What punishment expresses

In this article, I consider the question of what punishment expresses and propose a way of approaching the question that overcomes problems in both psychosocial and philosophical expressivist traditions. The problem in both traditions is, I suggest, the need for an adequate moral – neither moralizing nor reductive – psychology, and I argue that Melanie Klein’s work offers such a moral psychology. I offer a reconstruction of Klein’s central claims and begin to sketch some of its potential implications for an expressive account of punishment. I outline a Kleinian interpretation of modern punishment’s expression as of an essentially persecutory nature but also include depressive realizations that have generally proved too difficult for liberal modernity to work through successfully, and the recent ‘persecutory turn’ is a defence against such realizations. I conclude by considering the wider philosophical significance of a Kleinian account for the expressivist theory of punishment

The Influence of Dormitory Architecture On Resident Behavior

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66943/2/10.1177_001391657300500402.pd

Beyond the university : higher education institutions across time and space

This chapter makes the case for a history of higher education institutions which looks beyond the university. Building on recent historiographical developments, it argues that the history of higher education must not be limited to the history of the university, an institution fixed in space and time, but must rather adopt a transnational and transhistorical approach. It also argues for a broader definition of “institution” which includes concepts, ideas, and practices which have become “institutionalized” alongside traditional understandings of institutions as sites with fixed locations and physical forms. Beginning with an exploration of higher education and learning across the globe in the ancient world, it goes on to study significant developments in higher education during the medieval, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and modern periods. While considerable attention is paid to the development of the university in Europe and around the world, the role and significance of other higher education institutions are stressed throughout. Particular weight is placed on the importance of learned societies and academies as sites of research development and training in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The chapter concludes with reflections on the ways in which the prominence of the research university since the Second World War has shaped the writing of the history of higher education in recent years, most notably, the dominant position given to the university as institution. Potentially fruitful directions for future research are also discussed, in particular, the need to focus on alternative higher education institutions

Two Concepts of Basic Equality

It has become somewhat a commonplace in recent political philosophy to remark that all plausible political theories must share at least one fundamental premise, ‘that all humans are one another's equals’. One single concept of ‘basic equality’, therefore, is cast as the common touchstone of all contemporary political thought. This paper argues that this claim is false. Virtually all do indeed say that all humans are ‘equals’ in some basic sense. However, this is not the same sense. There are not one but (at least) two concepts of basic equality, and they reflect not a grand unity within political philosophy but a deep and striking division. I call these concepts ‘Equal Worth’ and ‘Equal Authority’. The former means that each individual’s good is of equal moral worth. The latter means that no individual is under the natural authority of anyone else. Whilst these two predicates are not in themselves logically inconsistent, I demonstrate that they are inconsistent foundation stones for political theory. A theory that starts from Equal Worth will find it near impossible to justify Equal Authority. And a theory that starts from Equal Authority will find any fact about the true worth of things, including ourselves, irrelevant to justifying legitimate action. This helps us identify the origin of many of our deepest and seemingly intractable disagreements within political philosophy, and directs our attention to the need for a clear debate about the truth and/or relationship between the two concepts. In short, my call to arms can be summed up in the demand that political philosophers never again be allowed to claim ‘that all human beings are equals’ full stop. They must be clear in what dimension they claim that we are equals—Worth or Authority (or perhaps something else)

Dr. Moberly's Theory of the Atonement

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