Pathways to democracy after authoritarian breakdown: Comparative case selection and lessons from the past

Mass movements that are able to overthrow a dictator do not always lead to democracy. Transition periods present narrow windows of opportunity in which activists face difficult decisions to build democracy and prevent authoritarian relapse. Existing scholarship offers limited guidance for pro-democracy forces because it focuses on unchangeable structural factors and cases with a known outcome. We propose an innovative approach for finding informative comparisons for ongoing transitions after authoritarian breakdowns. We quantify the similarity between all breakdowns caused by mass uprisings since 1945 based on their structural preconditions. We then apply our approach to Sudan's ongoing transition and draw lessons from two similar cases: the Philippines in 1986 (successful democratization); and Burma/Myanmar in 1988 (failed democratization). Our analysis shows that structural factors are weak predictors of transition outcomes and that Sudan shares characteristics with cases of both failed and successful democratization. Therefore, democratic transition appears possible in Sudan

Regime Transformation From Below: Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to 2021

Mass mobilization (MM) is an important driver of political change. While some citizens organize in favor of more democratic institutions, others take to the streets to support an authoritarian status quo. This article introduces measures of pro-democratic and pro-autocratic MM using expert assessments for 179 polities from 1900-2021. The data allow us to trace patterns in MM over time, across regions and regime types. We use this new data to systematically analyze the relationship between both types of mobilization and regime change. We confirm the findings of the literature on contentious democratic politics, and our analysis of autocratic mobilization allows us to make sense of the controversy in the literature on "bad actors" in civil society. We show that MM in favor of autocracy negatively affects democracy, making a case for specifying the goals of the actors involved in contentious politics to more precisely understand their impact

How democracies prevail: democratic resilience as a two-stage process

This article introduces a novel conceptualization of democratic resilience - a two-stage process where democracies avoid democratic declines altogether or avert democratic breakdown given that such autocratization is ongoing. Drawing on the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset, we find that democracies have had a high level of resilience to onset of autocratization since 1900. Nevertheless, democratic resilience has become substantially weaker since the end of the Cold War. Fifty-nine episodes of sustained and substantial declines in democratic practices have occurred since 1993, leading to the unprecedented breakdown of 36 democratic regimes. Ominously, we find that once autocratization begins, only one in five democracies manage to avert breakdown. We also analyse which factors are associated with each stage of democratic resilience. The results suggest that democracies are more resilient when strong judicial constraints on the executive are present and democratic institutions were strong in the past. Conversely and adding nuance to the literature, economic development is only associated with resilience to onset of autocratization, not to resilience against breakdown once autocratization has begun

The Crowdsourced Replication Initiative: Investigating Immigration and Social Policy Preferences. Executive Report.

In an era of mass migration, social scientists, populist parties and social movements raise concerns over the future of immigration-destination societies. What impacts does this have on policy and social solidarity? Comparative cross-national research, relying mostly on secondary data, has findings in different directions. There is a threat of selective model reporting and lack of replicability. The heterogeneity of countries obscures attempts to clearly define data-generating models. P-hacking and HARKing lurk among standard research practices in this area.This project employs crowdsourcing to address these issues. It draws on replication, deliberation, meta-analysis and harnessing the power of many minds at once. The Crowdsourced Replication Initiative carries two main goals, (a) to better investigate the linkage between immigration and social policy preferences across countries, and (b) to develop crowdsourcing as a social science method. The Executive Report provides short reviews of the area of social policy preferences and immigration, and the methods and impetus behind crowdsourcing plus a description of the entire project. Three main areas of findings will appear in three papers, that are registered as PAPs or in process

The Causes and Consequences of Pro-Government Mobilization in Authoritarian Regimes

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Polarisierung auf der Straße – Die politischen Folgen der Dynamiken von Protest und Gegenprotest

Über das letzte Jahrzehnt hat die politische Mobilisierung von Rechts in Deutschland und Europa zugenommen. Insbesondere die Migrationsbewegungen seit 2015 waren für Netzwerke wie Pegida Anlass auf die Straße zu gehen. Auf der anderen Seite haben sich diverse zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure von antifaschistischen Gruppen über Gewerkschaften bis hin zu Kirchen organisiert, um in Form von Gegendemonstrationen ein Zeichen gegen Rechts und für Weltoffenheit zu setzen. Diese Mobilisierungsdynamiken von Protest und Gegenprotest fanden im Zuge der Konflikte um staatliche Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Corona-Pandemie ihre Fortsetzung. Proteste und Gegenproteste können zum einen Ausdruck einer bestehenden Polarisierung der Gesellschaft sein und bergen zum anderen das Risiko einer weiteren Polarisierung auf der Straße. Am Beispiel der Interaktion zwischen Pegida und der NoPegida-Bewegung diskutiert dieser Beitrag die möglichen Folgen von Gegenmobilisierung. Die Analysen legen nahe, dass Gegenproteste nicht zu einer Demobilisierung der Gegenseite führen. Nichtsdestotrotz können sie einen Positionierungsdruck auf politische Entscheidungsträger*innen ausüben, mediale Aufmerksamkeit für gesellschaftliche Konflikte generieren und die Vernetzung progressiver zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure fördern.Over the last decade, mobilization from the far-right has increased in Germany and Europe. In particular, the migration flows since 2015 sparked street protests by movements like Pegida. Nevertheless, diverse civil society coalitions, including actors from anti-fascist groups, trade unions, and churches, have taken to the streets to counter far-right mobilization. These mobilization dynamics continue during protests for and against government measures to contain the Covid-19 pandemic. On the one hand, protests and counterprotests can indicate increasing polarization of society and, on the other hand, they carry the risk of further polarization on the streets. Using the interaction between Pegida and the NoPegida movement as an example, this paper examines the potential consequences of counterprotests. The analyses suggest that countermobilization is unlikely to lead to demobilization of the opposing side. Nevertheless, it can force politicians and decision-makers to take a stand, generate media attention for existing societal conflicts, and facilitate networking among progressive civil society actors

"Votarem!" Was uns das gescheiterte Referendum über die Stärke der katalanischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung sagt

Vor einem Monat haben sich mehr als zwei Millionen Katalanen für die Unabhängigkeit der Region von Spanien ausgesprochen. Auch wenn das Referendum für illegal erklärt wurde und weniger als die Hälfte der Katalanen teilnahmen, verraten uns die Ergebnisse einiges über die Stärke der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, wie ein mögliches legales Referendum mit höherer Wahlbeteiligung ausgehen könnte. Auch wenn die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen ein solches Referendum nicht vorsehen, unterstützen laut aktueller Umfragen auch eine Mehrheit der Spanier diesen Weg der Konfliktlösung

From masks to mismanagement: A global assessment of the rise and fall of pandemic-related protests

The Covid-19 pandemic changed contentious politics worldwide. After causing a short-lived decline in global protest activities in early 2020, it has led to the emergence of a variety of pandemic-related protests. While previous work has mostly looked at how event frequencies have changed over time, this paper focuses on changes in protest issues. It applies quantitative text analysis to protest event descriptions and makes the following contributions. First, it traces the rise and fall of pandemic-related protests globally between 2020 and mid-2022, showing that, on average, more than 15% of protest events were pandemic-related. Second, it identifies the most dominant pandemic-related protest issues—masks and vaccination, the economy, business restrictions, health care, education, mismanagement, and crime—and their salience over time. Third, the paper explores potential explanations for differences in the prevalence of pandemic-related protest issues between countries. Multivariate regression analyses suggest a global divide. Protests in developed countries and liberal democracies were more likely about government restrictions. In contrast, citizens in less developed countries took to the streets to demand better healthcare provision

How to Build Democracy after Authoritarian Breakdown: Insights from a Mixed Methods Approach

Mass movements that are able to overthrow a dictator do not always lead to democracy. Transition periods present narrow windows of opportunity in which activists face difficult decisions to build democracy and prevent authoritarian relapse. Existing scholarship offers limited guidance for pro- democracy forces because it focuses on unchangeable structural factors and cases with a known outcome. We propose an innovative approach for finding informative comparisons for ongoing transitions after authoritarian breakdowns. We quantify the similarity between all breakdowns caused by mass uprisings since 1945 based on their structural preconditions. We then apply our approach to Sudan's ongoing transition and draw lessons from three similar cases: Benin in 1990, the Philippines in 1986 (successful democratization) and Burma in 1988 (failed democratization). Our case studies suggest that democratic transition is possible in Sudan if pro-democracy forces maintain unity, build inclusive political agendas and keep the military committed to the democratic process.This research was supported by Vetenskapsrådet [grant number 2018-016114], PI: Anna Lührmann and European Research Council, Grant 724191, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden as well as by internal grants from the Vice-Chancellors office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg