Extraction and Classification of Diving Clips from Continuous Video Footage

Due to recent advances in technology, the recording and analysis of video data has become an increasingly common component of athlete training programmes. Today it is incredibly easy and affordable to set up a fixed camera and record athletes in a wide range of sports, such as diving, gymnastics, golf, tennis, etc. However, the manual analysis of the obtained footage is a time-consuming task which involves isolating actions of interest and categorizing them using domain-specific knowledge. In order to automate this kind of task, three challenging sub-problems are often encountered: 1) temporally cropping events/actions of interest from continuous video; 2) tracking the object of interest; and 3) classifying the events/actions of interest. Most previous work has focused on solving just one of the above sub-problems in isolation. In contrast, this paper provides a complete solution to the overall action monitoring task in the context of a challenging real-world exemplar. Specifically, we address the problem of diving classification. This is a challenging problem since the person (diver) of interest typically occupies fewer than 1% of the pixels in each frame. The model is required to learn the temporal boundaries of a dive, even though other divers and bystanders may be in view. Finally, the model must be sensitive to subtle changes in body pose over a large number of frames to determine the classification code. We provide effective solutions to each of the sub-problems which combine to provide a highly functional solution to the task as a whole. The techniques proposed can be easily generalized to video footage recorded from other sports.Comment: To appear at CVsports 201

The Dividend Problem

Everyone knows that shareholders receive dividends because they are entitled to the residual returns of a public corporation. Everyone is wrong. Using the familiar economic model of the firm, I show that shareholders have no special claim on corporate economic returns. No one has an entitlement to rents in a capitalist system. Shareholders, the purely fungible providers of a purely fungible commodity and a sunk cost, are particularly unlikely to be able to command a share of economic profits or, indeed, any return at all. Shareholders do win much of the corporate surplus. But this is not by market right or moral entitlement. Rather, it is the result of a (possibly temporary) ideological victory in a political battle over economic rents. Surprisingly, since corporate law often assumes a conflict between shareholders and top management, shareholder gains flow from the usefulness of the share-centered ideologies in justifying a tremendous shift of corporate wealth from employees to top managers. Burgeoning CEO salaries are part of the same phenomenon as high shareholder returns, not in opposition to it. Taking the political nature of the corporation seriously will lead to a series of new and important questions. Are current distributions of corporate wealth justifiable, or should corporate governance treat lower-paid employees as citizens instead of subjects? Why should only one side in a political conflict have the vote, and why per dollar instead of per person? Given undemocratic internal corporate politics, are current levels of deference to corporate autonomy justifiable

The Semi-Sovereign Corporation

For at least a generation, corporate law scholars have worked within a paradigm of the corporation as a nexus of contracts, using metaphors drawn from contract, property, agency and trust to describe the relationships between shareholders and the firm as something like those of strangers in a market. But historically, corporations were understood to be political organizations much like a miniature state or sovereign. The political view emphasizes that the participants in a firm include more than the public shareholders, that they have relationships with each other that extend beyond the momentary contact of strangers in a spot-market, and most important, that the firm is a self-governing entity for many important purposes. Naturally, it also foregrounds the important issue of how corporations make the decisions they make and why only certain role-holders are enfranchised. In this essay, I begin the process of resurrecting the memory of the semi-sovereign corporation. By examining the history of early corporations in the early colonial enterprises, I focus on the historical connection, now lost, between our business corporations and our municipal, governmental, ones

Calibration of neural networks using genetic algorithms, with application to optimal path planning

Genetic algorithms (GA) are used to search the synaptic weight space of artificial neural systems (ANS) for weight vectors that optimize some network performance function. GAs do not suffer from some of the architectural constraints involved with other techniques and it is straightforward to incorporate terms into the performance function concerning the metastructure of the ANS. Hence GAs offer a remarkably general approach to calibrating ANS. GAs are applied to the problem of calibrating an ANS that finds optimal paths over a given surface. This problem involves training an ANS on a relatively small set of paths and then examining whether the calibrated ANS is able to find good paths between arbitrary start and end points on the surface

Are Shareholders Entitled to the Residual?

Everyone knows that shareholders are entitled to the residual returns of a public corporation. Everyone is wrong. Using the familiar economic model of the firm, I show that shareholders have no special claim on a corporation’s economic returns. No one has an entitlement to economic rents in a capitalist system. Shareholders, the purely fungible providers of a purely fungible commodity, are particularly unlikely to be able to command a share of economic profits. Indeed, since the contribution of shareholders to the firm is a sunk cost, in a competitive market shareholders are unlikely to earn any return at all. Accordingly, market-based analyses of the firm should conclude that shareholder returns result from a market distortion. The implications are clear: shareholders win much of the corporate surplus not by market right or moral entitlement, but due to a (possibly temporary) ideological victory in a political battle over economic rents. Surprisingly, since corporate law often assumes a conflict between shareholders and top management, shareholder gains are more likely the result of the usefulness of the share-centered ideologies in justifying a tremendous shift of corporate wealth from employees to an alliance of top managers and shareholders. Standard accounts conceal the struggles over corporate surplus and the weakness of shareholder claims to appropriate it. Taking the political nature of the corporation seriously, in contrast, will lead to a series of new and important questions. Why should only one side in a political conflict have the vote, and why should a democracy allocate votes per dollar instead of per person

Person, State, or Not: The Place of Business Corporations in Our Constitutional Order

Business corporations are critical institutions in our democratic republican, market-based, economic order. The United States Constitution, however, is completely silent as to their status in our system. The Supreme Court has filled this silence by repeatedly granting corporations rights against the citizenry and its elected representatives. Instead, we ought to view business corporations, like municipal corporations, as governance structures created by We the People to promote our general Welfare. On this social contract view, corporations should have the constitutional rights specified in the text: none. Instead, we should be debating which rights of citizens against governmental agencies should also apply to these state-like governance institutions

Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy

Ordinary corporate law invests enormous authority in corporate leaders, largely without accountability either to those they govern or to the judiciary, in defiance of much of what we know about effective governance procedure. Instead, we rely on the markets in which the corporation participates as the primary check on incumbent officials. Regardless of whether relying on markets is sufficient in the ordinary course, corporate insolvency is the markets’ verdict that incumbent management has failed. Accordingly, in bankruptcy and insolvency more generally, the law ought to abandon its ordinary deference to the corporate powers that be and instead impose standard good governance rules. Failed incumbents should be replaced and those governed should have political voice, not merely market exit rights

Introduction to the Metaphors of Corporate Law

Corporate law is commonly viewed as merely an aspect of property, contract, or agency law. The corporation, in turn, is variously described as a thing to be owned, a moment in the market consisting of continuously renegotiated arms-length contracts between equals, an agency relationship characterized by the one-sided fiduciary duty of agent to principal, a formal device for distributing risk among investors, or even an individual in its own right. These metaphors contradict each other in many respects. However, each portrays corporations as private, individualized, egalitarian, and market-like, while hiding their organizational, institutional, political, and power distributing aspects. The metaphors drive current interpretations of the law but remain in strong conflict with it, in part because corporate law historically stemmed from explicitly political conceptions. Although corporations are powerful governance and economic institutions, our corporate law metaphors have taught us to ignore the group and institutional characteristics of corporations and to treat them as powerless and passive players in the markets