The Geometry of Stimulus Control

Many studies, both in ethology and comparative psychology, have shown that animals react to modifications of familiar stimuli. This phenomenon is often referred to as generalisation. Most modifications lead to a decrease in responding, but to certain new stimuli an increase in responding is observed. This holds for both innate and learned behaviour. Here we propose a heuristic approach to stimulus control, or stimulus selection, with the aim of explaining these phenomena. The model has two key elements. First, we choose the receptor level as the fundamental stimulus space. Each stimulus is represented as the pattern of activation it induces in sense organs. Second, in this space we introduce a simple measure of `similarity' between stimuli by calculating how activation patterns overlap. The main advantage we recognise in this approach is that the generalisation of acquired responses emerges from a few simple principles which are grounded in the recognition of how animals actually perceive stimuli. Many traditional problems that face theories of stimulus control (e.g. the Spence-Hull theory of gradient interaction or ethological theories of stimulus summation) do not arise in the present framework. These problems include the amount of generalisation along different dimensions, peak-shift phenomena (with respect to both positive and negative shifts), intensity generalisation, and generalisation after conditioning on two positive stimuli

Artificial neural networks as models of stimulus control

We evaluate the ability of artificial neural network models (multi-layer perceptrons) to predict stimulus-­response relationships. A variety of empirical results are considered, such as generalization, peak-shift (supernormality) and stimulus intensity effects. The networks were trained on the same tasks as the animals in the considered experiments. The subsequent generalization tests on the networks showed that the model replicates correctly the empirical results. It is concluded that these models are valuable tools in the study of animal behaviour

Cultural evolution developing its own rules: The rise of conservatism and persuasion

In the human sciences, cultural evolution is often viewed as an autonomous process free of genetic influence. A question that follows is, If culture is not influenced by genes, can it take any path? Employing a simple mathematical model of cultural transmission in which individuals may copy each other's traits, we show that cultural evolution favors individuals who are weakly influenced by others and able to influence others. The model suggests that the cultural evolution of rules of cultural transmission tends to create populations that evolve rapidly toward conservatism, and that bias in cultural transmission may result purely from cultural dynamics. Freedom from genetic influence is not freedom to take any direction

Chickens prefer beautiful humans

We trained chickens to react to an average human female face but not to an average male face (or vice-versa). In a subsequent test, the animals showed preferences for faces consistent with human sexual preferences (obtained from university students). This suggests that human preferences arise from general properties of nervous systems, rather than from face-specific adaptations. We discuss this result in the light of current debate on the meaning of sexual signals, and suggest further tests of existing hypotheses about the origin of sexual preferences

Discrete conventional signalling of a continuous variable

In aggressive interactions, animals often use a discrete set of signals, while the properties being signalled are likely to be continuous, for example fighting ability or value of victory. Here we investigate a particular model of fighting which allows for conventional signalling of subjective resource value to occur. The result shows that neither perfect nor no signalling are evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in the model. Instead, we find ESSs in which partial information is communicated, with discrete displays signalling a range of values rather than a precise one. The result also indicates that communication should be more precise in conflicts over small resources. Signalling strategies can exist in fighting because of the common interest in avoiding injuries, but communication is likely to be limited because of the fundamental conflict over the resource. Our results reflect a compromise between these two factors. Data allowing for a thorough test of the model are lacking; however, existing data seem consistent with the obtained theoretical results

Spectacular pehnomena and limits to rationality in genetic and cultural evolution

In studies of both animal and human behaviour, game theory is used as a tool for understanding strategies that appear in interactions between individuals. Game theory focuses on adaptive behaviour, which can be attained only at evolutionary equilibrium. Here we suggest that behaviour appearing during interactions is often outside the scope of such analysis. In many types of interaction, conflicts of interest exist between players, fueling the evolution of manipulative strategies. Such strategies evolve out of equilibrium, commonly appearing as spectacular morphology or behaviour with obscure meaning, to which other players may react in non-adaptive, irrational way approach, and outline the conditions in which evolutionary equilibria cannot be maintained. Evidence from studies of biological interactions seems to support the view that behaviour is often not at equilibrium. This also appears to be the case for many human cultural traits, which have spread rapidly despite the fact that they have a negative influence on reproduction

The evolution of signal form: Effects of learned versus inherited recognition

Organisms can learn by individual experience to recognize relevant stimuli in the environment or they can genetically inherit this ability from their parents. Here, we ask how these two modes of acquisition affect signal evolution, focusing in particular on the exaggeration and cost of signals. We argue first, that faster learning by individual receivers cannot be a driving force for the evolution of exaggerated and costly signals unless signal senders are related or the same receiver and sender meet repeatedly. We argue instead that biases in receivers’ recognition mechanisms can promote the evolution of costly exaggeration in signals. We provide support for this hypothesis by simulating coevolution between senders and receivers, using artificial neural networks as a model of receivers’ recognition mechanisms. We analyse the joint effects of receiver biases, signal cost and mode of acquisition, investigating the circumstances under which learned recognition gives rise to more exaggerated signals than inherited recognition. We conclude the paper by discussing the relevance of our results to a number of biological scenarios

How training and testing histories affect generalization: a test of simple neural networks

We show that a simple network model of associative learning can\ud reproduce three findings that arise from particular training and\ud testing procedures in generalization experiments: the effect of 1)\ud ``errorless learning'' and 2) extinction testing on peak shift, and\ud 3) the central tendency effect. These findings provide a true test\ud of the network model, which was developed to account for other\ud penhomena, and highlight the potential of neural networks to study\ud phenomena that depend on sequences of experiences with many stimuli.\ud Our results suggest that at least some such phenomena, e.g.,\ud stimulus range effects, may derive from basic mechanisms of\ud associative memory rather than from more complex memory processes

Memory for Stimulus Sequences: a Divide between Humans and Other Animals?

Humans stand out among animals for their unique capacities in domains such as language, culture and imitation, yet it has been difficult to identify cognitive elements that are specifically human. Most research has focused on how information is processed after it is acquired, e.g. in problem solving or ‘insight’ tasks, but we may also look for species differences in the initial acquisition and coding of information. Here, we show that non-human species have only a limited capacity to discriminate ordered sequences of stimuli. Collating data from 108 experiments on stimulus sequence discrimination (1540 data points from 14 bird and mammal species), we demonstrate pervasive and systematic errors, such as confusing a red–green sequence of lights with green–red and green–green sequences. These errors can persist after thousands of learning trials in tasks that humans learn to near perfection within tens of trials. To elucidate the causes of such poor performance, we formulate and test a mathematical model of non-human sequence discrimination, assuming that animals represent sequences as unstructured collections of memory traces. This representation carries only approximate information about stimulus duration, recency, order and frequency, yet our model predicts non-human performance with a 5.9% mean absolute error across 68 datasets. Because human-level cognition requires more accurate encoding of sequential information than afforded by memory traces, we conclude that improved coding of sequential information is a key cognitiv

The Power of Associative Learning and The Ontogeny of Optimal Behaviour

Behaving efficiently (optimally or near-optimally) is central to animals’ adaptation to their environment. Much evolutionary biology assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that optimal behavioural strategies are genetically inherited, yet the behaviour of many animals depends crucially on learning. The question of how learning contributes to optimal behaviour is largely open. Here we propose an associative learning model that can learn optimal behaviour in a wide variety of ecologically relevant circumstances. The model learns through chaining, a term introduced by Skinner to indicate learning of behaviour sequences by linking together shorter sequences or single behaviours. Our model formalizes the concept of conditioned reinforcement (the learning process that underlies chaining) and is closely related to optimization algorithms from machine learning. Our analysis dispels the common belief that associative learning is too limited to produce ‘intelligent’ behaviour such as tool use, social learning, selfcontrol or expectations of the future. Furthermore, the model readily accounts for both instinctual and learned aspects of behaviour, clarifying how genetic evolution and individual learning complement each other, and bridging a long-standing divide between ethology and psychology. We conclude that associative learning, supported by genetic predispositions and including the oft-neglected phenomenon of conditioned reinforcement, may suffice to explain the ontogeny of optimal behaviour in most, if not all, non-human animals. Our results establish associative learning as a more powerful optimizing mechanism than acknowledged by current opinion