15 research outputs found
Structural Learning of Attack Vectors for Generating Mutated XSS Attacks
Web applications suffer from cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks that
resulting from incomplete or incorrect input sanitization. Learning the
structure of attack vectors could enrich the variety of manifestations in
generated XSS attacks. In this study, we focus on generating more threatening
XSS attacks for the state-of-the-art detection approaches that can find
potential XSS vulnerabilities in Web applications, and propose a mechanism for
structural learning of attack vectors with the aim of generating mutated XSS
attacks in a fully automatic way. Mutated XSS attack generation depends on the
analysis of attack vectors and the structural learning mechanism. For the
kernel of the learning mechanism, we use a Hidden Markov model (HMM) as the
structure of the attack vector model to capture the implicit manner of the
attack vector, and this manner is benefited from the syntax meanings that are
labeled by the proposed tokenizing mechanism. Bayes theorem is used to
determine the number of hidden states in the model for generalizing the
structure model. The paper has the contributions as following: (1)
automatically learn the structure of attack vectors from practical data
analysis to modeling a structure model of attack vectors, (2) mimic the manners
and the elements of attack vectors to extend the ability of testing tool for
identifying XSS vulnerabilities, (3) be helpful to verify the flaws of
blacklist sanitization procedures of Web applications. We evaluated the
proposed mechanism by Burp Intruder with a dataset collected from public XSS
archives. The results show that mutated XSS attack generation can identify
potential vulnerabilities.Comment: In Proceedings TAV-WEB 2010, arXiv:1009.330
Improving the Efficiency and Robustness of Intrusion Detection Systems
With the increase in the complexity of computer systems, existing security measures are not enough to prevent attacks. Intrusion detection systems have become an integral part of computer security to detect attempted intrusions. Intrusion detection systems need to be fast in order to detect intrusions in real time. Furthermore, intrusion detection systems need to be robust against the attacks which are disguised to evade them.
We improve the runtime complexity and space requirements of a host-based anomaly detection system that uses q-gram matching. q-gram matching is often used for approximate substring matching problems in a wide range of application areas, including intrusion detection. During the text pre-processing phase, we store all the q-grams present in the text in a tree. We use a tree redundancy pruning algorithm to reduce the size of the tree without losing any information. We also use suffix links for fast linear-time q-gram search during query matching. We compare our work with the Rabin-Karp based hash-table technique, commonly used for multiple q-gram matching.
To analyze the robustness of network anomaly detection systems, we develop a new class of polymorphic attacks called polymorphic blending attacks, that can effectively evade payload-based network anomaly IDSs by carefully matching the statistics of the mutated attack instances to the normal profile. Using PAYL anomaly detection system for our case study, we show that these attacks are practically feasible. We develop a formal framework which is used to analyze polymorphic blending attacks for several network anomaly detection systems. We show that generating an optimal polymorphic blending attack is NP-hard for these anomaly detection systems. However, we can generate polymorphic blending attacks using the proposed approximation algorithms. The framework can also be used to improve the robustness of an intrusion detector. We suggest some possible countermeasures one can take to improve the robustness of an intrusion detection system against polymorphic blending attacks.Ph.D.Committee Chair: Lee, Wenke; Committee Member: Ahamad, Mustaque; Committee Member: Blough, Doug; Committee Member: Feamster, Nick; Committee Member: Venkateswaran, Harihara
DSO: Dependable Signing Overlay
Abstract. Dependable digital signing service requires both high fault-tolerance and high intrusion-tolerance. While providing high fault-tolerance, existing approaches do not satisfy the high intrusion-tolerance requirement in the face of availability, confidentiality and integrity attacks. In this paper, we propose Dependable Signing Overlay (DSO), a novel server architecture that can provide high intrusion-tolerance as well as high fault-tolerance. The key idea is: replicate the key shares and make the signing servers anonymous to clients (and thus also to the would-be attackers), in addition to using threshold signing. DSO utilizes structured P2P overlay routing techniques to provide timely services to legitimate clients. DSO is intended to be a scalable infrastructure for dependable digital signing service. This paper presents the architecture and protocols of DSO, and the analytical models for reliability and security analysis. We show that, compared with existing techniques, DSO has much better intrusion-tolerance under availability, confidentiality and integrity attacks
An Information-Theoretic Measure of Intrusion Detection Capability
A fundamental problem in intrusion detection is what metric(s) can be used to objectively evaluate an
intrusion detection system (IDS) in terms of its ability to correctly classify events as normal or intrusion. In
this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of existing metrics. We argue that the lack of a single unified
metric makes it difficult to fine tune and evaluate an IDS. The intrusion detection process can be examined
from an information-theoretic point of view. Intuitively, we should have less uncertainty about the input
(event data) given the IDS output (alarm data). We thus propose a new metric called Intrusion Detection
Capability, C[subscript ID], which is simply the ratio of the mutual information between IDS input and output, and the
entropy of the input. C[subscript ID] has the desired property that: (1) it takes into account all the important aspects
of detection capability naturally, i.e., true positive rate, false positive rate, positive predictive value, negative
predictive value, and base rate; (2) it objectively provide an intrinsic measure of intrusion detection capability;
(3) it is sensitive to IDS operation parameters. We propose that C[subscript ID] is the appropriate performance measure
to maximize when fine tuning an IDS. The thus obtained operation point is the best that can be achieved by the
IDS in terms of its intrinsic ability to classify input data. We use numerical examples as well as experiments
of actual IDSs on various datasets to show that using C[subscript ID], we can choose the best (optimal) operating point
for an IDS, and can objectively compare different IDSs
Misleading worm signature generators using deliberate noise injection
Several syntactic-based automatic worm signature generators, e.g., Polygraph, have recently been proposed. These systems typically assume that a set of suspicious flows are provided by a flow classifier, e.g., a honeynet or an intrusion detection system, that often introduces “noise ” due to difficulties and imprecision in flow classification. The algorithms for extracting the worm signatures from the flow data are designed to cope with the noise. It has been reported that these systems can handle a fairly high noise level, e.g., 80 % for Polygraph. In this paper, we show that if noise is introduced deliberately to mislead a worm signature generator, a much lower noise level, e.g., 50%, can already prevent the system from reliably generating useful worm signatures. Using Polygraph as a case study, we describe a new and general class of attacks whereby a worm can combine polymorphism and misleading behavior to intentionally pollute the dataset of suspicious flows during its propagation and successfully mislead the automatic signature generation process. This study suggests that unless an accurate and robust flow classification process is in place, automatic syntactic-based signature generators are vulnerable to such noise injection attacks.
A Context-Aware Security Architecture for Emerging Applications £
We describe an approach to building security services for context-aware environments. Specifically, we focus on the design of security services that incorporate the use of security-relevant “context ” to provide flexible access control and policy enforcement. We previously presented a generalized access control model that makes significant use of contextual information in policy definition. This document provides a concrete realization of such a model by presenting a system-level service architecture, as well as early implementation experience with the framework. Through our context-aware security services, our system architecture offers enhanced authentication services, more flexible access control and a security subsystem that can adapt itself based on current conditions in the environment. We discuss our architecture and implementation and show how it can be used to secure several sample applications.
Polymorphic blending attacks
A very effective means to evade signature-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) is to employ polymorphic techniques to generate attack instances that do not share a fixed signature. Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems provide good defense because existing polymorphic techniques can make the attack instances look different from each other, but cannot make them look like normal. In this paper we introduce a new class of polymorphic attacks, called polymorphic blending attacks, that can effectively evade byte frequencybased network anomaly IDS by carefully matching the statistics of the mutated attack instances to the normal profiles. The proposed polymorphic blending attacks can be viewed as a subclass of the mimicry attacks. We take a systematic approach to the problem and formally describe the algorithms and steps required to carry out such attacks. We not only show that such attacks are feasible but also analyze the hardness of evasion under different circumstances. We present detailed techniques usingPAYL, a byte frequency-based anomaly IDS, as a case study and demonstrate that these attacks are indeed feasible. We also provide some insight into possible countermeasures that can be used as defense.