Industrial Revolutions and Consumption: A Common Model to the Various Periods of Industrialization

What was the role of consumption structure evolution in the industrialization phases of the Western world since the 18th century? To answer this question, we first ask the économical ad historical literature. We detify the main phases of consumption structure evolution and establish a plausible link between consumption structure evolutions and industrial revolutions. In particular, we show that an industrial revolution starts with a "smithian growth process",which is demand driven, and a "schumpeterian growth process" which is supply driven, one the new techniques adopted. We then model the role of consumption habits evolution in the schumpeterian growth process. Finally, we show that consumption habits evolutions can be endogenously explained if we introduce, in an original way, the concept of "commercial revolution", which appears to be mainly linked to schumpeterian growth processes.Industrial revolutions, history, consumption

Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future?

This paper addresses the question of what options are available to regulate the sector in the near future. In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the problem of investment and innovation in an ex ante regulated sector. Relying on existing literature, we argue that ex ante regulation could represent a danger for the long-term development of the sector by delaying or cancelling investment projects, especially (but not only) concerning the construction of new infrastructures. We also argue that ex ante regulation is distorting investment itself: incremental investment is privileged as opposed to radical investment. In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation in the near future: 1) continuing ex ante regulation, 2) substituting ex post regulation for ex ante regulation and 3) implementing an industrial policy for macro-strategic reasons. After describing a few major mutations in the sector that must be taken into account by regulators and presenting the major dilemmas that the latter are facing, we propose two possible solutions inspired by foreign policy. The first solution consists of offering investors regulation holidays, with regular reviews to deem whether these holidays should be prolonged or not. The second solution consists of implementing an industrial policy that could take the form of a contract negotiated between the regulator and operators. This would guarantee the absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in terms of regional planning, price, quality of service, types of investment…) are met.regulation; innovation; investment and industrial policy

Innovation, nature of investment and divergent growth paths: an explanatory model

The principle of conditional convergence, in growth theory, fails to explain growth paths that are durably divergent among countries having similar structural characteristics (same rates of investment, of capitaldepreciation, of demographic growth, and similar access to technologies and resources...). Our research models the reasons of these divergencesby making the assumption that the nature of technical progress is not the same one according to the type of investment that is realized. We first deduce from this assumption relations between investment, production and employment. Then, by introducing the optimizing behavior of the firms, we show the existence of two balanced and durable growth regimes. The "fast growth regime" is characterized by the importancegiven to the capacity investments (and thus to product innovation). The "slow growth regime" is characterized by the importance given to process investments. The nature of investments thus constitutes a crucial conditition of convergence of the economies.Growth, consumption, investment, growth paths

Innovation, investment and regulation : What are the options for regulation in the near future ?.

This paper addresses the question of what options are available to regulate the sector in the near future. In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the problem of investment and innovation in an ex ante regulated sector. Relying on existing literature, we argue that ex ante regulation could represent a danger for the long-term development of the sector by delaying or cancelling investment projects, especially (but not only) concerning the construction of new infrastructures. We also argue that ex ante regulation is distorting investment itself: incremental investment is privileged as opposed to radical investment. In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation in the near future: 1) continuing ex ante regulation, 2) substituting ex post regulation for ex ante regulation and 3) implementing an industrial policy for macro-strategic reasons. After describing a few major mutations in the sector that must be taken into account by regulators and presenting the major dilemmas that the latter are facing, we propose two possible solutions inspired by foreign policy. The first solution consists of offering investors regulation holidays, with regular reviews to deem whether these holidays should be prolonged or not. The second solution consists of implementing an industrial policy that could take the form of a contract negotiated between the regulator and operators. This would guarantee the absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in terms of regional planning, price, quality of service, types of investment…) are met.Industrial Policy; Investment; Innovation; Regulation;

Modeling tuition fees in presence of social heterogeneity

International audienceTuition fees have been spreading through developed countries in the last decade. Beyond the obvious interest of funding universities, it is advocated that they could serve as a tool to select students. According to some recent models, in presence of asymmetric and imperfect information on the candidates' capacities, tuition should be the only selection device, at the expense of tests. Following Bourdieu's seminal work on higher education, we consider that powerful sociologic mechanisms induce social reproduction. These effects must be taken into account to understand the behaviour of potential students. In particular, candidates from lower social groups may underestimate their capacities. Therefore, we introduce heterogeneity in potential students' private evaluation of their own capacities. As a result, we obtain that tuition fees do not lead to social optimum, because talented member discard themselves. This effect gets only stronger as entrance tests are abandoned. Nevertheless, we do not recommend strong selecting tests, since the same sociologic mechanisms negatively biased the results of applicants from lower social groups

Tuition fees, self-esteem and social heterogeneity

International audienceModelling students' behaviour in relation to tuition fees is a complex task since students' "talent" is not common knowledge. Students observe a private noisy signal of their abilities, while university receives noisy information based on the quantitative and qualitative data provided by university applicants. In this article, we add the heterogeneity of the population to this model: we assume that this heterogeneity means that the perception of skills among a part of the population is biased and underestimates the capabilities of its members to succeed in the higher education system. Our conclusions differ from those derived in the literature and show in particular that the optimal tuition fees for a given number of students are lower than those obtained for a homogeneous population

The Concept of Industry and How to Measure it: Origins, Limits and Perspectives. An Application to the Study of Industrial Changes

Are present categorisations suited to the analysis of industrial change? While the light shed by national statistics is undeniable, the construction of these categorisations does not make it possible to segment economic activity homogenously or to deduce from it an industrial framework on which to base analysis of recent developments. We first show that the historical bases for categorisations remain largely rooted in an historical reality, that of the industrial revolution, in which industry was particularly synonymous with technical progress and job creation. While profound technical and organisational changes have taken place over the last twenty and more years, the article underlines the importance of re-evaluating the industrial landscape. We suggest three approaches which correspond to three definitions and three fundamental questions for the economist. We empirically illustrate our approach, applying these definitions to the 1978-2003 period, and suggest avenues to explore in order to undertake further research in this area.Economic Methodology, Industrial Structure, Manufacturing Sector, Industrialization and Desindustrialization

Efficient tuition fees and examinations : A reply

Dans un récent article, Gary-Bobo et Trannoy (2008) avancent l'idée que, sous certaines conditions, les frais d'inscription à l'université peuvent être un élément socialement utile pour sélectionner les étudiants à l'entrée de l'université. Les conditions définies dans leur article sont essentiellement l'existence d'informations imparfaites et asymétriques (informations “bruitées” des étudiants sur leur talent et des universités sur le talent des étudiants) et l'absence de contraintes sur le marché financier (afin de “garantir” aux bons étudiants issus de milieux modestes d'être en mesure d'emprunter la somme nécessaire à leurs études, somme qu'ils rembourseront une fois entrés dans la vie active). L'imperfection et l'asymétrie d'information conduiraient à un phénomène d'opportunisme ex ante (anti-sélection) que des frais de scolarité suffisamment élevés permettraient de combattre (en décourageant les étudiants “ trop mauvais ” d'intégrer l'enseignement supérieur). Leur article repose néanmoins sur une hypothèse consistant à modéliser une population indépendamment du milieu social d'origine. En appuyant notre recherche sur des travaux sociologiques et économiques, nous soulignons, au contraire, qu'une sous-estimation, par les individus issus de classes sociales défavorisées, de leurs capacités, apparaît plus réaliste. La prise en compte de cette hypothèse nous permet alors de montrer que les frais de scolarité doivent être relativement faibles, même en l'absence de contraintes de crédit (afin de ne pas exclure ces populations du système universitaire). Nous proposons enfin une discussion critique des autres raisons généralement avancées en faveur d'un accroissement des frais de scolarité et dégageons des perspectives de recherche.

Régime par répartition dans l'enseignement supérieur : fondements théoriques et estimations empiriques

Après avoir rappelé qu'un régime par capitalisation ne garantissait ni équité, ni efficience, ni même le financement de l'enseignement supérieur, nous définissons ce que pourrait être un régime d'éducation par répartition et discuté de ses atouts et limites, pour construire une approche théorique du concept. Une éducation par répartition conjugue la gratuité de l'accès, une allocation universelle d'autonomie et un accroissement des dépenses publiques destinés à l'université (jusqu'à un niveau jugé raisonnable pour que celle-ci puisse mener à bien ses missions). Nous montrons qu'un tel régime peut se révéler équitable et efficace pour financer le système éducatif et discutons des conditions permettant à un tel système d'être efficient. Nous montrons également qu'il permet de limiter les mécanismes de polarisation au sein de l'enseignement supérieur. Nous chiffrons alors le coût du régime par répartition (en année pleine: 5 milliards d'euros pour accroître les besoins de financement des universités et 19 milliards d'euros pour l'allocation d'autonomie), proposons des modalités de financement et analysons l'impact de ce régime sur les revenus de foyers types. Nous concluons en présentant les limites et perspectives de recherche

Contributory education scheme : theoretical basis and application

International audienceAfter a short criticism of the "self-funded education scheme" which is widely implemented in the world and often based on tuition fees, this article develops theoretical basis for a "contributory education scheme". This model is characterised 1) by a universal access for students to grants allowing them to take charge of themselves during their higher education curriculum; and 2) by a funding regime relying in particular on the population that has benefited from grants, once studies are finished. The article first points out the limits of the self-funded education scheme. Then, it discusses the analogies and differences with pension systems implemented in countries like France. We derive theoretical motivations in favour of a contributory education scheme: The equity of access to higher education, the incentives for students and university to be efficient, as well as the contributory equity are discussed. The article proposes finally to assess, for France, the cost and the options concerning the transformation of the tax system that would be needed for funding such a reform. Beyond the individual income, variables like the degree obtained by the student are taken into account in our assessment. The conclusion draws research perspectives concerning the theoretical dimensions and the transition such a reform concretely implies