Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies

In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence of effective public norm enforcement.norm enforcement, public goods, institutions, sanctioning

Between Agora and Shopping Mall

Advertisements provide consumers with knowledge about private products, whereas political information is required to provide voters with knowledge of public issues. Modern information technologies and globalization are increasing the exposure of individuals to information. Goods advertising is competing with political information for people's attention. This paper presents a politico-economic equilibrium model in which the tension between private and public agendas can be analysed. It is shown that in an information-rich society, international goods market integration tends to reduce the quality of public policy. Complementing economic integration with political integration can increase the gains from globalisation, though not in all cases.globalisation, agenda-setting, information-rich societies, scarcity of attention, advertising

A welfare analysis of "junk" information and spam filters

This paper analyses the equilibrium effects of individual information filters. Information is modelled as advertisements which are distributed across a population of consumers with heterogeneous preferences. An advertisement that provides knowledge about a product with little or no utility for a consumer is considered junk. Filters are characterised by their level of tolerance. The quality of the filter is measured in terms of the share of useful items in the total set of items passing the filter. It is shown that in conditions of decentralised competition, multiple equilibria arise. A social optimum can be achieved by demanding each consumer to reject a certain percentage of advertisements, leaving the choice of what is rejected up to the consumer him/herself.global information society, advertising, junk information, spam filter, Internet regulation

Attention Economies

Attracting attention is a basic feature of economic life but no standard economic problem. A new theoretical model is developed which describes the general structure of competition for attention and characterizes equilibria. The exogenous fundamentals of an attention economy are the space of receiving subjects with their attention capacity, and the potential set of competing companies (senders) with their radiation technologies. The endogenous variables explained by the theory are equilibrium audiences (the clients belonging to a company), their signal exposure and attention, and the diversity of senders surviving the contest for attention. Application of the equilibrium analysis to changes in information technologies and globalisation suggests that international integration or range-increasing technical progress may decrease global diversity. Local diversity, perceived by the individual receivers, may increase nonetheless.

Between Agora and Shopping Mall

Advertisements provide consumers with knowledge about private products, whereas political information is required to provide voters with knowledge of public issues. Modern information technologies and globalisation are increasing the exposure of individuals to information. Goods advertising is competing with political information for people's attention. This paper presents a politico-economic equilibrium model in which the tension between private and public agendas can be analysed. It is shown that in an information-rich society, international goods market integration tends to reduce the quality of public policy. Complementing economic integration with political integration can increase the gains from globalisation, though not in all cases.Globalisation, agenda-setting, information-rich societies, scarcity of attention, advertising

Distribution and Use of Knowledge under the “Laws of the Web”

Empirical evidence shows that the perception of information is strongly concentrated in those environments in which a mass of producers and users of knowledge interact through a distribution medium. This paper considers the consequences of this fact for economic equilibrium analysis. In particular, it examines how the ranking schemes applied by the distribution technology affect the use of knowledge, and it then describes the characteristics of an optimal ranking scheme. The analysis is carried out using a model in which agents’ productivity is based on the stock of knowledge used. The value of a piece of information is assessed in terms of its contribution to productivity.global rankings, information and internet services, limited attention, diversity, knowledge society

Work Organization, Wage Pressure in the Secondary Labor Market, and the Green Card

Two trends have marked the politico-economic discussion in many industrialized countries in recent years. On the one hand, international production, workplace decentralization, shareholder orientation and generous manager remuneration have changed the face of firms in the primary economy. On the other hand, there is increased pressure on the secondary labor market revealed by unemployment or declining wages of low-skilled workers. This paper establishes a causal relationship between the two trends by developing a model in which labor market segmentation stems from the fact that organizational labor (management) is a key element in the primary, but not in the secondary economy. We also evaluate the effectiveness of selective immigration policies for high-skilled workers (green card).Dual labor market; reorganization of work, organizational labor, international competition, green card

The Role of Public Infrastructure for Firm Location and International Outsourcing

This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade agreement (FTA). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view. It is shown when coordination of competitive location policies is useful and when it is not.international outsourcing, firm location, public infrastructure, welfare effects

Institutions and Development: The Interaction between Trade Regime and Political System

This paper argues that openness to goods trade in combination with an unequal distribution of political power has been a major determinant of the comparatively slow development of resource- or land-abundant regions like South America and the Caribbean in the nineteenth century. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model with a tax-financed public sector, and show that in a feudal society (dominated by landed elites) productivity-enhancing public investments like the provision of schooling are typically lower in an open than in a closed economy. Moreover, we find that, under openness to trade, development is faster in a democratic system. We also endogenize the trade regime and demonstrate that, in political equilibrium, a land-abundant and landowner-dominated economy supports openness to trade. Finally, we discuss empirical evidence which strongly supports our basic hypotheses.economic development, institutions, political system, public education, trade

A Complete Characterization of the Distributional Effects of International Outsourcing in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model

This paper determines the distributional effects of internationaloutsourcing in a two sector Heckscher-Ohlin type model. It isshown that the factor-biased and the sector-biased impact ofinternational outsourcing discussed in the literature can be seenas special cases of the more general characterization presented inthis paper. Concerning the welfare implications of internationaloutsourcing, the main finding is that a Pareto-improvement cannotbe excluded from a theoretical point of view.international outsourcing, general equilibrium analysis,distributional effects, welfare effects.