A Collaborative Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Prediction Problems

Machine Learning competitions such as the Netflix Prize have proven reasonably successful as a method of "crowdsourcing" prediction tasks. But these competitions have a number of weaknesses, particularly in the incentive structure they create for the participants. We propose a new approach, called a Crowdsourced Learning Mechanism, in which participants collaboratively "learn" a hypothesis for a given prediction task. The approach draws heavily from the concept of a prediction market, where traders bet on the likelihood of a future event. In our framework, the mechanism continues to publish the current hypothesis, and participants can modify this hypothesis by wagering on an update. The critical incentive property is that a participant will profit an amount that scales according to how much her update improves performance on a released test set.Comment: Full version of the extended abstract which appeared in NIPS 201

Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money

Recent work shows that we can use partial verification instead of money to implement truthful mechanisms. In this paper we develop tools to answer the following question. Given an allocation rule that can be made truthful with payments, what is the minimal verification needed to make it truthful without them? Our techniques leverage the geometric relationship between the type space and the set of possible allocations.Comment: Extended Version of 'Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money', AAAI 201

Information Aggregation in Exponential Family Markets

We consider the design of prediction market mechanisms known as automated market makers. We show that we can design these mechanisms via the mold of \emph{exponential family distributions}, a popular and well-studied probability distribution template used in statistics. We give a full development of this relationship and explore a range of benefits. We draw connections between the information aggregation of market prices and the belief aggregation of learning agents that rely on exponential family distributions. We develop a very natural analysis of the market behavior as well as the price equilibrium under the assumption that the traders exhibit risk aversion according to exponential utility. We also consider similar aspects under alternative models, such as when traders are budget constrained