Determinants of the Timing and Incidence of Exploratory Drilling on Offshort Wildcat Tracts

This paper documents exploratory drilling activity on offshore wildcat oil and gas leases in the Gulf of Mexico that were sold between 1954 and 1990, with emphasis on the period before 1980. For each year of the lease, we study the determinants of the decision whether or not to begin exploratory drilling, and the outcome of any drilling activity. Our results indicate that equilibrium predictions of plausible noncooperative models are reasonably accurate, and more descriptive than those of cooperative models of drilling timing. We discuss why noncooperative behavior may occur, and the potential gains from coordination.

Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions

This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium bidding in a common values model that is implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We compute bid markups and rents under the alternative hypotheses of private and common values and find that the data are more consistent with the latter hypothesis. Finally, we use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction in common value auctions that bidders may bid less aggressively when they expect more competition.

Evaluation of Knife Separable Lean Content of Cull Sows at Harvest and Development of a Prediction Equation for Pounds Lean

A study was conducted to measure the quantity of fat and muscle from 4 primal cuts of cull sows from the four USDA market grades based on weight, and to develop prediction equations for estimating cull sow knife separable lean content. Lean and fat weights by primal within and across the USDA cull sow weight classes. These prediction equations could assist processors in their decision to purchase cull sow weight classes that meet the processors needs for pork products with defined lean:fat content, such as brats and sausage. Hot carcass weight and 10th rib backfat resulted in a prediction equation that had an R-square greater than 0.90. This equation was developed across weight classes and was more predictive that any one single class equation

Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price

The paper analyzes a first price, sealed bid auction with a random reservation price where the object has an unknown common value, but one buyer has better information than the others. We permit the reservation price to be correlated with the information of the informed buyer, which reflects both his assessment of the value of the object and probability of rejection at any bid. Assuming all random variables are affiliated, we establish the following results. (1) The rate of increase in the distribution of the uninformed bidder is never greater than the rate of increase in the distribution of the informed bid. (2) The distributions are identical at bids above the support of the reservation price. (3) The informed buyer is more likely to submit low bids. We demonstrate that these restrictions are satisfied by bid data from the federal sales of offshore drainage leases.Affiliation, Bidding, Oil, Auctions.

Feints

In both economic and military situations, agents may try to mislead rivals about their true types or plans, whatever they may be. We consider a simple model in which one player attacks and the other player defends. We show that such environments have two types of possible equilibrium behavior, depending upon the signaling technology. If the signal is not very revealing about the attacker's plans, then the attacker always invests more resources in attack than in misdirection. If the technology is revealing, then the attacker does not always feint, but when he feints, he invests more than half of his resources into misdirection. Comparative statics also depend on whether the technology is revealing. "Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible." —General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson "Create havoc in the east and strike in the west." —Sun Tz

Equilibrium in Preemption Games with Complete Information

Equilibria, game theory, asymmetric payoffs, continuous distribution