzed Continuous-Flow Hydrogenation Using Segmented Flow in Capillary Columns

Segmented flow in standard GC capillary columns, with a heterogeneous Pd catalyst on the walls, gave rapid information about catalytic processes in them. The residence time and conversion was monitored visually, greatly simplifying bench-scale optimization. Examples show the benefits of the elimination of pore diffusion and axial dispersion. Further, we demonstrated how to quickly identify deactivating species in multistep synthesis without intermediate workup

ICAR: endoscopic skull‐base surgery

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Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Society of Sports Nutrition (ISSN) Conference and Expo

Meeting Abstracts: Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Society of Sports Nutrition (ISSN) Conference and Expo Clearwater Beach, FL, USA. 9-11 June 201

The Difficulties of Encouraging Cooperation in a Zero-Sum Game

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally provide only the “rules of the road” on which litigation is conducted. However, in some areas the Rules step outside of this role and attempt to overtly encourage cooperation. One such rule is Rule 68, which allows a defendant to make an offer of judgment to the plaintiff, and provides that if the plaintiff refuses and subsequently wins less money than the defendant offered, the plaintiff must cover the defendant’s costs. Rule 68 was launched into prominence when the Supreme Court ruled, in Marek v. Chesney that a Rule 68 offer could negate the operation of attorney’s fee-shifting statutes. A storm of proposals, counter-proposals, analyses and critiques of the Rule soon followed. This article compares Rule 68 to Rule 4(d), which has been operating quietly for some time to encourage parties to cooperate to avoid the costs of service of process. The comparison serves to highlight some of the unappreciated features of Rule 68 as it currently stands, and some of the potential pitfalls to the commonly proposed expansion of the rule. The article concludes by offering a reform proposal designed to enhance the likelihood of reasonable settlements while avoiding the normative and practical problems inherent in expanding Rule 68

Two-phase segmented flow in capillaries and monolith reactors

Monolith reactors are attracting more and more attention as alternatives for both threephase slurry reactors [1-3] and trickle-bed reactors [4,5]. From a fluid mechanical point of view, the operating mode depends on the size of the straight parallel channels. In large channels the fluid trickles downwards along the channel walls and the gas travels through the channel in the channel core. In smaller channels, the dominant flow pattern is a segmented slug flow or bubble-train flow of alternating bubbles and slugs, where the bubbles span all but the complete channel cross-section. In the beginning of this chapter, criteria to predict the different multiphase flow regimes are briefly reviewed, and the remainder of the chapter deals with the segmented flow pattern. For the trickle-flow or film-flow pattern, the interested reader is referred to Chapter 13