37 research outputs found
European Energy Security: What Should It Mean? What to Do? ESF Working Paper, No. 23, 30 October 2006
[From the Introduction]. âą Is energy a strategic good? If it is, to what extent does it make sense to deny the extraction of political leverage from energy policy? In criticising Russian energy policy, are we not protesting too much against the fact that Russia (as others) is using energy for political ends â instead of criticising, as we should, the content of Russiaâs policy? And if energy is strategic, should a European Union energy policy be primarily about the liberalisation of the energy market? âą Is claiming reciprocity always smart? After all, do we really want Russian firms to control both the downstream as well as the upstream elements of the EUâs energy supply chain, in exchange for access by EU firms to Russian energy production and transport? âą Should it really be EU policy to help Turkey to make full use of its potential as a major energy hub? After all, half of Russiaâs oil exports already pass through the Bosporus, creating a major risk if that very vulnerable route were to be cut
Starting over: for a Franco-German initiative in European defence
Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Chancen, Notwendigkeiten und Probleme einer deutsch-französischen militĂ€rischen Zusammenarbeit im Kontext einer neuen internationalen Sicherheitslage. Vor dem Hintergrund eines neuen strategischen Umfeldes erklĂ€ren die Autoren zunĂ€chst, warum ein Neubeginn der deutsch-französischen Zusammenarbeit notwendig ist und wie sich dieser gestalten könnte. Danach werden dieses neue strategische Umfeld und die daraus resultierende neue Sicherheitslandschaft im Zusammenhang mit neuen Bedrohungsszenarien und Risiken analysiert. Im zweiten Teil werden die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit Anfang der 90er Jahre untersucht und der aktuelle Stand der Beziehungen beleuchtet. AbschlieĂend werden die institutionellen und politischen Anforderungen an eine engere Zusammenarbeit diskutiert und spezifische Bereiche benannt, in denen eine Kooperation besonders lohnend erscheint. (ICD
European security policy towards 2000: ways and means to establish genuine credibility. First report of the high-level group of experts on the CFSP
Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for explaining changing norms.
The article contributes to the debate about the emergence of a European strategic culture to underpin a European Security and Defence Policy. Noting both conceptual and empirical weaknesses in the literature, the article disaggregates the concept of strategic culture and focuses on four types of norms concerning the means and ends for the use of force. The study argues that national strategic cultures are less resistant to change than commonly thought and that they have been subject to three types of learning pressures since 1989: changing threat perceptions, institutional socialization, and mediatized crisis learning. The combined effect of these mechanisms would be a process of convergence with regard to strategic norms prevalent in current EU countries. If the outlined hypotheses can be substantiated by further research the implications for ESDP are positive, especially if the EU acts cautiously in those cases which involve norms that are not yet sufficiently shared across countries
Readings in European Security, Volume 6. CEPS Paperbacks. November 2010
The sixth and final volume of Readings in European Security brings together the unique insight and analysis of security experts from the EU, NATO, diplomatic missions, national governments, parliaments, business, media and academics on the following topics: Obamaâs Foreign Policy: Is this change we can believe in?; Somalia and the Pirates; The Political Future of Afghanistan
L'Europe face à la politique militaire américaine
Europe and the Problem of American Military Policy, by François Heisbourg
The build-up of the American military effort began several years prior to Reagan's Ă©lection. At present it seems to have acquired a leapfrog dimension rather than a simple catching-up. Due to an accumulation of modernisation processes through partial and progressive stages, we are today on the threshold of a qualitative transformation of military technology. The difference between the Strategie Defense Initiative (SDI) and plans for a conventional dissuasion force depend on the Ă©volution of technology but the final objective is the same. This is to reduce or completely eliminate the dependence on nuclear arms, whether in order to maintain peace or to achieve victory. Medium-sized nuclear powers such as France, China and the U.K., would be disturbed by develop-ments which threatened U.S. adhĂ©rence to the 1972 treaty. But for the Europeans, the problems posed are political and technical rather than strategie and military. They need to coordinate their defence industries in order to be better placed for cooperative arrangements with the United States or Japan.Le redĂ©marrage de l'effort militaire a prĂ©cĂ©dĂ© de plusieurs annĂ©es l'Ă©lection de Reagan. La dynamique actuelle correspond autant Ă un envol qu'Ă un simple rattrapage. GrĂące Ă une accumulation de modernisations partielles et progressives, on est aujourd'hui parvenu au seuil d'une transformation qualitative. Entre l'Initiative de dĂ©fense stratĂ©gique (SDI) et les plans militaires visant l'Ă©tablissement d'une dissuasion conventionnelle s'appuyant sur les progrĂšs de la technique (ET), il y a des diffĂ©rences, mais un mĂȘme objectif final : rĂ©duire, voire annuler, la dĂ©pendance Ă l'Ă©gard des armes nuclĂ©aires, qu'il s'agisse de maintenir la paix ou d'emporter la victoire. Les forces nuclĂ©aires moyennes â France, Chine, Royaume-Uni â seraient probablement gĂȘnĂ©es par une Ă©volution qui mettraient en cause le traitĂ© de 1972. Mais, pour les EuropĂ©ens, les risques sont plus d'ordre politique et technique que stratĂ©gique et militaire. Pour y faire face, les EuropĂ©ens devront mieux coordonner leurs actions en matiĂšre d'industries de dĂ©fense, pour ĂȘtre mieux Ă mĂȘme d'entrer dans des coopĂ©rations avec les Etats-Unis ou le Japon.Heisbourg. L'Europe face Ă la politique militaire amĂ©ricaine. In: Politique Ă©trangĂšre, n°3 - 1984 - 49á”annĂ©e. pp. 571-587
L'Europe de la défense dans l'Alliance atlantique
Europe's Common Defence in the Atlantic Alliance, by François Heisbourg
Notwithstanding fifty years of success, the future of the Alliance is far from assured. While we know what the Alliance does â transatlantic security and defence co-operation ; the preparation and conduct of multilateral military operations â we don't really know what it is for (or against). Furthermore, the balance of responsibilities between a "hard power" America and a "soft power" Europe is increasingly considered to be unsatisfactory viewed from both sides of the Atlantic. Europe must do what is in its power to increase its "hard power" capability, notably in terms of power projection. This implies, inter alia, a deliberate effort by the EU Defence Ministers to promote a convergence of defence policies, through the adoption of a set of budget and manpower criteria, methodologically akin to the effort which led to the establishment of the euro.Pour François Heisbourg, malgrĂ© ses succĂšs, l'avenir de l'OTAN est incertain, notamment en raison du caractĂšre flou de sa raison d'ĂȘtre actuelle et de la remise en cause croissante de sa cohĂ©rence. Dans ce contexte, les EuropĂ©ens doivent dĂ©velopper leurs capacitĂ©s de dĂ©fense, susceptibles de soutenir une vĂ©ritable politique extĂ©rieure et de sĂ©curitĂ© commune et d'apporter une contribution positive Ă l'Alliance. Selon lui, les pays de l'Union devraient privilĂ©gier tout particuliĂšrement les capacitĂ©s de projection de forces adaptĂ©es aux crises de l'aprĂšs-guerre froide, dont les insuffisances sont notables dans le conflit du Kosovo, et favoriser une convergence sur le long terme des politiques de dĂ©fense et d'Ă©quipement militaire.Heisbourg. L'Europe de la dĂ©fense dans l'Alliance atlantique. In: Politique Ă©trangĂšre, n°2 - 1999 - 64á”annĂ©e. pp. 219-232
SĂ©curitĂ© : l'Europe livrĂ©e Ă elle-mĂȘme
Security : Europe Left to Its Own Devices, by François Heisbourg
In post-cold War Europe, insecutrity is less a resuit of the reemergence of important national blocs, as it was the case in the period hefore 1914, as the process of fragmentation along exaggerated ethnie bases. Faced with these phenomena of countries looking inwards, there is a risk that Western European countries will be temptea to do likewise and follow divergent defence and security policies, a situation which could eventually lead to antagonistic behaviour. In these conditions the large multilateral instituitons inherited from the Cold War can most effectively enhance security by providing a legitimate framework for the promotion of the principles and logic that ivill enable the Western countries to avoid this temptation to withdraiv into themselves. The opening-up of trade and organic enlargement by the admittance of the new democraties will also help. The performance of these institutions and their member-states regarding the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia has been poor and urgently reinforces the need for a change of perspective so that the use of force in certain circumstances is a « proxima ratio » â an early recourse â rather than a last resort.Dans l'Europe de l'aprĂšs-guerre froide, l'insĂ©curitĂ© naĂźt moins de la rĂ©Ă©mergence de grands blocs nationaux Ă l'instar de ce qui caractĂ©risa la pĂ©riode d'avant 1914, que du processus de fragmentation sur des bases ethniques exacerbĂ©es. Face Ă ces phĂ©nomĂšnes d'implosion, le risque existe qu'Ă leur tour les pays d'Europe occidentale cĂšdent Ă la tentation du repli sur soi et de la conduite de politiques divergentes de sĂ©curitĂ© et de dĂ©fense d'oĂč pourraient naĂźtre, Ă terme, des conduites antagonistes. Dans ces conditions, les grandes institutions multilatĂ©rales hĂ©ritiĂšres de la guerre froide contribueront d'autant plus efficacement Ă la sĂ©curitĂ© qu'elles fourniront le cadre de lĂ©gitimation et de promotion des principes et des logiques permettant d'Ă©chapper Ă la tentation du repli : ainsi, l'ouverture commerciale, l'Ă©largissement organique par inclusion des nouvelles dĂ©mocraties. Le mauvais dĂ©part que constitue l'incapacitĂ© de ces institutions et des Etats qui les composent face aux crises de l'ex-Yougoslavie renforce tant l'urgence d'un changement de portage que la nĂ©cessitĂ© de l'emploi dans certaines circonstances de la force comme proxima ratio et non comme ultime recours.Heisbourg. SĂ©curitĂ© : l'Europe livrĂ©e Ă elle-mĂȘme. In: Politique Ă©trangĂšre, n°1 - 1994 - 59á”annĂ©e. pp. 247-260
La France et sa défense
France and its Defence, by François Heisbourg
The end of the Cold War bas caused a reduction in armed forces in the main industrialised countries. This bas become inevitable and should facilitate the transformation of the French forces, especially the Army into a " volunteer army ". However, up until now, France bas been one of the countries which bas least reduced its military spending and thus avoided making the decisions necessitated by the new geopolitical situation. Moreover, a long-term strategy must be adopted in the struggle against NBC terrorism, especially at a European level, since the proliferation of weapons of mais destruction, by parties, that are not states and that do not have any territorial base, poses a new threat that deterrence cannot thwart. Lastly France which is drawing doser to NATO, ought to be presented at ail levels of a military organisation that is adapted to the needs of the post-Cold War period according to the modalities which favour the emergence of a European defence pillar.La fin de la guerre froide a entraĂźnĂ© une rĂ©duction du format des forces armĂ©es dans les principaux pays industrialisĂ©s. Cette rĂ©duction, devenue inĂ©vitable, devrait favoriser la tranformation de l'armĂ©e française, et en particulier de l'armĂ©e de terre, en une " armĂ©e de volontaires ". Or, jusqu'Ă prĂ©sent, la France a Ă©tĂ© l'un des pays qui a le moins rĂ©duit ses dĂ©penses militaires et qui n'a donc pas effectuĂ© les choix nĂ©cessitĂ©s par la nouvelle donne gĂ©ostratĂ©gique. En outre, un effort de longue haleine doit ĂȘtre prĂ©vu en matiĂšre de lutte contre le terrorisme NBC, notamment Ă l'Ă©chelle europĂ©enne, car la prolifĂ©ration d'armes de destruction massive au profit d'entitĂ©s non Ă©tatiques, sans assise territoriale, constitue une menace nouvelle que la dissuasion ne saurait contrecarrer. Enfin, la France, qui se rapproche de plus en plus de l'OTAN, devrait ĂȘtre prĂ©sente tous les niveaux d'une organisation militaire adaptĂ©e aux besoins de aprĂšs-guerre froide suivant des modalitĂ©s favorisant l'Ă©mergence d'un pilier europĂ©en de dĂ©fense.Heisbourg. La France et sa dĂ©fense. In: Politique Ă©trangĂšre, n°4 - 1995 - 60á”annĂ©e. pp. 983-992