127 research outputs found

    Spontaneous traumatic macular hole closure in a 50-year-old woman: a case report

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    <p>Abstract</p> <p>Introduction</p> <p>Traumatic macular holes (TMH) are well-known complications of ocular contusion injury. Spontaneous closure occurs in approximately 50% of cases, but rarely after the age of thirty. We report a case of spontaneous closure of a full thickness macular hole due to a blunt trauma and we suggest possible mechanisms for this closure.</p> <p>Case presentation</p> <p>A 50-year-old Greek woman was referred with a history of reduced best-corrected visual acuity after blunt trauma to her right eye. Diagnosis was based on fundoscopic, optical coherence tomography as well as fluorescein angiography findings with follow-up visits at two days, 20 days and five months. Fundoscopy revealed a full-thickness TMH with a minor sub-retinal hemorrhage and posterior vitreous detachment. The presence of a coagulum in the TMH base was observed. Subsequently, TMH closure was observed.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The clot in the TMH base, potentially a hemorrhage by-product containing a significant quantity of platelets, may have simulated the clot observed after autologous serum use, thus facilitating a similar effect. This may have stimulated glial cell migration and proliferation, thus contributing to spontaneous hole closure.</p

    Reconstructing rational reconstructions: on Lakatos’s account on the relation between history and philosophy of science

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    In this paper, I argue that Imre Lakatos’s account on the relation between the history and the philosophy of science, if properly understood and also if properly modified, can be valuable for the philosophical comprehension of the relation between the history and the philosophy of science. The paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part, I provide a charitable exegesis of the Lakatosian conception of the history of science in order to show that Lakatos’s history cannot be a caricature. In the second part, I describe what I believe are the real problems of Lakatos’s account on a metaphysical and on a methodological level. In order to address these problems, I take advantage of the recent critique of the so-called “confrontation model”. Finally, in the third part, I suggest that a proper modification of Lakatos’s perspective can resolve the aforementioned problems without distorting Lakatos’s central aspiration, which is that the philosophical theories of scientific rationality can be assessed with the help of the history of science without losing their normative content. © 2020, Springer Nature B.V
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