348 research outputs found

    How valuable are chances?

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    Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not; and hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required

    How valuable are chances?

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    Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not; and hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required

    Fairness and risk attitudes

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    According to a common judgement, a social planner should often use a lottery to decide which of two people should receive a good. This judgement undermines one of the best-known arguments for utilitarianism, due to John C. Harsanyi, and more generally undermines axiomatic arguments for utilitarianism and similar views. In this paper we ask which combinations of views about (a) the social planner’s attitude to risk and inequality, and (b) the subjects’ attitudes to risk are consistent with the aforementioned judgement. We find that the class of combinations of views that can plausibly accommodate this judgement is quite limited. But one theory does better than others: the theory of chance-sensitive utility

    Counterfactual Desirability

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    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability maximising. We end the paper by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be an expected utility. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles

    Desire, expectation, and invariance

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    The Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB) states that any rational person desires a proposition exactly to the degree that she believes or expects the proposition to be good. Many people take David Lewis to have shown the thesis to be inconsistent with Bayesian decision theory. However, as we show, Lewis’s argument was based on an Invariance condition that itself is inconsistent with the (standard formulation of the) version of Bayesian decision theory that he assumed in his arguments against DAB. The aim of this paper is to explore what impact the rejection of Invariance has on the DAB thesis. Without assuming Invariance, we first refute all versions of DAB that entail that there are only two levels of goodness. We next consider two theses according to which rational desires are intimately connected to expectations of (multi-levelled) goodness, and show that these are consistent with Bayesian decision theory as long as we assume that the contents of ‘value propositions’ are not fixed. We explain why this conclusion is independently plausible, and show how to construct such proposition

    Succinyl-CoA:3-ketoacid coenzyme A transferase (SCOT): development of an antibody to human SCOT and diagnostic use in hereditary SCOT deficiency

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    AbstractSuccinyl-CoA:3-ketoacid CoA transferase (SCOT) is a key enzyme for ketone body utilization. Hereditary SCOT deficiency in humans (McKusick catalogue number 245050) is characterized by intermittent ketoacidotic attacks and permanent hyperketonemia. Since previously-available antibody to rat SCOT did not crossreact with human SCOT, we developed an antibody against recombinant human SCOT expressed in a bacterial system. The recombinant SCOT was insoluble except under denaturing conditions. Antibody raised to this polypeptide recognized denatured SCOT and proved useful for immunoblot analysis. On immunoblots, SCOT was easily detectable in control fibroblasts and lymphocytes but was detected neither in fibroblast extracts from four SCOT-deficient patients, nor in lymphocytes from two SCOT-deficient patients. These data indicate that immunoblot analysis is useful for diagnosis of SCOT deficiency in combination with enzyme assay

    A case of coexisting Warthin tumor and langerhans cell histiocytosis associated with necrosis, eosinophilic abscesses and a granulomatous reaction in intraparotid lymph nodes

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    We present a patient (50-year-old male) with coexisting Warthin tumor and involvement of two intraparotid lymph nodes by Langerhans cell histiocytosis associated with necrosis, eosinophilic abscesses and a granulomatous reaction. This is the second documented case of this unusual combination of histological changes in nodal Langerhans cell histiocytosis and the first case involving intraparotid lymph nodes occurring together with an ipsilateral Warthin tumor

    Search for dinucleon decay into pions at Super-Kamiokande

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    A search for dinucleon decay into pions with the Super-Kamiokande detector has been performed with an exposure of 282.1 kiloton-years. Dinucleon decay is a process that violates baryon number by two units. We present the first search for dinucleon decay to pions in a large water Cherenkov detector. The modes 16^{16}O(pp)→(pp) \rightarrow 14^{14}Cπ+π+\pi^{+}\pi^{+}, 16^{16}O(pn)→(pn) \rightarrow 14^{14}Nπ+π0\pi^{+}\pi^{0}, and 16^{16}O(nn)→(nn) \rightarrow 14^{14}Oπ0π0\pi^{0}\pi^{0} are investigated. No significant excess in the Super-Kamiokande data has been found, so a lower limit on the lifetime of the process per oxygen nucleus is determined. These limits are: τpp→π+π+>7.22×1031\tau_{pp\rightarrow\pi^{+}\pi^{+}} > 7.22 \times 10^{31} years, τpn→π+π0>1.70×1032\tau_{pn\rightarrow\pi^{+}\pi^{0}} > 1.70 \times 10^{32} years, and τnn→π0π0>4.04×1032\tau_{nn\rightarrow\pi^{0}\pi^{0}} > 4.04 \times 10^{32} years. The lower limits on each mode are about two orders of magnitude better than previous limits from searches for dinucleon decay in iron.Comment: 20 pages, 17 figures. Accepted for publication in Physical Review D on March 30, 201
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