Context-Dependent Biodiversity Conservation Management Regimes: Theory and Simulations

WP 2003-14 September 2003Ecosystem degradation has motivated a search for successful conservation approaches. The perceived failure of state-directed protected areas in the tropics has prompted experimentation with community management and co-management strategies. Numerous case studies suggest that none of these are effective universally. There exists, however, little analytical or empirical work to identify under what conditions one arrangement will be more effective than another. This paper develops a model of state-dependent equilibrium conservation management design that identifies the comparative advantage of different managers, in the interest of appropriately locating authority for conservation tasks as a function of prevailing biophysical, economic, and sociopolitical conditions

Incentive-based approaches in marine conservation: Applications for sea turtles

Conservation practitioners are increasingly turning to incentive-based approaches to encourage local resource users to change behaviors that impact biodiversity and natural habitat. We assess the design and performance of marine conservation interventions with varying types of incentives through an analysis of case studies from around the world. Here we focus on seven examples that are particularly relevant to designing incentives for sea turtle conservation. Four of the cases are focused on sea turtle conservation, and the others contain elements that may be applied to turtle projects. Many more opportunities exist for interventions that combine the strengths of these approaches, such as performance-based agreements that provide funds for education or alternative livelihood development, and leasing fishing rights to reduce bycatch

Locating Tropical Biodiversity Conservation Amid Weak Institutions

WP 1999-21 June 1999This paper addresses the broad question ofwhere to locate authority for tropical biodiversity conservation considering: (1) community-based natural research management (CBNRM) overreaches the indisputable place of local communities in tropical conservation efforts; (2) the most promise for tropical conservation and development is offered by multiple layers of nested institutions; (3) the greatest challenge for implementation of multiple layer designs is weakness at all levels of existing tropical institutions; and (4) rehabilitating such institutions, facilitating ongoing coordination among them, and introducing new and appropriate institutional designs will require significant international and national policy reorientation and greater commitment of financial and technical assistance

Context-Dependent Biodiversity Conservation Management Regimes: Theory and Simulation

Ecosystem degradation hasmotivated a search for successful conservation approaches. The perceived failure of state-directed protected areas in the tropics has prompted experimentation with community management and co-management strategies. Numerous case studies suggest that none of these are effective universally. There exists, however, little analytical or empirical work to identify under what conditions one arrangement will be more effective than another. This paper develops a model of statedependent, equilibrium conservation management design that identifies the comparative advantage of different managers, in the interest of appropriately locating authority for conservation tasks as a function of prevailing biophysical, economic, and sociopolitical conditions.

Locating Tropical Biodiversity Conservation Amid Weak Institutions

This paper addresses the broad question ofwhere to locate authority for tropical biodiversity conservation considering: (1) community-based natural research management (CBNRM) overreaches the indisputable place of local communities in tropical conservation efforts; (2) the most promise for tropical conservation and development is offered by multiple layers of nested institutions; (3) the greatest challenge for implementation of multiple layer designs is weakness at all levels of existing tropical institutions; and (4) rehabilitating such institutions, facilitating ongoing coordination among them, and introducing new and appropriate institutional designs will require significant international and national policy reorientation and greater commitment of financial and technical assistance

Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring

Abstract This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resources. Key elements of these agreements are (1) they are ongoing arrangements between a local community and an outside party, typically a nongovernmental organization (NGO); (2) they feature payments in exchange for conservation services; (3) the prospects for success depend on the NGO engaging in costly monitoring to detect whether the community is foregoing short-term gains to protect the resource; (4) lacking a strong external enforcement system, they rely on self-enforcement; and (5) the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate at any time. A repeated-game model is developed and utilized to organize an evaluation of real conservation agreements, using three case studies as representative examples. (JEL D74, D86, Q20, Q56