The legitimacy-conferring capacity of constitutional courts: Evidence from a comparative survey experiment

Can constitutional court decisions shape public opinion on a governmental policy? Previous studies have focused on the US Supreme Court, which enjoys a high degree of public support as the major resource of power for courts. In this study, we examine the extent to which courts can influence public opinion regarding a government bill at European courts. First, we argue that the public support for courts also allows them to move public opinion on policies into the direction of their decisions. This works in both directions: they can confer legitimacy to a policy that they support, but they can also de-legitimize a policy that they oppose. Second, we argue that this mechanism strongly depends on the amount of support that a court receives. It only has an effect for courts that possess a higher institutional legitimacy and among the group of citizens trusting a court. We test our arguments by combining a most different systems design for France and Germany with a survey priming experiment on a school security bill. France and Germany are selected for a most different systems design as they exhibit different institutional designs as well as different levels of support for the court at the aggregate level. The survey experiment is implemented within large national election surveys, the German Internet Panel and the French National Election Study. Both experiments contain more than 2,600 respondents each. Our survey experiment primes for decision outcomes and different institutions to understand whether there are differences between an institution supporting and opposing a policy and between a court and alternative institutions. Our findings confirm that with higher public support, courts can move the opinion of citizens to both legitimize and de-legitimize a policy. This effect can be found at the aggregate level for a court enjoying higher public support, but also at the individual level for respondents with higher trust in the court. Interestingly, courts can even move the opinion of citizens with strong prior attitudes in the opposite direction, if these citizens highly trust the court. These findings have implications beyond the study itself. First, they confirm that the legitimacy-conferring effect can also be observed for European courts, not only for the US Supreme Court. Second, they show that the relevance of a mechanism identified for a single case, like the US Supreme Court, might only hold for specific conditions. As public support for courts strongly varies across countries in Europe, we also expect the impact of any mechanism relying on public support to strongly vary, as we can observe in our own analysis

A guilt-free strategy increases self-reported non-compliance with COVID-19 preventive measures:Experimental evidence from 12 countries

Studies of citizens’ compliance with COVID-19 preventive measures routinely rely on survey data. While such data are essential, public health restrictions provide clear signals of what is socially desirable in this context, creating a potential source of response bias in self-reported measures of compliance. In this research, we examine whether the results of a guilt-free strategy recently proposed to lessen this constraint are generalizable across twelve countries, and whether the treatment effect varies across subgroups. Our findings show that the guilt-free strategy is a useful tool in every country included, increasing respondents’ proclivity to report non-compliance by 9 to 16 percentage points. This effect holds for different subgroups based on gender, age and education. We conclude that the inclusion of this strategy should be the new standard for survey research that aims to provide crucial data on the current pandemic

The effect of Germany’s federalism on student success : The “Index of Commitment“ as comparative measure for study and examination regulations

Long-term studies and drop-outs are a major issue in higher education research, but explanatory factors have often been focusing on attitudinal and sociological characteristics using student surveys as methodology. Institutional rules regarding study and learning regulations have often been neglected, although recent research has shown that they incentivize student behaviour. We develop and Index of Commitment (IOC) to cover these rules over different types of study phases and different types of commitments of different actors. We distinguish between an early study phase, a main phase and a late study phase and commitments regarding consultation and examination rules by the state, a higher education institution (HEI) and students. This paper shows empirically that there is a considerable variance of these rules between the 16 German states, which are responsible for the legislation and financing of most of the higher education institutions in Germany. We find states with very soft regulation, where legislation sets almost no rules and student autonomy is held in high regard and states with very precise rules setting strong incentives and leaving only little room for implementation to the HEI. We can show that our index correlates with the percentage of students successfully finishing their degree in time in a state. By presenting our index, we provide a comprehensive understanding of the commitment of study and examination regulations. The findings and insights can contribute to the ongoing discourse on student autonomy and state control in higher education, as well as inform policy makers and educational institutions in developing effective strategies to address dropout and long-term study. It also shows again that “bringing the state back in” in higher education research is important

Noughts and Crosses

The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset is the only dataset providing information about the positions of parties for comparative researchers across time and countries. This article evaluates its structure and finds a peculiarity: A high number of zeros and their unequal distribution across items, countries and time. They influence the results of any procedure to build a scale, but especially those using factor analyses. The article shows that zeroes have different meanings: Firstly, there are substantial zeroes in line with saliency theory. Secondly, zeroes exist for non-substantial reasons: The length of a manifesto and the percentage of uncoded sentences, both strongly varying across time and country. We quantify the problem and propose a procedure to identify data points containing non-substantial zeroes. For the future comparative use of the dataset we plead for a theoretical selection of items combined with the information about the likelihood that zeroes are substantially meaningful

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System der BRD - ein unbekanntes Wesen?

"Dieser Beitrag argumentiert, dass die Hypothese der zunehmenden Justizialisierung der Politik als dominantes Forschungsparadigma in der Literatur zum Bundesverfassungsgericht zu kurz greift. Vielmehr befindet sich das Gericht in einem Spannungsfeld mit anderen Akteuren, mit der Regierung, der Opposition, regulären Gerichten sowie den Bürgern in Form von individuellen Klägern sowie der Öffentlichkeit. Im Folgenden werden institutionelle Verknüpfungen dieser Akteure identifiziert und neue Forschungsfragen aufgeworfen. Abschließend werden die damit verbundenen Herausforderungen in theoretischer, methodischer und empirischer Hinsicht erörtert." (Autorenreferat)"This article argues that the judicialization hypothesis as a dominant research paradigm in the literature on the Bundesverfassungsgericht leaves out a number of relevant aspects. Rather, the court should be understood as being embedded in an area of competing interests among government, opposition, courts, litigating citizens and public opinion. The article identifies the institutional links between actors and relevant research questions. Finally, it discusses the theoretical, methodological and empirical challenges for further research on the Bundesverfassungsgericht." (author's abstract

Noughts and Crosses

The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset is the only dataset providing information about the positions of parties for comparative researchers across time and countries. This article evaluates its structure and finds a peculiarity: A high number of zeros and their unequal distribution across items, countries and time. They influence the results of any procedure to build a scale, but especially those using factor analyses. The article shows that zeroes have different meanings: Firstly, there are substantial zeroes in line with saliency theory. Secondly, zeroes exist for non-substantial reasons: The length of a manifesto and the percentage of uncoded sentences, both strongly varying across time and country. We quantify the problem and propose a procedure to identify data points containing non-substantial zeroes. For the future comparative use of the dataset we plead for a theoretical selection of items combined with the information about the likelihood that zeroes are substantially meaningful

Temporal Strategies: Governments alter the pace of legislation in bicameralism depending on electoral expectations

Does a government in a bicameral system strategically alter the length of the legislative process in the first chamber in anticipation of future majorities in the second chamber? Drawing on an existing formal model of dynamic policymaking, we argue that governing majorities strategically accelerate or delay their agenda when a potential majority change in the second chamber is imminent. If the government fears losing control over the second chamber, then the government accelerates their agenda. By contrast, if the government hopes to gain control over the second chamber, the government decelerates their agenda. We test our argument in Germany's symmetric and asymmetric bicameralism by analyzing 1,966 governmental bills from 1998 to 2013. The analyses confirm our expectations for symmetric bicameralism, thus suggesting that the synchronicity of election cycles should be taken into account both in the analysis of bicameral systems and in institutional design of such systems. © 2020 The Authors. Legislative Studies Quarterly published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Washington University in St. Loui