The Civil War Letters of Jeremiah Mickly of Franklin Township, Adams County

On December 2, 1862, just eleven days before the Battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia, Jeremiah Mickly said goodbye to his wife and two children and reported for duty with the 177th Pennsylvania Infantry to become a Civil War chaplain. The only known photograph ofMickly shows him dressed in the standard chaplain\u27s uniform of the day: a plain black frock coat with a standing collar and black buttons with plain black pantaloons. Like many other Civil War soldiers, Mickly re-enlisted for service after his stint with the 177th ended, becoming chaplain of the 43rd Regiment, United States Colored Troops. Impressed with the educational progress and courage of the black soldiers he served with, Mickly wrote a history of the 43rd Regiment. The 88-page booklet was published in 1866 in Gettysburg by J. E. Wible, Printer. Mickly\u27s book and correspondence prove that his Civil War experience shaped his belief that black people are entitled to equal rights. [excerpt

Polymorphic Types in ACL2

This paper describes a tool suite for the ACL2 programming language which incorporates certain ideas from the Hindley-Milner paradigm of functional programming (as exemplified in popular languages like ML and Haskell), including a "typed" style of programming with the ability to define polymorphic types. These ideas are introduced via macros into the language of ACL2, taking advantage of ACL2's guard-checking mechanism to perform type checking on both function definitions and theorems. Finally, we discuss how these macros were used to implement features of Specware, a software specification and implementation system.Comment: In Proceedings ACL2 2014, arXiv:1406.123

The optimal search for an astrophysical gravitational-wave background

Roughly every 2-10 minutes, a pair of stellar mass black holes merge somewhere in the Universe. A small fraction of these mergers are detected as individually resolvable gravitational-wave events by advanced detectors such as LIGO and Virgo. The rest contribute to a stochastic background. We derive the statistically optimal search strategy for a background of unresolved binaries. Our method applies Bayesian parameter estimation to all available data. Using Monte Carlo simulations, we demonstrate that the search is both "safe" and effective: it is not fooled by instrumental artefacts such as glitches, and it recovers simulated stochastic signals without bias. Given realistic assumptions, we estimate that the search can detect the binary black hole background with about one day of design sensitivity data versus $\approx 40$ months using the traditional cross-correlation search. This framework independently constrains the merger rate and black hole mass distribution, breaking a degeneracy present in the cross-correlation approach. The search provides a unified framework for population studies of compact binaries, which is cast in terms of hyper-parameter estimation. We discuss a number of extensions and generalizations including: application to other sources (such as binary neutron stars and continuous-wave sources), simultaneous estimation of a continuous Gaussian background, and applications to pulsar timing.Comment: 16 pages, 9 figure

Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.Strategic market games, Clearinghouses, Credit evaluation, Default

Strategic Freedom, Constraint, and Symmetry in One-period Markets with Cash and Credit Payment

In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these "strategic market games" well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Strategic market games, Clearinghouses, Credit evaluation, Default

Commodity Money and the Valuation of Trade

In a previous essay we modeled the enforcement of contract, and through it the provision of money and markets, as a production function within the society, the scale of which is optimized endogenously by labor allocation away from primary production of goods. Government and a central bank provided fiat money and enforced repayment of loans, giving fiat a predictable value in trade, and also rationalizing the allocation of labor to government service, in return for a fiat salary. Here, for comparison, we consider the same trade problem without government or fiat money, using instead a durable good (gold) as a commodity money between the time it is produced and the time it is removed by manufacture to yield utilitarian services. We compare the monetary value of the two money systems themselves, by introducing a natural money-metric social welfare function. Because labor allocation both to production and potentially to government of the economy is endogenous, the only constraint in the society is its population, so that the natural money-metric is labor. Money systems, whether fiat or commodity, are valued in units of the labor that would produce an equivalent utility gain among competitive equilibria, if it were added to the primary production capacity of the society.Bureaucracy, Contract enforcement, Taxes, Money

Price distributions and competition

Considerable evidence demonstrates that significant dispersion exists in the prices charged for seemingly homogeneous goods. This paper adopts a simple, flexible equilibrium model of search to investigate the way the market structure influences price dispersion. Using the noisy search approach, the paper demonstrates the effects of having a single large, price-leading firm with multiple outlets and a competitive fringe of small firms with one retail outlet each.

Fiat Money and the Natural Scale of Government

The competitive market structure of a decentralized economy is converted into a self-policing system treating the bureaucracy and enforcement of the legal system endogenously. In particular we consider money systems as constructs to make agents' economic strategies predictable from knowledge of their preferences and endowments, and thus to support coordinated resource production and distribution from independent decision making. Diverse rule systems can accomplish this, and we construct minimal strategic market games representing government-issued fiat money and ideal commodity money as two cases. We endogenize the provision of money and rules for its use as productive activities within the society, and consider the problem of transition from generalist to specialist production of subsistence goods as one requiring economic coordination under the support of a money system to be solved. The scarce resource in a society is labor limited by its ability to coordinate (specifically, calling for the expenditure of time and effort on communication, computation, and control), which must be diverted from primary production either to maintain coordinated group activity, or to provide the institutional services supporting decentralized trade. Social optima are solutions in which the reduced costs of individual decision making against rules (relative to maintenance of coalitions) are larger than the costs of the institutions providing the rules, and in which the costs of the institutions are less than the gains from the trade they enable to take place.Bureaucracy, Contract enforcement, Taxes, Money